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Language and Participation 
Cristina M. Rodriguezt 
In this piece, I tackle a current subject of popular controversy 
whether growing multilingualism in the United States imperils the future of 
American democracy. I offer a positive theory, centered on the value of 
democratic participation, of how a society like the United States should 
approach the multilingualism of its population. I conclude that embracing 
bilingualism in individuals and multilingualism in society is more likely to 
make linguistic pluralism socially functional and to sustain the vitality of 
public and social institutions than demanding public monolingualism. I 
begin by demonstrating that current approaches to language diversity in 
constitutional democracies, including our own, are largely remedial in na 
ture. They focus either on ensuring the survival of particular minority 
groups historically present and marginalized in a given nation-state, or on 
helping immigrants overcome language barriers as they assimilate into the 
dominant language of the society in question. On its own, this remedial 
conception cannot ensure that linguistic diversity complements, rather than 
undermines, democratic institutions, because it does not account for the 
variety of linguistic interests present in a multiethnic society. I then ad 
dress this limitation by offering an alternative, participatory theory of lan 
guage difference. I base my conception of participation on principles of 
decentralized decisionmaking. This focus requires considering how to ex 
pand the individual's associative options and improve access to the mid 
level social institutions where we live out most of our lives, such as the 
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workplace and the public schools. In accommodating speakers of multiple 
languages in a given institution, we should focus on promoting social in 
vestment by individuals and groups, as well as preserving individual con 
trol over matters of deeply personal concern, rather than on the survival of 
particular languages or cultures. In developing this framework, I draw 
from the experiences of other multilingual societies and legal systems, but I 
present the United States as a case study to explain what a participatory 
approach would look like in practice. I focus on the major sites of lan 
guage conflict in the United States- the political arena, the debate over 
official English, the workplace, and the public schools-and argue that a 
multilingual understanding of these sites and the legal rules that structure 
them best promotes participation. 
INTRODUCTION 
When speakers of different languages inhabit the same space, friction 
often results. In January 2005, for example, a child-court judge in 
Tennessee made headlines for ordering a number of non-English speaking 
women involved in custody or neglect disputes to take English language 
classes for "the good of their children."' In at least one case, the court ap 
parently threatened that failure to comply within six months would result in 
the termination of parental rights.2 In July, upon hearing a coach instruct a 
fourteen-year-old pitcher, in Spanish, to pick off a runner at second base, a 
Little League umpire in Massachusetts ruled that only English could be 
spoken for the remainder of the game.3 Though Little League officials re 
sponded to the subsequent protest by suggesting that the umpire had no 
malicious intent, the League nonetheless suspended the official for the re 
mainder of the tournament.4 In October, a co-op on the Lower East Side of 
Manhattan erupted in debate over the building's policy requiring all porters 
to speak only English while on the job.5 Upon learning of the policy, the 
tenants lit up the neighborhood's online message board with condemna 
tions, but the management corporation defended its policy on the grounds 
that it furthered public safety and communication.6 And, in December, the 
principal of a Kansas City public high school sent a sixteen year-old stu 
dent home for asking a classmate, in Spanish, to borrow a dollar.7 In the 
wake of the controversy that ensued, the school district rescinded the 
1. Natalia Mielczarek, Judge Tells Moms in Custody Cases to Learn English, Tennessean, Jan. 
29, 2005, at 1A, available at http://www.tennessean.com/local/archives/05/01/64800164.shtml. 
2. See id. 
3. See Associated Press, No More Games for Umpire Who Banned Spanish, July 29, 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/news/story?id=2119529. 
4. See id. 
5. See Richard Morgan, English Only, Por Favor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2005, ? 14, at 5. 
6. .See id. 
1. See T.R. Reid, Spanish at School Translates to Suspension, Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 2005, at A3. 
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suspension, but not before the school's principal had made clear that the 
student and others had been asked, prior to the incident, not to speak 
Spanish at school.8 
Each of these episodes reflects ambivalence about the propriety of 
communicating through languages other than English. Since its colonial 
beginnings, the United States has been a multilingual society, but this lin 
guistic diversity has long complicated our conceptions of American na 
tional identity. Rhetorical battles over linguistic identity are often fought at 
high levels of generality, through debates over whether English-the 
dominant language-should become the official language. But as these 
various episodes suggest, the debate also takes place on a local and every 
day basis in the commercial, communal, and familial spaces of this coun 
try. 
In recent years, language diversity has become a particularly salient 
and controversial feature of American demography, because dramatic rates 
of immigration are reshaping our social, political, and aesthetic environ 
ments.9 The foreign-born and their children now constitute approximately 
twenty percent of the U.S. population.10 These groups are "concentrated in 
a number of large states such as California, Florida, New York, Texas, and 
Illinois, magnifying the regional impacts of immigration."' New York 
City-a city of eight million people-is now home to almost three million 
foreign-born residents.12 Of that population, almost 43% arrived in the 
United States in the past ten years, and 46% of that population speaks a 
language other than English at home.13 In other, smaller cities, such as San 
8. See id. 
9. As a recent study of immigration and assimilation points out, the 2000 Census documents this 
wave. See Richard Alba & Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation 
and Contemporary Immigration 9 (2003). According to the study, 
[Immigrants'] presence has been dramatically visible in California, the nation's most 
populous state, where one in eight Americans resides. The state's robust population growth 
during the 1990s, almost 10 percent, was largely driven by the rapid increase in the Hispanic 
and Asian populations, which grew by 33 and 34 percent respectively.... The profundity and 
rapidity of California's demographic change are unlikely to be replicated on a large scale 
elsewhere in the United States in the near future; but in some other large states and 
metropolitan areas, nonwhites and Latinos have achieved a critical mass sufficient to exercise 
a strong, if not increasingly dominant, influence on regional developments." 
Id. The 2000 Census also reveals that one in five U.S. residents speaks a language other than English. 
In addition, it projects that, by 2044, a majority will speak a language other than English, though not 
necessarily to the exclusion of English. James Crawford, National Association for Bilingual Education, 
Making Sense of Census 2000 (2005), http://www.nabe.org/research/demography.html; see also Hyon 
B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English-Speaking Ability: 2000; Census 2000 Brief 
(2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf (presenting language data from the 2000 
U.S. Census). 
10. Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 8-9. 
11. /?at 9. 
12. New York City Department of Planning, The Newest New Yorkers 
2000: Immigrant New York in the New Millennium xi (2004) (executive summary available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/planning/nny). 
13. Id. at 1. 
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Antonio, Texas, the Latino population has climbed to sixty percent-a 
trend due, in large part, to recent immigration from Mexico and Central 
America.14 
Whereas the economic consequences of this immigration are often 
discussed,'5 the cultural consequences of these changing demographics re 
main undertheorized. But the cultural effects of immigration are palpable 
and must be understood clearly. One of the standard responses to the im 
migrant influx, repeated at various stages of American history, recently has 
found high-profile expression in Samuel Huntington's plea for the soul of 
America, in which he warns, "There is no Americano dream. There is only 
the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican 
Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in 
English."16 According to Huntington, American democracy now faces the 
possibility of its own unraveling, brought on by the failure of an unprece 
dented number of recent immigrants, mostly from Latin America, to as 
similate linguistically and culturally into an English-speaking mainstream. 
Whatever one thinks of Huntington's dire predictions, he broaches an im 
portant question-is there a relationship between linguistic diversity and 
the future of our democracy? 
The mainstream, liberal response to Huntington's argument insists 
that linguistic assimilation continues apace-that the grandchildren of 
Latin American immigrants "could not dream in Spanish even if they 
wanted to."17 Despite the fact that this retort has strong sociological data on 
its side,18 it elides an important point, and the account of language diversity 
14. See Simon Romero, Texas Paper Bets on Espa?ol, Not Assimilation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 
2005, at Cl. 
15. See, e.g., George Borjas, Richard Freeman, & Lawrence Katz, How Much Do Immigration 
and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes?, 1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 62-63 
(1997); The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration 
(James Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997). 
16. Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, Foreign Policy, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30, 45; 
see also Samuel P. Huntington, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 18-19 (2004) (discussing the unique impact of Spanish-speaking immigrants in the context 
of discussing the crisis of identity facing the United States in this century). 
17. Lawrence H. Fuchs, Mr. Huntington 's Nightmare, American Prospect, Aug. 2004, at 70, 71 
(reviewing Samuel P. Huntington, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL 
IDENTITY (2004)); see also Andrew Hacker, Patriot Games, N.Y. Rev. of Books, June 24, 2004, at 29 
("As [critic] Louis Menand wrote ... [Huntington] doesn't seem aware of the recent finding by the 
sociologists Richard Alba and Victor Nee that in 1990 'more than 95 percent of Mexican-Americans 
between twenty-five and forty who were born in the U.S. could speak English well.'"). 
18. All studies of the current immigration demonstrate that "linguistic assimilation in the form of 
English acquisition is a quasi-universal pattern." Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 220-21; see also id. at 
220 ("[S]ome proficiency in English generally is apparent among immigrants who have resided in the 
United States for more than a few years, and English proficiency attains a high level among their U.S. 
born children. Even in the largest enclave economies... U.S.-born generations are, to an 
overwhelming degree, fluent in English."). Census data and social science studies also reveal that 
immigrants and their descendants acquire English ability in the first generation and English fluency in 
the second. See Richard Alba, Lewis Mumford CTR. for Comparative Urban & Regional 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2006] LANGUAGE AND PARTICIPATION 691 
it offers is incomplete. Even as the children and grandchildren of immi 
grants become native English speakers, the United States will remain, as it 
always has been, a multilingual society. Statistics documenting assimila 
tion cannot explain away the tension Huntington has identified, for two 
reasons. First, at least with respect to immigrants from Latin America, bi 
lingualism persists strongly in the second generation and even somewhat in 
the third. Whereas the classic three-generation trend toward English mono 
lingualism describes most immigrant groups as a whole,19 some theorists 
hypothesize that English-Spanish bilingualism may prove an exception to 
this classic rule-a possibility that seems plausible in light of the sheer 
number of immigrants from Latin America, the proximity of their countries 
of origin, and their continued regional concentration.20 
Second, and more universally, continued immigration will ensure the 
ongoing replenishment of immigrant communities-a phenomenon not 
characteristic of the experience of European immigrants in the twentieth 
century.2' This change in the nature of immigration means that multiple 
generations of Americans, possessing varying levels of facility with non 
English languages, will remain present in the body politic, even as individ 
ual family lines assimilate linguistically.22 Speech communities comprised 
of non-English-speaking immigrants, their monolingual-in-English descen 
dants, and a wide array of bilinguals in between will persist-a 
Research, University at Albany, Language Assimilation Today: Bilingualism Persists More 
Than in the Past, But English Still Dominates (2004), http://mumford.albany.edu/ 
children/reports/language_assimilation/language_assimilation_brief.pdf; see also Shin & Bruno, 
supra note 9, at 2-3 (noting that in the 2000 Census, 55% of people who spoke a language other than 
English at home reported speaking English "very well," meaning that, when combined with those who 
spoke only English at home, 92% of the population over five years of age had no difficulty speaking 
English). 
19. As Alba and Nee explain, this paradigm of language shift, according to which a transition to 
English monolingualism occurs over the course of three generations, was first demonstrated by 
sociolinguists Joshua Fishman and Calvin Veltman. This pattern, almost without exception, held for 
earlier, predominantly European immigrant groups. Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 219. 
"Schematically," they write, "the process of Anglicization occurs in the following way. Some 
individuals of the immigrant generation learn English, though they generally prefer their native 
language, especially at home. Thus, their children usually grow up as bilinguals, but many of them 
prefer English_Members of the second generation generally speak English at home when 
establishing their own households and rearing children. Consequently, by the third generation, the 
prevalent pattern is English monolingualism, and knowledge of the mother tongue for most ethnics is 
fragmentary at best." Id. 
20. Id. at 220 ("Spanish [may be] unique among immigrant languages in its ability to resist the 
hegemony of English."). 
21. See Mary C. Waters & Tom?s R. Jim?nez, Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical 
and Theoretical Challenges, 31 Ann. Rev. Sociol. 105, 107 (2005) (arguing that the conception of 
generation must be rethought, given the "ongoing replenishment of new immigrants that is likely to be 
a defining characteristic of American immigration for years to come"). 
22. .See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive 
Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133,142-45 (2001). 
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phenomenon I have called the mutability continuum of language.23 In fact, 
the 2000 Census predicted that, by 2044, a majority of people residing in 
the United States will speak a language other than English, though not nec 
essarily to the exclusion of English.24 For the foreseeable future, bilingual 
ism will remain a demographic characteristic that complicates our cultural, 
social, and political interactions.25 
In light of these observations, neither the Anglo-Protestant "ideal" nor 
the liberal version of the assimilation story can account for the modem re 
ality of the United States as a truly multilingual society. The former yearns 
for a homogeneous national identity that bears little resemblance to demo 
graphic reality and that has never quite existed. The latter, while descrip 
tively accurate, does not provide the necessary substantive account of how 
individual bilingualism and social multilingualism may be changing the 
character of our political and social institutions. The presence of speakers 
of languages other than English is reshaping important social settings, such 
as the workplace, the schools, and the countless different fora in which 
politics occur. To deal adequately with this inescapable demographic and 
linguistic reality, we need to understand the effects of language diversity 
on the dynamics in these institutions. 
Despite an ever-present and increasingly pressing need for this type of 
thinking in the United States, our understanding of the relationship be 
tween linguistic diversity and democracy remains thin. We resort too often 
to general discussions of multiculturalism and assimilation to answer the 
challenges of multilingualism.26 Whereas that ongoing debate forms an 
important context for discussions of language rights and policy, the 
23. See id.; see also Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 229 ("For as far into the future as the eye can 
possibly see, then, the United States will be a polyglot society, displaying a robust linguistic pluralism. 
Large parts of the first and second generations, along with smaller parts of the third, will be bilingual, 
and their numbers will grow if immigration continues at its present clip."); Waters & Jim?nez, supra 
note 21, at 120 (discussing how replenishment helps to "refresh" the ethnic identity of second- and 
third-generation Mexican Americans). 
24. See supra note 9. 
25. Scholars in various fields have noted this phenomenon. See, e.g., Bilingual Games: Some 
Literary Investigations (Doris Sommer ed., 2003); The Multilingual Anthology of 
American Literature (Marc Shell & Werner Sollors eds., 2002). 
26. Huntington's emphasis on the linguistic dimension of assimilation, or the lack thereof, in 
Who Are We? offers a classic example of this tendency. See generally Huntington, Who Are We?, 
supra note 16. The language question, until recently, has been subsumed by political theorists within 
larger discussions of multiculturalism and its critics. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship 45 (1995) (discussing minority language rights in the context of a broader discussion of 
collective rights); Language Rights and Political Theory 1-2 (Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten eds., 
2003) (discussing absence, until recently, of a free-standing normative theory of language rights); Alan 
Patten, Political Theory and Language Policy, 29 Pol. Theory 691, 691-92 (2001) (noting that 
language conflict implicates many of the same values at stake in multiculturalism debates, such as 
"equality, recognition, freedom, identity, democracy, and cultural preservation," but that various 
features of language make it distinctive and therefore in need of separate treatment). 
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language question must be confronted independently.27 In both an instru 
mental and affective sense, language serves as the fundamental medium of 
social interaction. At the same time, though certain languages may corre 
late with worldviews, they are not themselves values or practices. As a re 
sult, debates concerning the extent to which we should accommodate 
conflicting cultural values will not point to the best way to manage multi 
lingualism. 
In this Article, I reconceptualize the social significance of language 
difference by offering a positive theory of how a democratic society like 
the United States should approach the multilingualism of its population. 
Whereas existing models of language rights focus primarily on correcting 
injustices against particular minority groups, my central claim is that our 
legal and political framework for managing multilingualism should be built 
around the value of participation in public life. In the spirit of interpersonal 
engagement at the heart of language itself, the best model for the United 
States will strive to make linguistic pluralism, whatever its source, socially 
functional. 
This approach makes a certain amount of intuitive sense. Because 
language serves as the medium for interaction among people, democratic 
societies naturally will be concerned that linguistic differences not stymie 
such interaction or prevent people from accessing important social and 
governmental resources. As I elaborate below, a number of legal systems 
acknowledge this interest in participation to some degree when addressing 
the interests of different cultural and linguistic groups. In international law 
circles, for example, advocates argue that minority interests should be 
framed in terms of the right to "effective participation."28 
But existing models remain limited in their utility as points of com 
parison for an American project of language rights, for a few reasons. First, 
the participatory approach has not been fleshed out in any systematic way. 
The capaciousness of the term "participation" explains, in part, why a par 
ticipatory account remains nascent and ambiguous. Participation can be 
understood to encompass a wide variety of activities, and it may mean dif 
ferent things in different national contexts. 
Second, existing models, despite containing participatory aspirations, 
share a central preoccupation that necessarily limits the reach of these aspi 
rations. The language rights discourse of scholars, activists, and lawmakers 
the world over focuses primarily on remedying the unequal status of 
27. See Patten, supra note 26, at 692 (discussing the features that make language distinctive, 
including the fact that "language is the medium in which most social interaction takes place," and "the 
fact that most people can speak only one or several languages"). 
28. See, e.g., Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Copenhagen Declaration, 
June 29, 1990, art. 35 ("The participating States will respect the right of persons belonging to national 
minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the 
protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities."). 
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specific national minority groups, such as French-speaking Quebeckers and 
Catalans, and keeping the peace between groups with a history of con 
flict.29 Those who operate within this framework conceive of language 
rights as belonging to national minority groups in particular, and language 
policies in most societies have been targeted primarily at ensuring these 
groups' survival. This remedial conception of language rights is most 
clearly visible in the emergence of separate institutions or political ar 
rangements for once oppressed or marginalized national minority groups, 
as has occurred in Canada or Spain. 
But neither the focus on national minorities, nor the forms of accom 
modation that this focus has generated, fit well in the American context. 
For the United States, we require an account of multilingualism that moves 
beyond the limitations of existing models to address the linguistic plural 
ism created by the migration of peoples. This account must be based on 
something more than the standard rhetoric emphasizing that immigrant 
groups are not entitled to substantive recognition of their linguistic inter 
ests, apart from their right to access an English-speaking world. 
The alternative account I offer in this Article refocuses our approach 
to multilingualism around a theory of participation and engages several key 
issues: (1) how linguistic diversity affects participation in social and politi 
cal life; (2) how we should regulate multilingualism to promote 
participation in those spheres; and (3) whether we should emphasize mono 
lingualism or multilingualism in our institutions to achieve these participa 
tory ends. At first glance, it may seem obvious that participation, because it 
requires interaction, would be more effective and efficient if everyone used 
the same language. A viable participatory account, under this view, would 
emphasize monolingualism and policies that promote rapid linguistic as 
similation. My ultimate conclusion, however, is that this initial, monolin 
gual instinct cannot survive a second look into the nature of participation. 
In exploring the effects of multilingualism on the institutions with which I 
am concerned, I contend that bilingualism in individuals and multilingual 
ism in society promote democratic values in those institutions. A multilin 
gual conception of participation will better advance two important 
objectives of American democracy: social investment by minority language 
groups and personal control or autonomy over matters of deeply personal 
concern, including cultural destiny. 
In developing my participatory account, I emphasize two important 
dimensions of participation that transform the counterintuitive into the self 
evident. First, I focus on mid-level social institutions-workplaces, 
schools, and the scenes of everyday politics and government, or the arenas 
through which most citizens live their daily lives-rather than on national 
29. See infra notes 34-54 and accompanying text (discussing efforts in Spain, Canada, and Latvia 
to raise the status of current and former national minority languages). 
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political institutions. Second, I conceptualize participation as access to so 
cial institutions, not as conversation over issues of common concern. This 
approach deemphasizes the idea that all conversations of public concern 
must be mutually intelligible to all people at all times, recognizing instead 
that any given public debate will occur through simultaneous, overlapping 
conversations by multiple communities. This framework ultimately con 
templates that particular languages may differ in their social status and may 
not be used to the same degree at all levels of civic society. 
I aim primarily to provide a framework for thinking about language 
diversity in the United States, and I therefore elaborate the details of my 
theory using institutions and debates in the United States as examples, be 
cause I aim primarily to provide a framework for thinking about language 
diversity in the United States. I begin this Article, however, by exploring 
the ways in which other societies have dealt with their own language ques 
tions. Though language differences always have fueled intense conflict in 
societies around the world,30 examples of robustly multilingual, participa 
tory democracies abound. These societies thrive because they make lin 
guistic pluralism and popular self-government mutually reinforcing, as 
opposed to destructive of one another. While my intention is not to present 
a general study of other language-rights systems, existing approaches to 
language rights will be useful points of reference in developing my ac 
count, for two reasons. First, as noted above, the idea of participation is 
present in some extant models. The Canadian regime, in particular, inter 
weaves the participatory and remedial objectives in an instructive fashion. 
Second, the language rights debates of societies with significant, vocal na 
tional minorities, like Canada and Spain, demonstrate that a particular lan 
guage is more than instrumentally significant to its speakers-a 
significance that should be taken into account in building the American 
case. Though context matters to the appropriate resolution of a given lan 
guage controversy, the rich and extensive literature that addresses the lan 
guage questions of societies such as Canada and Spain will help illuminate 
the relationship between linguistic pluralism and politics and the law, even 
for an American writer primarily concerned with multilingualism in the 
United States.3" 
By exploring and then challenging the traditional terms of language 
rights debates-that such rights are group rights inconsistent with an as 
similationist national identity-I attempt to dismantle the conceptual 
30. Marc Shell, Language Wars, 1 New Centennial Rev. 1-4 (2001) (discussing the sources of 
language conflict, including the desire to create linguistically safe spaces). 
31. Of course, some scholars who address those contexts have extended their discussion of 
language rights to consider the case of the immigrant. See, e.g., Ruth Rubio-Mar?n, Language 
Rights: Exploring the Competing Rationales, in Language Rights and Political Theory, 52, 73-76 
(Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten, eds., 2003) (discussing the extension of certain types of language 
rights, which she calls "instrumental," to immigrants). 
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assumptions that make it possible for Americans to conclude that language 
rights have no real place in our law. At the same time, I seek to demon 
strate that fluid conceptions of participation available to multiethnic socie 
ties formed largely through immigration, like the United States, can 
improve the mediation of language diversity in countries populated by na 
tional minorities with strong historical claims to special status. This 
Article, in other words, sets out a generalizable framework for thinking 
about language diversity and its relationship to democracy. 
In Part I of this Article, I explore the remedial thrust of the language 
law and policy of various legal systems around the world, including the 
United States, and establish why an alternative account must be developed. 
In Part II, I elaborate the participatory alternative. I explain the value of 
participation and identify the spheres of social life with which the partici 
patory account should be concerned, establishing why we should prefer a 
multilingual rather than monolingual account of participation. I confront 
the claim that multilingualism produces social balkanization. In so doing, I 
address what I consider to be the most trenchant criticism of culture-based 
politics-that multicultural theories promote group survival, which in turn 
prevents groups from evolving and individuals from escaping the group 
identities they might prefer to abandon. I argue that language, as a cultural 
characteristic, is sufficiently flexible to ensure that different groups retain 
the ability and incentive to interact with one another in society's most im 
portant institutions, despite the persistence of multiple languages in a 
community. Embracing bilingualism in individuals and multilingualism in 
society will make real, rather than thwart, this possibility. I conclude, in 
Part III, by considering the United States as a case study, outlining a set of 
participatory practices for several American institutions-governmental 
bureaucracies, the workplace, and public schools. I suggest how the law 
that structures these institutions should be shaped, insofar as language is 
concerned, to accomplish participatory objectives. Through this discussion, 
it becomes clear that our participatory account should be multilingual 
rather than monolingual. 
Throughout this Article, I draw on the existing terms of language 
rights discourse. The term language rights may be unfamiliar to many 
readers in the United States. Within academic and policy discussions, one 
school of thought regards language rights qua language rights as guaran 
tees to specific language groups-guarantees such as the right to public 
education delivered in one's mother tongue, or the right to use one's native 
language in court proceedings. Under Canadian law, language rights have 
this meaning, as they belong only to Francophones and Anglophones and 
protect the right to use one's mother tongue in certain contexts. On the 
other hand, the concept of language rights also could be understood to refer 
not to substantive rights, per se, but to the means necessary to protect 
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generally applicable rights in circumstances involving language minorities. 
The due process right to translation in criminal proceedings represents the 
classic example of this formulation. Providing such translation is a neces 
sary part of protecting non-culture-specific, due process rights. Though this 
distinction may be important to the existing literature on language rights, it 
is ancillary to my project here. I am concerned with the impact of language 
difference on social institutions. I therefore use the term "language rights" 
in a more general sense-as a term that encompasses both the right to use 
the language of one's choice in certain contexts, as well as the interpreta 
tion of non-culture-specific rights in a manner that takes into account the 
linguistic and cultural dimensions of those rights.32 
I 
LANGUAGE RIGHTS AS REMEDY 
Both scholarly and political discourses on language rights have been 
influenced considerably by a dichotomy commonly drawn between two 
different types of minorities: national minority groups with historical pres 
ence in a nation-state, and minority groups formed as the result of immi 
gration. This dichotomy has facilitated the rise of a kind of orthodoxy, 
which holds that language rights as substantive rights belong primarily to 
the former. Whereas states may be obligated to support the preservation of 
once-threatened languages, immigrants, who by definition lack a historical 
relationship to the nation-state, are entitled to nothing more than assimila 
tion to the dominant language on fair terms. 
Language rights, under this formulation, serve as a kind of compensa 
tion or remedy for a nation's past attempts to destroy or suppress the cul 
ture of a national minority group. The language rights regimes of various 
societies around the world reflect this conceptualization. In parts of Europe 
and in Canada, for example, language rights constitute substantive rights 
that belong to particular minority groups, such as Catalans or French Que 
beckers. These rights function to ensure their survival as groups, in the 
wake of a history of oppression or semi-coerced assimilation. In the United 
States, by contrast, a conception of language rights as substantive rights 
does not really exist. Though national minorities are present in the United 
States, we frame the language question as a matter of transitioning non 
English speaking immigrants, on fair terms, into a monolingual main 
stream. To the extent that language conflict arises, the law channels that 
32. I draw this distinction in response to Ruth Rubio-Marin's call to think of language rights not 
simply as "instruments of cultural protection," but also as rights that enable citizens to overcome 
linguistic obstacles. Rubio-Mar?n, supra note 31, at 53. She conceptualizes language rights as either 
instrumental or noninstrumental. The former ensure that language does not create obstacles to the 
"effective enjoyment of rights with a linguistic dimension," and the latter provide linguistic minorities 
with the "capacity to enjoy a secure linguistic environment in her/his mother tongue." Id. at 56. 
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conflict through generally applicable antidiscrimination protections, and 
provides limited support for linguistic interests other than the interest in 
learning English.33 
In this Part, I conclude that the remedial approach focused on ensuring 
minority group survival requires too much of the state and the public. At 
the same time, the promise made to immigrants of assimilation on fair 
terms requires too little. This conclusion need not lead to a rejection of the 
national minority paradigm and the corresponding remedial imperative 
completely. Both constructs, after all, will be quite relevant to protecting 
the interests of historically subordinated national minority groups and to 
securing the conditions for their survival. Rather, the limitations of the re 
medial conception underscore the need for an alternative vision of the in 
terests of language minorities-an alternative I offer in Part II. To make 
this necessity clear, I consider how regimes designed to secure the survival 
of national minorities have evolved, why a robust conception of language 
rights has not emerged in the United States, and why the national minority 
paradigm requires reformulation. 
A. Remediation, Revival, and National Minorities 
The remedial conception of language rights builds upon the assump 
tion that national minorities-groups such as French-speaking Quebeckers 
and Catalan speakers in Spain-are entitled to linguistic recognition and 
resuscitation of their once-suppressed or threatened languages.34 In socie 
ties with a history of such suppression, the evolution to a liberal, tolerant 
system of government historically has required a form of culture-based 
recognition as compensation for this past treatment. National minority 
groups' claims for recognition usually have taken shape as demands for 
equality of status, or for the declaration of co-official status for their lan 
guage at some level of government.35 In some cases, the claims for recogni 
tion have been presented as demands for role reversal-for the once 
threatened language to be heavily favored over the once-dominant lan 
guage.36 Because the minority language in question in many cases is 
emerging from an era of clandestine use, or a period of significant 
33. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing the antidiscrimination framework 
with which law in the United States frames the issue of providing language assistance). 
34. I refer to this version of remedial language rights as either the revival variation, because it 
focuses on the restoration of excluded languages, or the national minority paradigm. 
35. See, e.g., infra notes 53-55, 124-126 and accompanying text (discussing the equal status 
principle in Canadian law). 
36. See, e.g., infra notes 40 and 51 (discussing the role reversal of Latvian and Russian after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union). 
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assimilation, even claims to equality have required considerable preferen 
tial treatment of the minority language.37 
The policies of Spain, Latvia, and Canada reflect this commitment to 
language revival. Spanish law,38 for example, recognizes Spain's minority 
languages as national heritage languages that should be protected and pre 
served.39 This commitment acknowledges their historical marginalization 
dating back to the nineteenth century and to Francisco Franco's repression 
of minority languages during his decades of rule in the twentieth century. 
Similarly, the Soviet Union's Russification policies in Latvia have been 
invoked to justify a language law that aggressively promotes Latvian as the 
state's official language at the expense of the Russian minority within the 
37. See, e.g., infra notes 40 and 51 (discussing preferential treatment given Latvian over Russian 
after independence from the Soviet Union); see also Charlotte Hoffmann, Balancing Language 
Planning and Language Rights: Catalonia's Uneasy Juggling Act, 21 J. of Multilingual & 
Multicultural Development 425, 439 (2000) (noting that "[f]rom a purely sociolinguistic 
perspective, efforts to counteract language shift require 'affirmative action' or 'proactive language 
policies'... i.e., a form of positive discrimination"); see generally Josep Costa, Catalan Linguistic 
Policy: Liberal or Illiberal?, 9 Nations & Nationalism 413 (2003) (discussing Catalonia's 1998 
Language Act and assessing the controversy over whether its preferences for Catalan reflect illiberal 
tendencies). Instruments such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages address past 
subordination by endorsing the adoption of affirmative action-type policies when needed to eliminate 
"unjustified" distinctions between dominant and minority languages. See European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages Part II, art. 7, para. 2, Nov. 5, 1992, E.T.S. 148 (establishing that 
special measures aimed at promoting minority languages do not discriminate against speakers of more 
widely used language). 
38. In addition to the constitutional provisions discussed above and below, several of Spain's 
autonomous communities?the subunits of Spain's federal system?have passed what are known as 
normalization laws, which promote the use of the region's minority language in all spheres of life, 
including education, public administration, and communication. See, e.g., Llei 1 de 7 de Gener, de 
Pol?tica 
Ljng??stica [Act 
No. 1, of 7th January 1988, on Linguistic Policy] (Generalit?t of Catalonia), 
available at http://www6.gencat.net/llengcat/legis/en/lpl.htm; see also Costa, supra note 37, at 416-18 
(discussing Catalonia's 1998 Linguistic Policy Act, its explanation of the political and demographic 
reasons for Catalan's current precarious position, and its objectives of promoting the use of Catalan in 
schools, media and cultural industries, and social and economic fields). 
39. The Spanish Constitution expressly recognizes Spain's multilingual character: 
1. El castellano es la lengua epa?ola oficial del Estado. Todos los espa?oles tienen el deber de 
conocerla y el derecho a usarla. 
2. Las dem?s lenguas espa?olas ser?n tambi?n oficiales en las respectivas Comunidades 
Aut?nomas de acuerdo con sus Estatutos. 
3. La riqueza de las distintas modalidades ling??sticas de Espa?a es un patrimonio cultural 
que ser? objeto de especial respeto y protecci?n. 
Constituci?n [CE.] art. 3 (Spain) ("Castilian is the official Spanish language of the state. All Spaniards 
have the duty to know it and the right to use it. The other Spanish languages also will be official in the 
respective autonomous communities, in accordance with their Statutes. The wealth of Spain's different 
linguistic modalities is a cultural patrimony that will be the object of special respect and protection."). 
Note, however, that the role that language plays in the politics of the autonomous communities differs 
from context to context. For example, some scholars have noted that Basque nationalism has focused 
more on ethnicity-based politics than on linguistic identity. See, e.g., Ruth Rubio-Mar?n, Lengua y 
Ciudadan?a Multicultural: Una perspectiva constitucional 98 (forthcoming) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author); Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and 
Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation 173-86 (1997). 
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new state.40 In Canada, the equal status given to the Francophone minority 
and the constitutional and statutory rights that stem from that status 
emerged in response to concern for the erosion of Francophone culture and 
power. In all three cases, however, the focus on revival has generated new 
forms of language conflict and exerted pressure on minorities within 
40. For a general discussion of the Soviet experiment with national autonomy and the subsequent 
language policies that have arisen as a form of compensation in the Baltics, see Joseph Eliot Magnet, 
National Minorities and the Multinational State, 26 Queen's L.J. 397, 446-47 (2001). For a discussion 
of the effects of Latvia's language laws on the Russian minority, see Sonia Bychkov Green, Language 
of Lullabies: The Russification and De-Russification of the Baltic States, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 219, 
223-36 (1997) (claiming that language laws in the Baltic states discriminate against the Russian 
minority in those states). 
Despite Latvia's initial movement to deny minority language rights to Russian speakers, one of the 
conditions of Latvia's accession to the European Union was that it adopt "measures to facilitate the 
naturalisation process to better integrate non-citizens... and enhance Latvian language training for 
non-Latvian speakers," and that it respect the rights of the Russian-speaking minority. Regular 
Report from the Commission on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession 7, 13 (1998), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_ll_98/pdf/en/latvia_en.pdf. From 1998 to 2003, an EU 
Commission monitored Latvia's treatment of non-Latvian speakers; the Commission included in its 
annual reports to the European Council observations on whether Latvia's language laws were in 
compliance with international human rights obligations. See, e.g., id. In the 1998 Report, for example, 
the Commission made note of efforts to remove from Latvia's language law "discriminatory 
provisions" that required use of Latvian in the private sector. See id. at 13-14. By the 2000 report, the 
Commission indicated that Latvia's Language Law was in conformity with Latvia's international 
obligations, as well as the European Agreement. See Regular Report from the Commission on 
Latvia's Progress Towards Accession 100 (2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
enlargement/report_ll_00/pdf/en/lv_en.pdf. For further discussion of the ways in which pressure from 
the Council of Europe led to the softening of Latvia's Language Law, see Pamela A. Jordan, Does 
Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance Into the Council of Europe and Compliance with Human 
Rights Norms, 25 Hum. Rts. Q. 660, 668-74 (2003) (describing the language conflict that followed 
independence, the international pressure that ensued, and the Latvian Parliament's eventual decision in 
1999 to remove from the language law a requirement that citizens and businesses use only Latvian). 
All of that said, language conflict has not subsided in Latvia. In its 2003 report, issued in the year 
of the Treaty of Accession, the Commission continued to emphasize that it strongly encouraged Latvia 
to "promote integration of the Russian minority by... ensuring] sufficient flexibility regarding 
transition to bilingual education in minority schools, and to ensure that at all levels the implementation 
of the language law respects the ... public interest... as well as Latvia's international obligations," 
suggesting that a gap existed between the formal requirements of the law and actual practice. See 
Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Latvia's Preparations for Membership 36 (2003), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_lv_flnal.pdf. Indeed, despite the changes 
mentioned above, the 1999 law is still criticized for making Latvian the sole official language and for 
giving officials too much discretion in the enforcement of the law. See Jordan, supra, at 670. The 
persistent tension between the Latvian majority and the Russian minority is reflected in a 2002 
challenge by a member of the Russian minority in the European Court of Human Rights to Latvia's 
election law. See Podkolzina v. Latvia, App. No. 46726/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2002/405.html (holding that Latvia violated article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the Human Rights Convention when the State Language Center forbade a Russian 
speaking candidate from running for Parliament). In response to the court's decision, Parliament 
amended the constitution to heighten the status of Latvian. See Jordan, supra, at 673. In addition, 
controversy remains over the question of language education. See, e.g., Russian Diplomat Criticizes 
Rights Situation in Latvia Since EU Accession, BBC Monitoring, Sept. 7, 2004, at 1 (transcript of 
Radio Russia broadcast) (noting opposition to elimination of secondary education in Russian and 
sentiment among Russians in Latvia that there have been no positive movements in addressing 
language rights of Russians since Latvia's accession to the European Union). 
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minorities, such as Castilian speakers in Catalonia, Russian speakers in 
Latvia, and Anglophones in Quebec. 
In Spain, in particular, the constitution makes a commitment to de 
fending the nation's linguistic heritage,4" but it declares Castilian the offi 
cial language42 and delegates responsibility for protecting minority 
languages to the nation's autonomous regions.43 Indeed, the language ques 
tion in Spain coincides with the country's particular version of federalism, 
or the devolution of political power to Spain's so-called autonomous com 
munities." While this arrangement may make structural sense for Spain, it 
is not without potential difficulties. First, it puts the language minority at a 
distinct disadvantage in relation to Castilian speakers, because the ar 
rangement means that Catalan and other recognized minority languages 
have no real status throughout Spain.45 Second, because only Castilian has 
official status in the country as a whole, the arrangement provides a consti 
tutional justification for Castilian speakers to eschew bilingualism in re 
gions where a second language has official status alongside Castilian.46 
41. Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution sets out the framework through which Spanish 
institutions manage multilingualism and provides that "[t]he wealth of Spain's different linguistic 
modalities is a cultural patrimony that will be the object of special respect and protection." 
Constituci?n [CE.] art. 3, ? 3 (Spain) (author's trans.) 
42. By formalizing Castilian as the lingua franca of modern Spain, article 3 of the constitution 
creates a universal right and obligation to speak and know Castilian and arguably impedes the 
resurrection of Spain's minority languages as public languages. 
43. Article 3 of the constitution establishes that "[t]he other languages of Spain will also be 
official in the respective autonomous communities, in accordance with their Statutes," Constituci?n 
[CE.] art. 3, ?2 (Spain) (author's trans.; emphasis added), which explicitly leaves the task of revival 
largely to the governments of the autonomous regions. See also Costa, supra note 37, at 415 (noting 
that "[t]here is no clear constitutional obligation for the [Spanish central] state itself to promote or 
protect multilingualism" and observing that while the central government generally respects linguistic 
laws passed by autonomous communities, it does not fully implement them in its own jurisdiction and 
actively promotes Castilian). 
44. Spaniards generally understand such devolution as appropriate and important to the 
protection of Spain's minority languages, even though not all autonomous communities contain large 
populations of minority-language speakers. See Rubio-Mar?n, supra note 39, at 117. 
45. See, e.g., supra note 42; see also Costa, supra note 37, at 415 (noting that, in its review of 
Galicia's Language Act, the Constitutional Court held that any attempt to establish by law a duty to 
know a language other than Castilian was unconstitutional). Whereas speakers of Castilian carry their 
language rights with them throughout Spain, other language groups have no rights outside of the 
territories that have passed statutes to protect particular minority languages. See Costa, supra note 37, 
at 427. What is more, the central government of Spain is largely monolingual. As a result, government 
agencies in Catalonia still controlled by Madrid operate primarily in Castilian. While such 
bureaucracies have achieved a degree of bilingualism, progress apparently remains slow. By contrast, 
in those offices that the Statute of Autonomy transferred to the Catalan government, officials 
administer services almost entirely in Catalan. See Miguel Strubell, Language, Democracy and 
Devolution in Catalonia, in Language, Democracy and Devolution in Catalonia 4, 30 (Sue 
Wright ed., 1999). 
46. The extent to which the law supports this possibility is debatable. Although the constitution 
declares no duty of residents to learn a region's co-official language, some commentators have argued 
that the declaration of official status for a language?a constitutionally authorized act?presupposes a 
duty to know that language. For a discussion of this issue, see Rubio-Mar?n, supra note 39, at 111-12. 
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At the same time, the lack of federal support for the language revival 
creates potential problems for non-Catalan speakers living in Catalonia. 
The autonomous community has a distinct incentive to favor official mono 
lingualism at the sub-state level, in the interest of giving the minority re 
vival as much support as possible. Indeed, the 1998 language reform, with 
its emphasis on promoting the social, commercial, judicial, artistic, politi 
cal, and financial use of Catalan, has proven controversial for its seemingly 
exclusive preference for Catalan.47 The legislation attempts to make Cata 
lan not just a language of normal usage, but the predominant language in 
the public and social spheres. As scholars have emphasized, the 1998 law 
makes Catalan the language of all Catalonian institutions, from the schools, 
to political parties and unions, to private institutions operating in the public 
interest.48 Though Spaniards have associated the Catalan revival closely 
with the development of post-Franco Spanish democracy, liberal critics 
recently have protested that Catalonia's language policies, by promoting 
ethnolinguistic democracy, are anti-democratic.49 The Castilian minority in 
Catalonia may be the most directly disadvantaged by this preference, but 
the Catalan national minority group might also be disserved. The prefer 
ence not only diminishes the incentive to learn and use the quite useful and 
more widespread Castilian language,50 it also fosters a potentially divisive 
ethnicity-based politics. 
47. See Alan Yates, Response to Miguel Strubell, in Language, Democracy, and Devolution 
in Catalonia, supra note 45, at 62, 62-63. 
48. See Rubio-Mar?n, supra note 39, at 91, 143. 
49. See Strubell, supra note 45, at 15 (quoting Francesco de Carreras) ("[E]sta pol?tica ... inspira 
una concepci?n nacionalista de Catalu?a que, a mi modo de ver, no resulta conciliable con los 
principios de libertad y pluralismo en los cuales est? basada nuestra democracia constitucional.") ("This 
policy... inspires a nationalistic conception of Catalonia that, from my perspective, cannot be 
reconciled with the principles of liberty and pluralism on which our democratic constitution is based.") 
(author's trans.). Other critics have challenged laws requiring knowledge of Catalan in certain 
employment contexts on the ground that they violate the article 28 of the constitution, which guarantees 
freedom of movement?a basic liberal principle. See Strubell, supra note 45, at 26. In Canada, a similar 
tension between non-language-specific constitutional provisions, such as the freedom of speech, and 
the language policies of federal entities has arisen with respect to a Quebec law that both the Supreme 
Court of Canada and the U.N. Human Rights Commission have declared an unconstitutional intrusion 
on the freedom of expression. For a brief discussion of this case, see infra notes 218-221 and 
accompanying text. 
50. The Spanish Constitution's declaration of Castilian as the nation's official language lessens 
these dangers. All citizens reasonably can be expected to know the language. At least formally, the 
Catalan Generalit?t must commit to the "normal and official use of both languages, adopting] 
whatever measures are deemed necessary to ensure both languages are known, and creating] suitable 
conditions so that full equality between the two can be achieved as far as the rights and duties of the 
citizens of Catalonia are concerned." Estatut d'Autonomia [Statute of Autonomy] art. 3, para. 3 (1979) 
(Generalit?t of Catalonia). Catalonia's language normalization law recognizes Catalan and Castilian as 
official languages and provides that they "poden ?sser emprades indistintament pels ciutadans i 
ciutadanes en totes les activitats publiques i privades sense discriminado." See Llei 1 de 7 de Gener, de 
Pol?tica Ling??stica [Act No. 1, of 7th January 1988, on Linguistic Policy] art 3. (both official 
languages "may be used indiscriminately by citizens in all private and public activities without 
exception") (translation available at http://www6.gencat.net/llengcat/legis/en/lpl.htm). The law also 
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In comparison with Catalonia, the Baltic states' language policies 
highlight the dangers posed by laws focused primarily on revival to an 
even greater degree. The resurrection of Latvian as a public language has 
taken place in circumstances politically distinct from the revival of Spain's 
minority languages. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the entity 
responsible for the suppression of Latvian ceased to exist. Latvia's post 
independence policies to establish Latvian hegemony, therefore, have not 
been in tension with the language policy of a central authority run by a lin 
guistically dominant majority. In 1988, before independence, Latvia rees 
tablished Latvian as its official language, but nonetheless retained certain 
"special rights" for Russian speakers. But in 1992, free from Soviet over 
sight, Latvia eliminated those rights and began a newly aggressive promo 
tion of Latvian.5" These changes in the law seemed to ignore the fact that 
more than 30% of the population remained tied to the Russian language. 
Today, the Russian minority continues to be a social force to be reckoned 
with.52 This experience thus underscores that reformulating institutions to 
promote the survival of the once-oppressed language creates new opportu 
nities for language conflict. 
Finally, Canada's language regime centers around a similar focus on 
language revival. In contrast to Spain and Latvia, authoritarian suppression 
of the minority language has not defined relations between Canada's two 
major language groups, perhaps with the exception of populations in the 
Western provinces.53 The Francophone minority, instead, has faced 
establishes that the Generalit?t must create circumstances such that the full equality of the two 
languages will be realized. See id. art. 4 (establishing that everyone in Catalonia is entitled to be 
proficient in both languages, to express themselves in both languages, and to be free from 
discrimination on account of official language used); see also supra note 38. Nonetheless, because the 
specifics of language policy in Spain are, in practice, elaborated through the public laws of the 
autonomous regions, these external, constitutional constraints exist in tension with regional language 
politics. See supra note 47. 
51. Ina Druviete, Language Policy in a Changing Society: Problematic Issues in the 
Implementation of International Linguistic Human Rights Standards, in Language, a Right and a 
Resource 264-65 (Mikl?s Kontra et al. eds., 1999). Article 4 of the 1992 Language Law, for example, 
provides that public servants and "persons who have everyday contact with the general public" use the 
official language. Id. 
52. See Jordan, supra note 40, at 669. 
53. For instance, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B & B Commission) 
convened in 1963 to address a growing constitutional crisis rooted in the complexities of Anglophone 
Francophone relations. It pronounced French a language imperiled by factors such as the 
disproportionate assimilation of immigrants to English rather than French, see 1 Royal Commission 
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism 24 (1967), increasing assimilation of Francophones outside Quebec, economic 
inferiority of Francophones within Quebec, and lack of Francophone representation in the public 
service. See Richard Silver, The Right to English Health and Social Services in Quebec: A Legal and 
Political Analysis, 45 McGill L.J. 681, 693 (2000). In its Report, the Royal B & B Commission noted 
the Canadian Constitution Act's ad hoc approach to language rights, the poor linguistic resources 
outside Quebec to serve minority Francophone populations, see Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism, supra, at 52-69, and the lack of a "fully developed linguistic r?gime expressing 
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socioeconomic inequalities and the more benign threat of assimilation into 
the dominant Anglophone culture.54 Moreover, in negotiating the terms of 
the public revival of the French language, Canada has opted for an institu 
tional model that stands, in many ways, as a counterpoint to the Spanish 
system. The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms declares French and 
English to have equal status throughout Canada and obligates federal au 
thorities across the country to promote that status.55 Yet, despite its differ 
ences from the Spanish system, Canada's contemporary language rights 
regime reflects a similar concern with addressing the demands of a group 
with a particular historical relationship to the nation-state and imposes 
some of the same costs. For example, the emphasis on resuscitation of 
French as a public language results in policies that sometimes obscure the 
interests of the Anglophone minority within the Francophone region of 
Quebec.56 
I do not, of course, mean to suggest that these language regimes have 
taken shape as they have without good reason. In fact, to promote equality 
and stability generally, it may be necessary to permit the preferences de 
scribed in these examples-at least until the once-dominated language has 
been revived to the point of stability, or the point at which the threat of as 
similation has receded.57 But the point of stability will be difficult to iden 
tify. More significantly, once it has been reached, a remedial conception of 
language rights, focused as it is on reviving a particular minority, provides 
little guidance with respect to how to treat minorities within the national 
minority, who may not want to assimilate.58 Finally, and perhaps most 
the bicultural character of the country as a whole," id. at 69, factors which threatened to consign French 
to a secondary status in contemporary Canada, despite its official equality with English. 
54. See id. 
55. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), 
?? 16-20 (Can.) (establishing English and French as coequal official languages and the rights of 
individuals to use either language in proceedings before Parliament, in court proceedings, and in 
communications and interactions with federal institutions). 
56. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text (discussing case in which interest in 
promoting public use of French came into conflict with speech and commercial interests of Anglophone 
minority in Quebec). 
57. Measures adopted by the Generalit?t to secure the status of Catalan have included: 
requirements that all local authorities and public corporations of Catalonia use Catalan; civil service 
language training in Catalan; the promotion of public use of Catalan and the use of Catalan in higher 
education; linguistic requirements for public employers; and quota systems for private television and 
radio companies. See Llei 1 de 7 de Gener, de Pol?tica Ling??stica [Act No. 1, of 7th January 1988, on 
Linguistic Policy] art. 9 (language of government); id. art. 11, para. 2 (civil service training); id. art. 11 
(public employment); id. art. 22 (university education); id. art. 26 (quota system for television and 
radio). In the context of these measures being passed, it has been suggested that "[o]ne could argue that 
it is no longer necessary to implement language policies in order to support Catalan identity?this 
identity is already quite well established." Hoffmann, supra note 37, at 439. 
58. Cases such as Latvia's, where no national legal authority (perhaps only political pressure 
from Russia) protects the Russian-speaking minority, exemplify this concern. The obvious response is 
that the demands of remediation justify a language policy designed to promote the complete 
assimilation of the new language minority. As noted above, such a policy would not be an option in 
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importantly, the idea of revival does not address the linguistic challenges 
presented by immigration, which is a highly relevant phenomenon for 
many societies with large national minorities, including Spain and Canada. 
Indeed, the development of language politics in Canada, as a two-language 
question, renders the Canadian system incapable of accounting for the po 
tentially valid claims and interests of minority groups other than 
Francophones.59 We require something more. 
B. Remediation and Antidiscrimination 
Language diversity long has been a defining feature of the United 
States' demography, and language conflict therefore has appeared through 
out American history. The American legal system has not ignored the lin 
guistic interests of non-English speakers, but, in contrast to Europeans and 
Canadians, Americans have not addressed this conflict by making a strong 
national commitment to the survival of particular language minorities. 
Though the population of the United States always has included groups 
that fit the definition of national minority-Native Americans, Mexican 
Americans in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans, and Hawaiians-the law either 
has treated them as special cases or elided their linguistic interests. Our 
legal system's basic approach to language difference, instead, enlists the 
immigrant seeking assimilation on nondiscriminatory terms to serve as the 
paradigm case.60 For reasons that I will explain, this approach does not 
generate a sufficiently substantive account of multilingualism. But the re 
sponse to this inadequacy should not be to adopt the survivalist impulse 
reflected in the national minority paradigm. Instead, the inadequacies of 
that paradigm, particularly for a society like ours whose language diversity 
has resulted in substantial measure from immigration, underscore the need 
for an alternative to extant conceptions of language rights. But before an 
alternative account can be developed, we must understand the American 
system in more detail. 
Catalonia, because of the Spanish Constitution's declaration of Castilian as the national language and 
its provision that "all Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it." Constituci?n [CE.] art. 
3, para. 1 (Spain). Even if this guarantee did not exist, Catalonia's presence in a larger Castilian 
speaking union virtually guarantees the presence of a sizable population of native Castilian speakers, 
most of whom are likely to be unwilling to lose their linguistic connection to the rest of Spain. 
59. C. Michael Macmillan, The Practice of Language Rights in Canada 180-202 (1998) 
(discussing the interests of speakers of languages other than French and English). 
60. This paradigm includes cases, like Meyer v. Nebraska, that protect the rights of individuals in 
the private sphere to use the language of their choice. See, e.g., Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 
500, 524-28 (1926) (holding that Philippine Bookkeeping Act, which prohibited keeping of accounts in 
languages other than English, Spanish, and Philippine dialects, violated Philippine Bill of Rights, 
patterned by Congress after U.S. Bill of Rights, on grounds that it deprived Chinese merchants in 
Philippines of due process of law); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923) (striking down 
state statute forbidding foreign-language instruction in public schools until after eighth grade on due 
process grounds). 
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Courts and lawmakers in the United States have tended to view lan 
guage difference in transitional and antidiscrimination terms and have fo 
cused on ensuring that non-English speakers receive adequate resources to 
overcome language barriers. The law relies on antidiscrimination language 
to frame this form of assistance and sometimes regards the failure to ac 
commodate a non-English-speaking minority as discrimination on the basis 
of race or national origin. But once the language barrier has been over 
come, the language minority ceases to have legal status as a language mi 
nority. 
More specifically, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
American law has recognized the linguistic interests of non-English speak 
ers by requiring that certain institutions affirmatively assist them. In 1974, 
for example, the Supreme Court held that a public school's failure to ad 
dress its students' language barriers potentially constituted national origin 
discrimination, essentially concluding that Title VI guarantees a "right" to 
learn English in the public schools.6' Though the continuing validity of this 
holding is in doubt for reasons unrelated to the specific rights of language 
minorities,62 the case and subsequent congressional regulations reflect a 
commitment to protecting non-English speakers' interests through antidis 
crimination law.63 Even more recently, in the waning days of the Clinton 
administration, the Department of Labor published policy guidelines clari 
fying its position on the obligations of recipients of federal financial assis 
tance to accommodate "persons with limited English proficiency" in the 
workplace.64 The memorandum accompanying the executive order framed 
the guidelines as enforcing the prohibition on national origin discrimina 
tion in Title VI.65 Similarly, guidelines of the Equal Employment 
61. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
62. Since 1974, the Court has declared Title VI to be coterminous with the Equal Protection 
Clause. Further, the Court also has held that Title VI does not authorize individuals to bring 
enforcement actions?the mechanism through which Kimminey Lau brought the case of the Chinese 
schoolchildren to the federal courts in Lau v. Nichols. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285, 
293 (2001) (holding that Title VI does not create freestanding private right of action to enforce 
disparate-impact regulations and making clear Court's rejection of Law's interpretation with respect to 
reach of Title VI); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 351 (1978) (suggesting that 
failure to accommodate language group without demonstrated connection to race might not be illegal). 
63. See, e.g., Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. ? 1703(f) (1994) (making unlawful 
failure of educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers impeding equal 
participation by students in instructional programs). 
64. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 16,2000). 
65. Policy Guidance on the Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination as It Affects 
Persons With Limited English Proficiency, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,596 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 17, 2001) 
("Because of language differences and the inability to speak or understand English, LEP persons are 
often excluded from programs and activities, experience delays or denials of services, or receive 
assistance and services based on inaccurate or incomplete information. Such exclusions, delays or 
denials may constitute discrimination on the basis of national origin...."). The memo describes 
certain pervasive practices, such as the reliance on a claimant's minor children to translate instead of 
engaging a professional translator to assist in the delivery of government benefits or services, as 
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Opportunity Commission interpreting Title VII treat English-only work 
place rules imposed by employers on employees as potential instances of 
national origin discrimination.66 
On the one hand, though these administrative efforts are couched in 
the formal language of national origin and antidiscrimination, they target 
for improvement the status of language minorities, and they are accommo 
dationist in nature. These policies require public entities to structure their 
institutions to make linguistic space for language minorities.67 At the same 
time, the assistance is designed to enable minorities' transition to the Eng 
lish-speaking mainstream, not to recognize any substantive linguistic 
rights. Language minorities qua language minorities have no status under 
antidiscrimination law. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not include lan 
guage in its list of protected classes, and the Supreme Court has declined to 
recognize language as a suspect classification in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence.68 Courts thus treat the question of language discrimination 
as a form of potential racial or national origin discrimination. The general 
consequence of this framing is that language minorities receive the protec 
tion of the antidiscrimination laws only in circumstances in which their 
status seems immutable. And courts consider language to be immutable 
only until the ability to speak English has been acquired. 
This formulation is apparent in the cases examining whether an em 
ployer's English-only policy, or rule that non-English languages may not 
be spoken in the workplace, violates Title VII. Many courts facing Title 
potential violations of Title VI. See also Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1045 (9th Cir. 1988), 
vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989) (striking down "English-only rules [that] generally have an 
adverse impact on protected groups and ordinarily constitute discriminatory conditions of 
employment"). 
66. See Speak-English-Only Rules, 29 C.F.R. ? 1606.7(a) (2005) (providing that blanket English 
only rule presumptively violates Title VII as "a burdensome term and condition of employment"); see 
also EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) ? 623 (discussing speak-English-only rules and other language 
policies). In recent years, the EEOC has been active in enforcing these regulations. Complaints to the 
EEOC with respect to workplace English-only rules quintupled from 1996 to 2000. The agency partly 
attributes the rising number of complaints to the outreach work of its national origin task force, and the 
agency has settled a number of these claims successfully. Maria Shim, English-Only Workplace Suits 
Continue to Rise, The Recorder, Oct. 18, 2000, at 3. 
67. In 2003, the New York City Council passed the Equal Access to Human Services Act, 
amending the city's administrative code to require city agencies and their contractors to provide free 
language-assistance services to limited English proficient individuals. See New York City Local Law 
No. 73, Ch. 10, ? 8-1003 (2003). In its declaration of legislative intent, the council took note of its 
obligation, as a recipient of federal funds, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to take 
"reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access to the information and services [provided by the City]." 
The Council noted that it was enacting the translation requirements to "ensure that persons eligible for 
social services receive them and to avoid the possibility that a person who attempts to access services 
will face discrimination based upon the language s/he speaks." Id. ? 1. For other examples of 
accommodation requirements that spring from interpretations of Title VII, see supra note 64. 
68. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 370-72 (1991) (holding that prosecutors could strike 
potential jurors based on fluency in another language without violating Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), because language and race, in this particular case, could be distinguished). 
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VII challenges to such rules have concluded, despite EEOC regulations to 
the contrary, that they do not have a disparate impact on bilingual employ 
ees, even though workers who speak no English at all might have colorable 
claims.69 The implication of these holdings is twofold. First, the courts 
seem open to the idea that English-only rules might harm a non-English 
speaker; his linguistic identity is constructively immutable, because at the 
time of the rule's imposition his inability to speak English cannot be al 
tered. Second, the courts have concluded that even if English-only rules 
disproportionately affect English-speaking national origin minorities, the 
impact they experience is not legally cognizable. In other words, whatever 
harms they feel do not constitute the harms policed by Title VII. The bilin 
gual can choose which language to speak, and his identity is therefore mu 
table. Knowledge of English reflects the fact that a language barrier has 
been crossed; the process of assimilation removes the protection of the law. 
I discuss the merits of these conclusions in Part JJJ,70 but if we assume 
that the suppression of languages other than English in public spaces is 
cause for concern, the current law's treatment of the issue offers an inade 
quate framework. Reliance on antidiscrimination law to channel language 
related issues has stymied the development of a complete understanding of 
the social significance of language, or an understanding that reaches be 
yond the language minority's interest in acquiring the dominant language. 
Because the antidiscrimination justifications for accommodationist policies 
are not connected to a substantive conception of the social status of lan 
guage, our policy discourse is impoverished. 
Put slightly differently, reliance on the language of race discrimina 
tion to justify language accommodation distorts the terms of the policy de 
bate. Framing language accommodation as a response to race 
discrimination makes it difficult to justify language policy to lawmakers 
who understand language and race to be distinct phenomena. Moreover, the 
role that language plays in social life is difficult to square with the constitu 
tional doctrines that have emerged to assess racial classifications. As hu 
man interaction must occur in language, it is impossible to resolve the 
language question by concluding that the state can be blind to that charac 
teristic, particularly when speakers of multiple languages populate the pub 
lic sphere. Whereas American equal protection law revolves around the 
69. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that 
'the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular moment is 
... a matter of 
choicer (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980))) (emphasis added); Gloor, 618 
F.2d at 269 (asserting that Title VII was not intended to protect characteristics over which individuals 
exercise control, and emphasizing that civil rights laws do not "prohibit all arbitrary employment 
practices," but rather focus on prohibiting discrimination on basis of traits that are "beyond the victim's 
power to alter"). 
70. See infra notes 253-268 and accompanying text. 
71. Patten, supra note 26, at 693. 
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principle that race has no inherent relevance to a person's capacity to par 
ticipate in social life, language, with its behavioral and social characteris 
tics, shapes that very capacity. As a result, linguistic diversity cannot be 
deemed a purely private or personal phenomenon, as one might character 
ize certain aspects of culture or religion. Relying conceptually on a body of 
law that rejects the social significance of race is counterproductive to a pol 
icy discourse that must fully embrace language difference, whether the de 
sired end is monolingualism or multilingualism.72 We may reach the 
ultimate conclusion that the public sphere should be monolingual. But that 
conclusion cannot be based reasonably on the assumption that the speaking 
of language is a matter of purely private concern. 
C. Rethinking the Remedial Paradigm 
In many ways, the American approach to language difference stands 
in sharp contrast to the language regimes of other constitutional democra 
cies. The latter guarantee substantive rights to secure the interests and sur 
vival of national minorities. National minorities do exist in the United 
States. But our language rights discourse revolves around the transitional 
interests of immigrants and the importance of their rapid acquisition of 
English-language skills. Despite this core difference, however, all of the 
systems I have discussed share a basic assumption: the cultural interests of 
national minorities and immigrants are distinguishable. This distinction, 
which I call the "national minority paradigm," embodies a powerful im 
pulse that pervades national and international law73 alike-the impulse to 
distinguish between the historically present minority and the new arrival. 
Whereas the linguistic culture of the former is to be preserved, members of 
the latter group must assimilate.74 
In this Section, I challenge the presumption that substantive language 
rights belong only to particular national minorities and make clear why the 
72. Were American constitutional law to make a turn toward a culture- or behavior-based 
approach to race, then the analogy of language to race might be more useful. But the wisdom of such a 
turn is well beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, the crucial point is that the current 
treatment of language minorities has resulted in an impoverished conception of the social significance 
of language. For an excellent critique of the colorblind view, in the wake of which the race and 
language parallel would become more viable, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is 
Color-Blind,"44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1991). 
73. See, e.g., European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages Part I, art. 1, para, a, Nov. 
5, 1992, E.T.S. 148 (protecting languages "traditionally used within a given territory of a State by 
nationals ofthat State," and "not... the languages of migrants"). 
74. Some scholars have suggested that certain types of language rights need not be thought of as 
strictly belonging to national minority groups. In drawing a distinction between instrumental language 
rights, or rights designed to help language minorities overcome linguistic obstacles, and 
noninstrumental rights, or rights intended to secure the "linguistic environment" of language minorities, 
Rubio-Mar?n concludes that there is "no reason to limit the instrumental rights to autochthonous 
national minorities, no matter how broad the consensus that only those groups should be accorded non 
instrumental language rights." Rubio-Mar?n, supra note 31, at 73. 
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linguistic interests of non-national minorities should be the subject of a 
theory of language difference. I do not claim that we should discard the 
national minority paradigm, for it provides a useful means of cabining 
claims to territorial sovereignty, self-determination, and minority-run insti 
tutions. Furthermore, national minorities and immigrants do have different 
interests and are differently positioned in relation to the nation-state.75 In 
stead, in challenging the national minority/immigrant dichotomy, I empha 
size that immigrants often have cultural interests that resemble those of 
national minorities. I therefore seek to discredit the idea that language 
rights discourse has no place in U.S. law and to demonstrate a need for a 
conception of language rights different than either of the ones just ex 
plored. 
The national minority paradigm requires rethinking for at least three 
reasons. First, at the core of the distinction between immigrants and na 
tional minorities rests an oversimplified assumption about human agency 
that immigrants have chosen to abandon their culture of origin. As one 
scholar has framed it, immigrants are cultural minorities as a result of 
choices they have made, and they therefore have "no right-based claim 
to . . . [the] protection of] their heritage culture."76 As Will Kymlicka ex 
plains, "National minorities have resisted integration and fought to main 
tain or rebuild their own societal culture, while immigrants have accepted 
the expectation they will integrate into the dominant societal culture."77 
Indeed, the major immigrant countries of the West, including the United 
States, have managed over the past 150 years to integrate extraordinary 
numbers of immigrants without substantial risk to their stability or national 
unity. This reality reflects a strong historical tendency toward integration, 
as well as acceptance by immigrants that they must integrate into the domi 
nant culture.78 
75. The national minority paradigm has the advantage of appealing to advocates of judicial 
restraint. For example, in interpreting the right to have courtroom proceedings conducted in the 
language of one's choice, the Supreme Court of Canada cited the genesis of language rights in the 
Anglo-Franco political bargain in concluding that the right to speak both official languages in federal 
court did not include the right to be understood, meaning that simultaneous interpretation provided 
adequate linguistic accommodation. See Ass'n of Parents for Fairness in Educ. v. Soci?t? des Acadiens 
duNouveau-Brunswick, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, 555-56 (Can.). 
76. Joseph Heath, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Social Contract, 10 Can. J.L. & Juris. 
343, 355 (1997); see also Macmillan, supra note 59, at 189 (arguing that immigrants make a 
particular choice that involves ceding claims to language guarantees). 
77. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and 
Citizenship 156 (2001). To be sure, Kymlicka does advocate that immigrants be integrated on "fair 
terms" and outlines a number of proposals for culturally aware integrationist policies that 
"respect... the identities of ethnocultural minorities" while encouraging them to participate in 
mainstream institutions. See id. at 162-63. 
78. Id. at 152-56; see also Michael Walzer, Comment, in Multiculturalism 99, 103 (Charles 
Taylor ed., 1994) ("[Immigrants] intended (and still intend), were prepared (and still are prepared), to 
take cultural risks when they came here and to leave the certainties of their old way of life behind."). 
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The simplicity of this claim has a certain resonance, and the process 
of migration, when viewed from a distance, does suggest that assimilation 
is inexorable. But the cultural reality of immigration is far more compli 
cated than an abstracted sense of history permits us to see. It has become 
commonplace to note that various factors, sometimes referred to as a 
"push-pull" dynamic, lead people to migrate to countries like the United 
States. These factors include economic necessity, war and persecution, the 
desire for greater educational or professional opportunities, or the failure of 
migrants' own states to provide the conditions for living a meaningful 
life.79 Migration is also often a function of a "history of prior contact be 
tween sending and receiving societies.'80 This feature of migration sug 
gests not only that the receiving society has participated in some way in the 
conditions that generated the migration, but also that migration is not gen 
erally about abandonment. Immigrants cannot but be aware that cultural 
dislocation awaits them, but they may also expect to find family members 
and culturally and linguistically familiar communities in receiving socie 
ties. In fact, studies document migrants' tendency to gravitate to particular 
places in receiving societies because of the social networks that exist there 
to support them.81 
Migrants ultimately conceive of their relationship with the host soci 
ety in a wide variety of ways.82 A growing academic literature documents 
that immigrants to countries like the United States increasingly forge 
"transnational ties," or live a "transnational lifestyle." They act with the 
intention of "participat[ing] in the political and economic lives of their 
homelands, even as they are incorporated into their host societies."83 Con 
tributing to this phenomenon, "homeland" societies facilitate the retention 
79. See Thomas Holzer, Gerald Schneider, & Thomas Widmer, The Impact of Legislative 
Deterrence Measures on the Number of Asylum Applications in Switzerland (1986-1995), 34 Int'l 
Migration Rev. 1182, 1187 (2000) (describing "the 'push' and 'pull' factors [that] simultaneously 
contribute to migration"). For a critique of economic push-pull theories, see Alejandro Portes & J?zsef 
B?r?cz, Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on its Determinants and Modes of 
Incorporation, 23 Int'l Migration Rev. 606, 607 (1989) (arguing that push-pull theories that explain 
migration as the outcome of poverty in the sending countries are misguided). 
80. Portes & B?r?cz, supra note 79, at 608. 
81. See id. at 612-13. 
82. Cf. Bhiku Parekh, The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy, in The 
Rights of Minority Cultures 303, 311 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) ("[Immigrants] stand in different 
historical and contractual relations to the receiving country. Again, some immigrants are or see 
themselves as short-term residents anxious after a few years to return to their countries of origin or to 
move elsewhere; some are or see themselves as long-term residents anxious eventually to return to their 
countries of origin and in the meantime to remain and work within, but not to become full members of, 
the host society; some others want to remain members of their countries of origin as well as become 
full members of the host country; yet others have completely broken with countries of origin."). 
83. Peggy Levitt, The Transnational Villagers 3 (2001); see also id. at 15-21 (discussing 
the various theories and manifestations of "transnationalism"). 
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of dual identity through a variety of legal mechanisms that enable migrants 
to remain political participants in their countries of origin.84 
Ultimately, the phenomenon of migration is too complex to advance 
any single conclusion about migrants' intent. Indeed, given the changes in 
migration patterns noted in Part I,85 the rapid assimilation story that charac 
terized the German, Italian, and Jewish immigrations to the United States 
may turn out to be historically anomalous, and not the paradigm case.86 In 
other words, immigrants today more closely resemble national minorities 
in their expectations than they do their predecessors of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. What is more, as Kymlicka suggests, it was 
not until the post-civil rights era that a culture of tolerance that permitted 
difference to flourish prevailed in North America87-a political culture that 
changes the terms of immigrants' arrival by making it easier for them to 
retain a connection to their cultures of origin than in the past. If we shift 
our frame of reference from the borders of the United States to a more 
global perspective-a shift in orientation called for because of changes in 
trade and labor relations-then today's immigrants stand similarly posi 
tioned to the groups conventionally described as national minorities. The 
claim that immigrants ought to assimilate may still be valid. But that claim 
cannot be based on a foundation of consent. 
The second reason to reconsider the national minority paradigm stems 
from the universal salience of linguistic identity. Even those systems that 
ground language rights on a concept of historical desert also elaborate the 
content of those rights in terms of the universally applicable attributes of 
language. Take Canada as an example. On the one hand, to define the lan 
guage regime's scope, Canadian courts and politicians frequently make the 
claims that Anglophones and Francophones constitute Canada's "founding 
people," and that the very concept of language rights arose from the politi 
cal compromise that formed the confederation.88 The Canadian Charter's 
declaration of equal status for French and English supports the idea that 
language rights recognize these two groups' status as original, founding, 
84. See id. at 19. The Congress of the Dominican Republic has considered creating a legislative 
seat that would represent migrants. "Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Portugal, to name a few, 
have all amended their constitutions to include migrants as official members of their political 
communities, though each country grants them different political rights." Id. 
85. See supra notes 21 and 23 (discussing ways in which replenishment of minority groups 
through ongoing immigration will change characteristics of ethnic identification). 
86. I owe this formulation to Noah Feldman. 
87. See Kymlicka, supra note 26, at 14. 
88. See, e.g., Ass'n of Parents for Fairness in Educ. v. Soci?t? des Acadiens du Nouveau 
Brunswick, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, 555-56 (Can.) (noting that language rights remain founded on a 
political compromise). For a discussion of the founding peoples view in Canadian jurisprudence, see 
Denise G. R?aume, The Demise of the Political Compromise Doctrine: Have Official Language Use 
Rights Been Revived?, 47 McGill L.J. 593, 598-601 (2002). 
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historically entrenched people.89 This historical justification has emerged 
alongside a discourse of stability and national unity.90 The argument that 
language rights have emerged to solidify a political compromise has led the 
Supreme Court of Canada to find that language rights "lack the universal 
ity, generality and fluidity of basic rights resulting from the rules of natural 
justice,"'" precisely because they represent a narrowly defined set of spe 
cific provisions created to give legitimacy to a political reconciliation.92 
At the same time, the court, despite its emphasis of the founding mo 
ment, has acknowledged that language rights function as mechanisms of 
reconciliation only because they embody an appreciation of language's 
value to individuals and groups.93 Language rights amount to more than a 
simple set of clearly defined prescriptions articulated in a constitutional 
compromise; they embody a concept with evolving content. Defining the 
scope of language rights has required the court to interpret them in light of 
the role language plays in the creation of individual and group identity 
generally, not just in the context of the Anglo-Franco political bargain. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized repeatedly that 
"[language ... colours the content and meaning of expression" and serves 
as the vehicle for expression of individual identity.94 Members of the court 
have drawn a connection between the language one speaks and the process 
of human development, emphasizing that language "bridges the gap be 
tween isolation and community, allowing humans to delineate the rights 
and duties they hold in respect of one another, and thus to live in society."95 
89. .See Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.), ? 16 (Can.) (establishing English and French as coequal official languages). 
90. Though the two should not be confused, they tend to reinforce one another and to entrench 
the national minority paradigm. See, e.g., Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minster of Canada, House of 
Commons Debate (May 31, 1973) (arguing that language rights are protected "[n]ot primarily because 
of any historical founding rights .... We are dealing with straightforward political and social 
realities .... If only because of sheer force of numbers, either group has the power to destroy the unity 
of this country.") (quoted in Macmillan, supra note 59, at 168). 
91. MacDonald v. Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, 500 (Can.). 
92. See, e.g., Fed'n Provinciale des Comit?s de Parents, Inc. v. AG of Manitoba, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 
839, 851 (Can.); Reference re Section 79(3), (4), and (7) of the Public Schools Act of Manitoba, 
[1990] 67 D.L.R. 4th 488, 559-60 (O'Sullivan, J.A., concurring) (Can.), rev'd, [1993] 100 D.L.R. 4th 
723. For examples of the restrained approach to the interpretation of language rights taken by the court 
in the 1980s, see MacDonald, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 460 (holding that issuance of unilingual summons in 
French to English speaker did not violate s. 133's provision that either French or English may be used 
by any person or in any pleading or process issuing from any Court of Canada or Quebec) and Ass 'n of 
Parents for Fairness in Educ, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 549 (holding that right to use either official language 
in court proceedings did not include right to be understood). 
93. For a discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's move away from the political 
compromise doctrine in favor of a more robust reading of the Charter's language guarantees in all 
contexts, including in the courtroom, see R?aume, supra note 88, at 593. 
94. Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 716 (Can.). 
95. Ass'n of Parents for Fairness in Educ, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, at 563 (Can.) (internal citation 
omitted) (Dickson, C.J., concurring); see also R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, 786 (Can.) 
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Under this view, the reason language rights offer a viable means 
through which to secure political compromises is that they acknowledge 
the fundamental role language plays in creating and sustaining social ties, 
and they incorporate a core feature of a group's cultural practices into the 
constitutional foundations of the nation. As Canadian scholar C. Michael 
Macmillan explains, the importance of language rights "depends on the 
place of language in the daily life and self-definition of the cultural com 
munity."96 Though these rights are not "supremely sacred," they resemble 
fundamental human rights in important respects and have significance for 
language groups "that goes beyond the historical particularity of 
'compromise rights. "'97 The conclusion that immigrants can expect to rec 
reate their cultural practices only informally, or without institutional sup 
port,98 coheres with the liberal rhetoric of neutrality.99 But it is in tension 
with what I take to be multicultural theory's key contribution to the liberal 
perspective-that cultural affiliations are relevant to people's abilities to 
find their way to the good life and to make complete political and social 
choices.100 This understanding of culture applies no less to immigrants than 
to long-entrenched national minorities. This catholicity underscores the 
limitations of grounding language rights in long-standing territorial or his 
torical claims. 
A tension thus exists between this universalistic, dignitary conception 
of the significance of language and the equation of language rights with 
groups possessing a particular historical pedigree.101 Even in societies 
where the national minority paradigm cannot be escaped, it seems that cul 
ture-based rights, to be meaningful, must be justified in light of the nature 
of culture and its relationship to participation in social life, not just as the 
result of a hierarchy based on historical presence.102 Put slightly differently, 
(Bastarache, J.) (citing Ass 'n of Parents for Fairness in Educ, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 560 (Dickson, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
96. Macmillan, supra note 59, at 22. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., Heath, supra note 76, at 355. 
99. See Amy Gutmann, Introduction, in Multiculturalism 3, 10 (Charles Taylor ed., 1994). 
("Liberal democracy is suspicious of the demand to enlist politics in the preservation of separate group 
identities or the survival of subcultures that otherwise would not flourish through the free association of 
citizens."). 
100. See discussion infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text (discussing the affective case for 
participation through an articulation of basic principles of multicultural theory). 
101. One of liberalism's compelling features is its regard for the "moral unity of the human 
species" and its accordance of "secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural 
forms." Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights? in The Rights of Minority Cultures, 
228, 231 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). Kukathas also points out that "[g]roups or cultural communities do 
not exist prior to or independently of legal and political institutions but are given shape by those 
institutions." Id. at 232. This again suggests that claims for recognition should not depend on some kind 
of historical status, because that status is itself constructed, not inherent. 
102. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, National Minorities and Ethnic Immigrants: Liberalism's Political 
Sociology, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 54, 56 (2002) (observing that in "liberal democracies, differentiating among 
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whereas a group's status as a national minority clearly has political signifi 
cance,"03 this status has limited moral significance. The status does not enti 
tle national minorities to any greater respect of their cultural interests than 
would be owed to them as culture-bearing individuals. Historical realities 
may shape the form that equal respect takes, or the specific institutional 
responses a system adopts to manage cultural controversies, but they do not 
provide moral justification for limiting the respect to national minorities. 
Injecting a universalistic ethos into the effort to accommodate language 
differences "does not necessarily exclude consideration of historical condi 
tions, but it refocuses such consideration into a larger assessment of the 
requirements for the present-day realization of human values."104 Under 
this view, history becomes a useful resource for crafting politically viable 
policies, not a reason for according recognition to a group's language in the 
first instance. 
The final reason to rethink the distinction drawn between immigrant 
societies and societies populated by national minorities is that these socie 
ties are often one and the same. In the United States, for example, national 
minorities always have been a part of the population. To be sure, the socio 
linguistic consensus holds that communities of non-English speakers in the 
United States are fed more by present-day immigration than by "language 
maintenance" among national minority populations.105 But the presence of 
national minorities is inescapable. Native Americans, in particular, have 
acute linguistic interests, as many of their surviving languages face extinc 
tion.106 In many cases, national minorities are not distinguishable from 
citizens simply on the basis of prior membership, without additional justification... appears to 
contradict the basic liberal commitment of giving equal importance to the interests of every citizen"). 
103. During a debate in the House of Commons in 1973, former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau explained the justification for official bilingualism in Canada as follows: the Francophone 
minority must be recognized as equal in Canada "not primarily because of any historical founding 
rights, though they are important to many people .... We are dealing with straightforward political and 
social realities ... [that] leave Canada with only one choice, only one realistic policy: to guarantee the 
language rights of both linguistic communities." Trudeau, supra note 90 (quoted in Macmillan, supra 
note 59, at 168). 
104. S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights 
Claims, in The Rights of Minority Cultures 321, 327 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); cf. Avishai 
Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, in The Rights of minority cultures 79, 88 
(Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); ("But a history of persecution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for the instrumental case for self-government.... [Persecution is not the only reason why 
the groups may suffer without independence .... [TJhere may be other ways to fight and overcome 
persecution[,] and... independence ... may lead to economic decline, cultural decay, or social 
disorder, which only make their members worse off"). 
105. See Richard Y. Bourhis & David E. Marshall, The United States and Canada, in Handbook 
of Language and Ethnic Identity 244,250 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1999). 
106. Because claims made by indigenous peoples around the world stem from similar histories 
marked by colonial drives to extinguish native populations, either physically through military conquest 
or culturally through coerced assimilation, the remedy of cultural revival seems a natural response. 
While the claim to remediation of historical injustice represents only one of the many types of claims 
indigenous activists can and have asserted, see Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing 
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immigrants. In the United States, for example, immigration is not the sole 
source of the Latino population. The Southwest was Mexico until the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1850, and the current "Mexican Ameri 
can" populations of the region have inhabited their territory since long be 
fore statehood. These groups legitimately qualify as entrenched national 
minorities. Similarly, Puerto Ricans in the United States are not immi 
grants; since the early twentieth century, they have been natural-born citi 
zens. The complicated commonwealth status imposed on Puerto Rico by a 
trade between colonial powers (albeit a status Puerto Ricans now generally 
accept as a compromise between independence and statehood) justifies 
treating Puerto Ricans living on the island as a nation within the United 
States. Puerto Ricans living in the fifty states thus represent a kind of na 
tional subgroup with historically based claims to linguistic and cultural 
rights.'07 And, as noted at the outset, the uniquely ongoing nature of pre 
sent-day immigration serves to "refresh" the ethnic identities of minorities 
living in the United States, highlighting the artificiality of distinguishing 
between the types of minorities that make up cultural subcommunities in 
the United States.'08 
At the end of the day, the United States should move beyond the na 
tional minority paradigm because it privileges the less compelling justifica 
tion for language-based claims, not because national minorities do, in fact, 
live within the boundaries of the nation. The value of language and culture 
to the individual can be articulated in universal terms, underscoring that the 
language-based claims of groups formed largely through recent migration 
have an inescapable legitimacy. Rethinking the national minority paradigm 
along these lines will help ensure that the concept of "language rights" re 
mains capable of responding to the evolution of language groups, whether 
national minority or immigrant-based. 
Conceptual Structures of Indigenous People's Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 189 (2001), the indigenous case powerfully underscores the validity of 
revival as a remedy. At the same time, however, the sui generis quality of the indigenous claim to 
language recognition based on a history of colonial dispossession highlights the limitations of the 
remedial justification. Precisely because remediation for a serious historical offense may well require 
the state to actively perpetuate a minority culture, emphasizing the remedial justification for language 
rights permits majorities to define the universe of legitimate language-based claims in terms of the 
unique case of severe repression, thereby ignoring the far larger set of language-based concerns that do 
not stem from a history of brutality. While the unique posture of indigenous populations' claims may 
well make a remedial and hence preservationist approach politically palatable in their context, the 
participatory conception laid out below offers an alternative way of thinking about language claims that 
is both more comprehensive and more appealing as a general matter. 
107. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding section 4(e) of Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, which provides that no person who has completed sixth grade in Puerto Rican school where 
language of instruction was not English shall be denied right to vote because of inability to read or 
write English; provision was upheld even though federal statute prohibited enforcement of New York 
laws requiring ability to read and write English as a condition of voting). 
108. See supra notes 21 and 23. 
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Moving in this universalistic direction need not mean that we must 
accord all language groups equal status in all circumstances, nor would it 
preclude declaring some groups' claims more compelling than others. It 
may well be that immigrants, as a group, have been and will continue to be 
less inclined to fight for the long-term survival of their cultural communi 
ties than national minorities.109 The strong assimilationist narrative accord 
ing to which immigrants come to societies like the United States seeking 
cultural transformation may be based on a crude understanding of con 
sent.110 But the sociological data describing the linguistic assimilation of 
immigrants discussed above suggests that we should take seriously a 
weaker version of the assimilation narrative.111 Indeed, the history of Ger 
man immigrants, whose language and culture were once pervasive in the 
United States,112 demonstrates that the cultural issues associated with im 
migration work themselves out over two or three generations, whether we 
pursue an assimilationist or an accommodationist language policy.113 
But even if immigrants are less likely to fight for cultural survival 
than national minorities, the language question in a society like the United 
States should not be seen as a purely transitional one. Steady immigration 
makes bilingualism a cross-generational social phenomenon by ensuring 
that the foreign-born and their immediate descendants will be present for 
the foreseeable future, even though a given family line may assimilate 
completely within three to four generations and become English dominant 
within only two. Efforts to address our present demography should not be 
skewed by the assumption that, in a century's time, Spanish or commonly 
spoken Asian languages will be as marginal in the United States as German 
is today. 
Relying on the national minority paradigm to frame the issue of lan 
guage rights results in a worldview where assimilation represents the only 
option for immigrants, because its opposite-self-government-is implau 
sible. But this framework ignores the possibility that existing legal and so 
cial institutions can be transformed to create a public sphere that 
recognizes a variety of cultural identities. The proliferation of market 
provided services and media outlets in languages other than English across 
109. Compare Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 229 (documenting linguistic assimilation patterns of 
immigrants in United States) with supra notes 34-66 (discussing survival claims of national minorities 
in Spain, Latvia, and Canada). 
110. See supra notes 79-84. 
111. See Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 229. 
112. See generally Heinz Kloss, The American Bilingual Tradition ( 1998). 
113. See Robert Henry Billigmeier, Recent German Immigration to America, in Contemporary 
American Immigration: Interpretive Essays 110 (1982) ("Even though the German immigrants 
came in large numbers in most periods of American history, and though they often gathered themselves 
into at least loosely formed communities, their assimilation occurred relatively fast. The persistence of 
some aspects of their traditions, attachments, and sense of a special identity has not prevented the 
acquiring of the major patterns of American culture and identity."). 
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the United States, and the spectacle of politicians scrambling to inject 
Spanish into campaign speeches, suggest that public culture can sustain 
varied linguistic turns-that it can, in fact, be linguistically transformed. In 
the end, the national minority paradigm simply cannot account for the vari 
ety of speech communities that any given multilingual society must gov 
ern, because the linguistic profiles of this country and others are more 
diverse than the national minority paradigm suggests. 
D. Final Thoughts on Remediation 
Both conceptions of language rights outlined in this Part will play an 
important role in any language rights discourse. Survivalism represents a 
necessary response to historical relationships and circumstances, and the 
transitional approach, supported by a general antidiscrimination impera 
tive, will perform a useful integrative function in multilingual democracies, 
like the United States, that receive large-scale immigration. It may be that a 
combination of these two principles will be adequate for managing lan 
guage-related conflict by giving the most vocal language minorities institu 
tions of their own, protecting minorities within minorities through laws that 
prohibit deliberate forms of discrimination or oppression, and ensuring that 
language difference is not a permanent barrier to integration. But these re 
medial ideas, while necessary, are limited as organizational principles for a 
multilingual society. 
The dominant, survivalist approach to language rights is limited by its 
inability to deal with the linguistic consequences of immigration. It results 
in an incomplete appreciation of the linguistic interests of immigrants in 
societies dominated by historical struggles between long-standing national 
minority groups. Indeed, it has little or nothing to offer on the subject of 
general bilingualism, as opposed to bilingualism in the state's official or 
dominant languages, which is a key issue in polyglot, immigrant societies 
such as the United States, Canada, or the European Union. Because it looks 
backward for its raison d'etre, the remedial objective tends to ignore the 
emergence of new linguistic groups and the changing character of existing 
groups, and it does not account for the multilingualism that remains once 
the goals of survivalism have been achieved. A remedial principle focused 
on ensuring that language minorities acquire skills in the dominant lan 
guage does not specify how an institution should respond to inescapable 
multilingualism in its population that will nonetheless persist. What is 
more, the basic claim that all people should be free from language-based 
discrimination assumes an essential connection between cultural identity 
and human dignity that calls for forms of affirmative recognition. The par 
ticipatory approach I offer in Part II thus reorients language policy to ac 
count for the linguistic interests that fall outside the parameters of the 
various remedial rationales identified above. 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2006] LANG UA GE AND PARTICIPATION 719 
II 
LANGUAGE AND PARTICIPATION 
It may make sense as a structural matter to think of language differ 
ence in terms of how it affects interactions among people, but why moti 
vate people to participate at all? In my view, the experience of participation 
in a collective social endeavor has both social and personal benefits. 
Through interaction and cooperation with others, people become socially 
invested, because they acquire a sense of ownership over the institutions 
that govern their activities and a stake in the long-term viability of those 
institutions.114 Moreover, participation in civic life gives rise to a sense of 
control over one's destiny and the destiny of one's children by giving indi 
viduals voice in the institutions that inevitably shape that destiny. In fram 
ing participation in this manner, I take certain cues from theories of 
democracy that emphasize experimentation and collaboration. Under such 
frameworks, it is through organization and social action, or by thinking and 
working together, that the concept of individual autonomy acquires mean 
ing, and self-realization becomes possible."15 Additionally, experimental 
forms of organization and active collaboration among social actors teach 
problem solving and therefore promote learning.'16 In developing a partici 
patory approach to language difference, then, I focus on how to motivate 
and facilitate participation in a manner that adds experimental and dynamic 
energy to institutions while leaving individuals with autonomy over mat 
ters of deep personal concern. 
At first glance, encouraging participation might seem to require pro 
motion of a common language for the sake of communication. After all, 
effective participation depends on many of the virtues that advocates of 
rapid linguistic assimilation extol; under their view, deliberation, the crea 
tion of a common political identity, and social mobility all depend on the 
possibility of communication in a common language.'17 If we adopt this 
assumption, it might seem appropriate to emphasize the instrumental as 
pects of language and converge on a monolingual policy, rather than a 
114. This sense of ownership stems from a feeling of "political efficacy" derived from the exercise 
of control?a concept that contemporary theorists trace to the theories of Rousseau and Mill. See 
generally Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 22-35 (1970). 
115. See, e.g., John Dewey, Renascent Liberalism, in John Dewey: The Political Writings 
142,148,151-52 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). 
116. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 283-89 (1999) (discussing a new model of democratic 
experimentalism, inspired by Dewey's pragmatism and designed to promote practical collaboration as a 
form of democratic action); see also James S. Liebman & Charles Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey 
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 183, 303 (2003) (discussing how new techniques and principles emerge from "problem 
solving diversity"). 
117. Ronald Schmidt, Sr., Language Policy and Identity Politics in the United States 
139-45 (2000) (discussing debate over rapid assimilation policies). 
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multilingual policy that takes account of the cultural value of particular 
mother tongues to individuals or social subgroups. Certainly scholars of 
language conflict have observed that the typical human response to the 
"Babel of languages" is to "carve out a space in which only 'our' language 
is spoken""' in a quest for a homogeneity conducive to easy communica 
tion. 
But the need for a multilingual account of participation, which seems 
counterintuitive at first glance, becomes obvious upon frither analysis. To 
establish this claim, I begin from the premise that an adequate theory of 
democratic participation for a large and dizzyingly diverse society like the 
United States must be based on principles of decentralization. In taking this 
approach to participation, I contemplate not only decentralization accord 
ing to a federalist design of some sort, but also the decentralization of our 
perspective from governmental institutions to the mid-level social and cul 
tural institutions that structure most people's daily lives, such as the public 
schools and the workplace.119 
Decentralization, in the first, federalist sense, represents a time 
honored mechanism for channeling conflict and diversity of all types, as 
well as for enhancing the responsiveness of government to the concerns of 
the people. In a large, heterogeneous society, decentralization makes prag 
matic sense, because it allows decision making about diversity to be maxi 
mally responsive to changing circumstances and preferences across the 
population. The popularity of culture-based devolution in other parts of the 
world and federalism in the United States both reflect this intuition.120 
I carry the idea of decentralization an important step further by focus 
ing on interaction in social institutions, rather than on participation at high 
levels of government. As theorists of participatory democracy explain, for 
democracy to thrive, participation must be understood broadly to include 
the sites of true social engagement.121 Participation in high-level national 
118. Shell, supra note 30, at 1. 
119. "[F]or a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist.... The 
most important area is industry; most individuals spend a great deal of their lifetime at work and the 
business of the workplace provides an education in the management of collective affairs that it is 
difficult to parallel elsewhere." Pateman, supra note 114, at 43; see also Cynthia Estlund, 
Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (2003). 
120. Even in the American context, a discussion of decentralization need not be limited by 
existing federal structures. In developing his theory of democratic experimentalism, Charles Sabel, in 
particular, argues that we need new ways of effecting decentralization's productive possibilities. His 
model depends on "linked systems of local and inter-local" collaboration, see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 
116, at 287. The model also envisions collaboration between citizens and agencies that avoids the 
limitations of both top-down and bottom-up decision making, see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 
191 (arguing that educational reform has succeeded where top-down and bottom-up decision making 
has been avoided), 271 (discussing collaboration). 
121. "The theory of participatory democracy is built round the central assertion that individuals 
and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another. The existence of 
representative institutions at the national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum 
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institutions is not sufficient to produce a vital democracy. Because our 
lives are intimately intertwined with mid-level institutions, such as the 
workplace and the public schools, a political system that depends on the 
active engagement of the people must be concerned about the nature of 
participation in these types of places. The "authority structures" of mid 
level institutions, therefore, should function as political systems organized 
to provide individuals with the "maximum amount of control over their 
own lives and environment."122 Giving individuals this kind of control en 
courages them to engage with community affairs and to invest in public 
institutions and the people those institutions serve. 
Once we frame our understanding of participation in this manner, 
multilingualism becomes an asset, not a threat, to effective participation. 
Respecting and promoting bilingualism in individuals and multilingualism 
in our institutions will improve the quality of communication and participa 
tion in those institutions. This improvement will emerge for instrumental 
as well as affective reasons. Instrumentally speaking, participation re 
quires communication among social actors in at least three direc 
tions: (1) among individuals within the same linguistic sub 
communities; (2) among individuals of different linguistic subcommuni 
ties; and (3) between subcommunities and the majority language commu 
nity. As I explain below, bilingualism in individuals and multilingualism in 
society is what makes this varied communication possible. And as an af 
fective matter, the process of weaving different linguistic groups into a po 
litical community requires recognition of the emotional associations with 
family, heritage, and community that give particular languages value to 
their speakers.123 A multilingual approach to participation, ultimately, ad 
dresses the practical implications of an inescapable demographic reality 
and provides a means of managing that reality while still maintaining re 
spect for personal preferences. 
The Canadian case helps illuminate why embracing linguistic diver 
sity promotes participation. Despite being structured around a remedial 
paradigm focused on the interests of national minorities, the Canadian 
participation by all the people at that level, socialisation, or 'social training', for democracy must take 
place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be 
developed." Pateman, supra note 114, at 42; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1573 (1988) ("Citizenship... does not occur solely through official 
organs. Many organizations?including labor unions, religious associations, women's groups of 
various sorts, civil rights organizations, volunteer and charitable groups, and others ... serve as outlets 
for some of the principal functions of republican systems."). 
122. Pateman, supra note 114, at 43. 
123. Compare this to Alan Patten's discussion of language recognition, in which he identifies three 
distinct aspects of language: the interest in communication, the interest in symbolic affirmation, and the 
interest in identity promotion. See Patten, supra note 26, at 695. In my view, the latter two are both 
aspects of what I call the affective side of language, but I prefer to describe the affective dimension in 
terms of connection to family and community?an interest that may include but is not necessarily 
limited to symbolic affirmation or identity promotion. 
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language rights regime draws as well from a participatory ethic. The lan 
guage rights protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1980 
emerged from a long period of debate in the 1960s and '70s over how best 
to elevate the status of Canadian Francophones, who were persistently un 
derrepresented in public life and at the top of the socioeconomic ladder.'24 
Many of the language rights ultimately included in the Charter, as well as 
subsequent federal and provincial statutes, were intended to enhance 
Francophones' participation in the institutions of public and social life. 
The principle of bilingual enactment, which requires that government 
enact all laws in both English and French, gave Francophones a sense of 
ownership over the law and the lawmaking process.'25 The bilingualization 
of the federal bureaucracy promised to make government more accessible 
to Francophones generally and to ensure that Francophones had equal op 
portunity to participate in government work. The right to have one's chil 
dren educated in one's mother tongue gave Francophones control over 
forms of decision making central to the transmission of their culture from 
one generation to the next.'26 These and many other constitutional and 
statutory enactments recognized the fact of linguistic pluralism and at 
tempted to impose a structure on law and social institutions that would 
keep Canada's two major language groups socially invested.'27 In so doing, 
Canadian reform efforts also embodied a respect for people's personal at 
tachments to language and culture, as well as a corresponding recognition 
that fostering participation requires acknowledgment of these attach 
ments.'28 Today, the guarantees provide a framework for fostering partici 
pation in Canadian public life by making government accessible to 
Anglophones and Francophones alike.'29 
124. See Silver, supra note 53, at 693 (discussing the underrepresentation of Francophones in 
public service). 
125. See Constitution Act, 1867, U.K. 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3; see also Roderick A. MacDonald, 
Legal Bilingualism, 42 McGill L.J. 119, 145 (1997) (arguing that official bilingualism contemplates 
popular ownership over law by acknowledging that full "normativity" of law can be apprehended only 
"through 'committed practices' in both languages."). 
126. See Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.), ? 23 (Can.). 
127. See, e.g., R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, 786-87 (Can.); see also R?aume, supra note 88, 
at 601-11. 
128. The same could be said of language policies in the autonomous communities of Spain. The 
autonomous communities have understood the goal of their language policies to be both the 
normalization of the minority language and the global use of that language. They have sought to 
structure a legal regime that revives the minority languages, protects them from the force of 
assimilation, and makes them viable as languages in public institutions. See Rubio-Mar?n, supra note 
39, at 122. 
129. The Supreme Court of Canada has read the Charter's equal status principle to contain an 
aspirational element, according to which judges should interpret language rights in terms that contribute 
to the pursuit of de facto equal status. .See Ass'n of Parents for Fairness in Educ. v. Soci?t? des 
Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, 554 (Can.). (Dickson, C.J., concurring). 
According to Canadian scholar Andr? Bra?n, to serve their purpose language rights must provide "the 
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A. The Instrumental Case for Multilingualism 
The instrumental case for a multilingual account of participation be 
gins with the decentralization premise. The decentralized perspective on 
participation steals force from the monolingualist's argument, because the 
relevant community is no longer a large, national, monolithic one. The lin 
guistic spaces most relevant to a discussion of participation become the 
variety of public and social spaces that organize the lives of more discrete 
communities.130 Local and social institutions of course have communica 
tive interests and are run, in part, through conversation. Linguistic com 
monality will be needed, particularly in places such as New York City, 
where the nation's linguistic diversity is replicated on a much smaller scale 
and therefore intensified.'31 Yet the interest in communication is not a sin 
gle, general interest, but rather a series of interests in different types of 
communication-communication among individuals within subcommuni 
ties, among individuals from different communities, and between subcom 
munities and the body politic more generally. The goal of a theory of 
participation must be to enable people to deliberate and travel in and 
among these different spheres of life. Given the complexity of the commu 
nicative interest, then, I focus on giving language communities the capacity 
to function in two ways: internally and within a larger social context. Un 
derstanding communication in this way will help guarantee that individuals 
have access to a multiplicity of associative options.132 
1. Multilingualism and Intergroup Communication 
For individuals who either do not speak English or maintain a strong 
preference for non-English, the existence of minority language communi 
ties is vital to their ability to associate with others. For those whose bilin 
gualism tends toward preference for English, these subcommunities 
nonetheless represent a site with meaningful associative possibilities, either 
opportunity of dealing on an equal basis with the majority as well as possessing appropriate means to 
conserve their linguistic specificity." Andr? Bra?n, Language Rights, in Language Rights in 
Canada 8 (Michel Bastarache ed., 1987). 
130. See Shell, supra note 30, at 2 (discussing the "range of linguistic spaces" and calling for 
academic discussion to look beyond the space of the nation state). 
131. See generally New York City Department of Planning, supra note 12, at xi (noting that 
36% of New York City's population in 2000 was foreign born, and that the foreign-born population has 
"extremely diverse origins"); id. at 1 (noting that "46% of the population speaks a language other than 
English at home," and that New York City has no dominant racial or ethnic groups). 
132. This approach bears some resemblance to the Rawlsian strategy Alan Patten adopts in his 
liberal neutrality model: "The task of language policy is not to realize some specific linguistic outcome 
but to establish fair background conditions under which speakers of different languages can strive for 
the survival and success of their respective language communities." Alan Patten, Liberal Neutrality and 
Language Policy, 31 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 356, 366 (2003); cf. Patten, supra note 26, at 710 (discussing 
three different versions of equality relevant to language policy: equality of resources to pursue one's 
interests; equality along some social interest other than but still related to the language interest; and 
equality of success in promoting one's linguistic interests). 
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because of family connections and personal networks, or in light of cultural 
preferences. The existence and regular use of certain non-English lan 
guages is essential to the well-being of these vital subgroups. Securing a 
broad range of associative options for people thus requires embracing 
English/non-English bilingualism in individuals and therefore accepting 
social multilingualism. Given that these subgroups exist and are important 
in a participatory sense, it becomes crucial to determine how to facilitate 
intergroup communication. We require resources for dealing with the ab 
sence of a universally common language-an absence that is inescapable in 
the United States and other diverse societies, whether or not we prefer 
monolingualism. 
Making such communication possible ultimately depends on the de 
velopment of bilingual agents. Through bilingual and multilingual partici 
pants, communication can occur across groups. Facilitating the complex 
communicative interests of a multilingual society thus requires acknowl 
edging that human resources, in the form of individual bilinguals, are both 
necessary and worth developing. In other words, human resources in the 
form of members of subcommunities exist and can help bridge language 
barriers. Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized the poten 
tial of these resources: "Language permits an individual to express both a 
personal identity and membership in a community, and those who share a 
common language may interact in ways more intimate than those without 
this bond. Bilinguals, in a sense, inhabit two communities, and serve to 
bring them closer."133 
Promoting bilingualism in individuals thus simultaneously secures for 
individuals the linguistic means for social mobility and channels the bridg 
ing function bilinguals are uniquely suited to perform by using the lingua 
franca of English to link different subcommunities to one another and to a 
polyglot mainstream. Indeed, the value of the bridging function extends 
beyond our borders. The development of our linguistic capacities as a soci 
ety will give the United States a competitive edge by connecting the coun 
try, through its people, to the rest of the world. 
The affirmative development of bilingualism thus serves an integra 
tionist vision, because it unites otherwise disconnected communities.134 By 
contrast, the public demotion or exclusion of a language through restrictive 
official language laws and other means may well encourage language mi 
norities to identify with their nondominant language, as opposed to with 
133. Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 370 (1991) (upholding exclusion of bilingual individuals from 
jury). 
134. What is more, the persistence of robust democratic cultures in multilingual nation-states such 
as Spain and Canada demonstrates that a functioning political culture does not require absolute mutual 
intelligibility among all participants. 
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the society's dominant language."35 Sociolinguistic research has demon 
strated that "intergroup grievances" can foster ethnic identity and language 
use.136 In light of this possibility, an aggressively monolingual national lan 
guage policy in a multilingual nation may well undermine its own best in 
tentions. In order to develop the bilingual agents required to facilitate 
intergroup communication, then, our preference should be for policies that 
enable identification with English and minority languages both. 
But facilitating the multidirectional communication described above 
requires more than the development of bilingual agents. It also depends on 
the existence of bilingual institutions. Effective participation depends not 
just on facilitating communication among communities, but also on im 
proving access to institutions by developing institutional capacity to in 
clude non-English speakers. Achieving this objective requires setting up 
the means for interaction, either by providing targeted interpretation, or by 
delivering services and conducting business directly in non-English-a 
process that depends, naturally, on the development of bilingual agents. 
Ensuring access also requires that we focus our attention on a broad range 
of institutions, such as the local department of motor vehicles, the city 
council, the public schools, and the state and federal courts, as well as so 
cial institutions, such as the workplace. 
To be sure, the long-term consequences of a commitment to develop 
ing bilingual resources are hard to predict. In some cases, the commitment 
may lead to the complete assimilation of a group, and in others to the sur 
vival of certain subgroups. In the medium term, however, it will facilitate, 
not impede, interaction among society's various social and cultural entities. 
Commitment to bilingualism acknowledges the instrumental and cultural 
value of the dominant language to speakers of minority languages. At the 
same time, it acknowledges that rapid assimilation results in the loss of 
important cultural assets.'37 Bilingual ability, if embraced, will amplify the 
expressive capacities of both the individual and the political community. 
135. See Joshua A. Fishman, Sociolinguistics, in Handbook of Language and Ethnic 
Identity 152,154,161 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1999). 
136. Mark Janse, Introduction: Language Death and Language Maintenance: Problems and 
Prospects, in Language Death and Language Maintenance, at x (Mark Janse & Sijmen Toi eds., 
2003) ("As much as linguicide and linguistic discrimination may add to language death, they are at the 
same time powerful forces in the reawakening of ethnic identity feelings among speakers of endangered 
minority languages.... Ethnic identity is often accompanied by an increased interest in language 
maintenance."). 
137. See, e.g., Edward M. Chen, Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern 
California, Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Early Childhood, 
Youth, and Families (Nov. 1, 1995) ("America's own history dispels the notion that an 'official' 
language is needed to preserve national unity."). 
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2. The Instrumental Value of Linguistic Conflict 
While a decentralized perspective on participation helps make a multi 
lingual public life seem manageable, the presence of multiple language 
groups within local and social institutions will nonetheless give rise to lan 
guage conflict. Even in a decentralized world, the claims can be made that 
cultural homogeneity is necessary to maintain stability and that popular 
forms of government require people to organize themselves around a 
common language and culture. These claims, however, overlook several 
important realities. 
As a sociological matter, while multiethnic societies may be inher 
ently less stable than homogeneous ones,138 a homogeneous United States 
would be nearly impossible to achieve in light of immigration patterns. 
These patterns underscore that even a restrictive immigration law designed 
to increase our cultural homogeneity would not alleviate the pressure ex 
erted by the market forces that propel immigration.139 One way to regard 
language conflict, then, is as inevitable in a multiethnic society. Because 
monolingualism is not an achievable goal from a demographic perspective, 
we would be wise to develop the bridging capacity of bilingual agents and 
the linguistic capacity of institutions to help ameliorate the inevitable con 
flict. 
But linguistic diversity is not just inevitable. It is arguably the only 
acceptable alternative in a liberal democracy. The social and personal costs 
of the forced assimilation required to homogenize the population 
curtailing personal autonomy, threatening social isolation, creating culture 
based inequalities-would be anathema to basic liberal democratic princi 
ples. Perhaps more importantly, linguistic diversity can be instrumentally 
valuable in an affirmative sense. Heterogeneity and diversity are crucial to 
a political system based on progress through the exchange of ideas, and 
recognition of their value should always temper appeals to the value of sta 
bility. 
The idea that democracy thrives on difference is not a new one. As a 
general matter, theorists who take the kind of pragmatic approach to 
138. See Adam Przeworski et al., Culture and Democracy, in The Democracy Sourcebook 187, 
188-89 (Robert A. Dahl et al. eds., 2003). ("Ethnolinguistic fractionalization makes democracies less 
likely to survive: this much confirms common wisdom. But when the colonial legacy of a country is 
considered, it makes dictatorships less likely to survive as well. Hence, it seems that ethnolinguistic 
heterogeneity just makes political regimes less stable and, indeed, its effects on both regimes vanish 
when controlled for past political instability."). 
139. See Walter A. Ewing, Symposium: Globalization, Security & Human Rights: Immigration in 
the 21st Century: From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively Regulating Immigration to the U.S., 16 
Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 445, 446 (2005) ("Fruitless efforts by the U.S. government to stem the 
migratory flows produced by its own economic policies and demanded by the U.S. labor market have 
simply driven a large share of immigration to the United States underground and swelled the ranks of 
the undocumented."); see also Portes & B?r?cz, supra note 79 (discussing reasons for migration that 
are largely external to the law). 
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democracy outlined above emphasize the value of bringing inevitably con 
flicting interests "out into the open," where they can be settled with "the 
interest of the widest possible contribution to the interests of all."'40 
Though diversity may seem to add intractable complexity to social life, 
confronting that diversity in our interactions is ultimately what will make 
dealing with the pressures of diversity possible."41 What is more, multiplic 
ity in a society forces one to notice that one's own practices-one's relig 
ion, language, and cultural values-are not the only means for living a 
"legitimate" life.142 This awareness has instrumental value for individuals, 
because it can inspire the examination of one's own practices and cus 
toms,143 thus promoting self-improvement. It also has instrumental value 
for the larger social order, because it promotes tolerance and learning. 
Language diversity is likely to be particularly productive of this value 
enhancing conflict, because the difference that it announces is immediately 
obvious to the hearer. Language diversity leads to immediate and challeng 
ing confrontation with the unknown. 
Under this formulation, politics concerns more than identifying and 
proceeding from our points of commonality. It is also about learning to 
deal with the strange or unknown through productive embrace, rather than 
by destabilizing attempts at suppression.144 Indeed, some theorists who de 
fine democracy in pragmatic terms deemphasize the elusive common good 
in favor of a conception concerned with negotiating power relations to 
avoid the domination of one group by others.145 Legal rules and public 
policies designed to resist the drive toward homogenization and to make 
use of the sources of the unknown thus take on a democracy-enhancing 
character. Such rules will help preserve the value-enhancing diversity in 
herent in a plural society-a value premised on the fact that the cultural 
mainstream, in reality, will always be a moving target.'46 
The Supreme Court's recent reorientation of affirmative action juris 
prudence highlights the notion that diversity can play a positive role in 
American social life.147 To justify affirmative action policies in the educa 
tional context, the Court has shifted from a backward-looking inquiry into 
140. See Dewey, supra note 115, at 148. 
141. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 116, at 285-86 (discussing how, to early Pragmatists, 
confronting difference was "central to self- and mutual understanding"). 
142. See Doris Sommer, Bilingual Aesthetics: A New Sentimental Education 93 (2004). 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 84 (citing Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (1999)). 
145. See Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory 3-5 (2003). 
146. See Alba & Nee, supra note 9, at 11-14 (discussing the theory of assimilation according to 
which immigration transforms the dominant culture, even as immigrants and their descendants evolve 
linguistically and culturally). 
147. The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger confirmed that legal and political 
consciousness of racial and cultural diversity legitimize social institutions and encourage broad-based 
participation in those institutions. See 539 U.S. 306, 331-32 (2003). 
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historical subordination to an aspirational embrace of diversity, emphasiz 
ing that diversity in institutions helps secure their legitimacy in the eyes of 
all people. Not only does culture-based diversity enhance the vitality of 
institutions by injecting human sources of productive debate and conflict, it 
also operates as a check on their fairness in light of the fact that they gov 
ern the many groups that constitute the body politic. As states and localities 
check the power of the central government, diversity as a value empowers 
the people to check institutions by ensuring that neither power nor identity 
is concentrated in the hands of a single group. 
Finally, and relatedly, permitting language conflict to manifest itself, 
rather than trying to suppress it through enforced monolingualism, will 
likely reduce conflict in the long run, because it will promote a fair alloca 
tion of cultural burdens among citizens. On the one hand, we could regard 
English-only rules as understandable and appropriate attempts by the ma 
jority in the United States to secure control over its own cultural destiny 
to resist its own assimilation into a multilingual mainstream. In reality, 
however, English-only rules place the burden of linguistic diversity almost 
entirely on the shoulders of the linguistic minorities who must assimilate. 
They excuse the English-speaking majority from meaningfully participat 
ing in the negotiation of societal multilingualism. 
A multilingual account of participation, in contrast, spreads the bur 
den of linguistic diversity around the population by expecting all people to 
tolerate conversations they cannot understand and to struggle with the in 
ability to communicate. The inverse of the reasonable American expecta 
tion that immigrants learn English is the reasonable social expectation that 
non-immigrants bear certain cultural responsibilities of their own. These 
responsibilities will include accepting linguistically diverse public spaces. 
Requiring this form of acceptance might mean that monolingual English 
speakers will not understand every conversation had in the public sphere. 
Lack of knowledge of another language or culture might translate into dis 
advantage in, say, the labor market. Multilingualism could create economic 
and humanistic incentives for native English speakers to learn something 
about minority languages and cultures, imposing a kind of obligation on 
the former to engage a cultural world outside their own. But as social 
trends change, so should the expectations of native English speakers. A 
multilingual account therefore promotes a kind of cultural fairness by mak 
ing majority and minority alike responsible for absorbing the cultural con 
sequences of immigration and globalization, and for adjusting to the 
presence of one another. 
B. The Affective Case for Multilingualism 
In addition to promising the benefits described above, a multilingual 
account of participation in our important public and social institutions is 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2006] LANGUAGE AND PARTICIPATION 729 
more consistent with the aspirations of participatory democracy than a 
monolingual account for what I call "affective" reasons. By recognizing 
citizenship's cultural dimension, an approach to participation that strives to 
recognize and harness multilingualism will inspire loyalty and willingness 
to participate. A system that integrates linguistic diversity into its institu 
tions will more likely give individuals the sense of control over personal 
cultural destiny they typically crave than will an approach bent on ridding 
institutions of this potential source of cacophony. 
1. The Affective Value of Cultural Recognition 
Strict state neutrality with respect to the cultural identities of its peo 
ple is not widely endorsed, perhaps because of the general impossibility of 
achieving it, particularly in the case of language.148 The multicultural ver 
sion of liberal theory149 builds on this reality and demonstrates why liberal 
rights should be interpreted as having cultural content. By publicly recog 
nizing its people's cultural identities, the state acknowledges that culture 
plays a role in creating the preconditions for a participatory democracy by 
giving individuals certain goods necessary to individual freedom.150 First, 
culture gives individuals a "context of choice," which promotes freedom 
by giving people a broad range of options for how to live their lives."5' As 
148. See Patten, Liberal Neutrality and Language Policy, supra note 132, at 356 (quoting 
Kymlicka's argument that "[t]he idea that government could be neutral with respect to ethnic and 
national groups ... is patently false"). 
149. The multicultural explosion of the 1990s gave rise to a variety of multicultural projects and 
political movements, ranging from relatively innocuous celebrations of diversity, to politically heated 
debates over campus speech codes, to the call for ethnic studies in universities. See generally Beyond 
Comfort Zones in Multiculturalism (Sandra Jackson & Jos? Sol?s eds., 2003) (discussing various 
programmatic aspects of the multiculturalism movement). Multicultural theory is not synonymous with 
any one of the multicultural programs of this period. Rather, multicultural theory represents an 
exploration of how modern understandings of democratic government and politics are affected by and 
should be re-imagined to account for our world's increasing heterogeneity. Multiculturalism's 
fundamental questions include how equality, freedom, and political autonomy relate to one another and 
can be realized best in a pluralistic world. Multicultural theorists identify culture as a critical axis in this 
inquiry. Their theoretical concerns are central to a number of political projects, including the 
development of transnational institutions and human rights law, nation-building enterprises, and the 
constitutional development of stable democratic regimes in multiethnic nation-states. See generally 
Kymlicka, supra note 77; Kymlicka, supra note 26. 
150. Many proponents of cultural recognition contend that we need not abandon individual rights 
based liberalism in order to account for difference. Habermas, for example, argues that the theory 
assumes that differences will be recognized because liberalism focuses on the protection of "the 
integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed." J?rgen Habermas, 
Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in Multiculturalism, 107, 113 
(Charles Taylor ed., 1994). Rights are realized only intersubjectively, through "social movements and 
political struggles." Id. 
151. Kymlicka, supra note 26, at 82-83 (discussing Dworkin on culture). In Kymlicka's 
formulation, having meaningful options to choose from in living one's life depends on having access to 
one's societal culture, and on understanding the "language and history which constitute [the] 
vocabulary" of culture. Id. at 83. Kymlicka defines societal culture as a culture that "provides its 
members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, 
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Canadian theorist Charles Taylor explains, we derive the ability to com 
municate, or the tools of self-understanding, through our interactions with 
others,152 a dialogic process that underscores the significance of the cul 
tures around us to human development. Second, and perhaps more impor 
tantly, cultures provide their members with a sense of belonging.153 
Participation in a culture can offer individuals a sense of social security, or 
a sense of being connected through practices and traditions to family, 
friends, and a community that transcends the here and now. This security 
then translates into a sense of self-respect that gives meaning to one's life 
choices.154 For these reasons, the individual's ability to thrive155 depends on 
public acknowledgment of his cultural contexts.'56 
Groups seeking recognition are not, of course, simply seeking sym 
bolic affirmation of their cultures. They also seek status and power. I con 
sider in the next Section the different forms this status or power might take. 
The point to recognize here, however, is simply that the goods groups of 
people typically seek-respect for their ways of life and the power to live 
life on their own terms-will require some form of public recognition of 
their cultures. This acknowledgment is essential in a democratic society 
that values equality as a form of mutual respect.'57 
2. Cultural Recognition and the Coercion Critique 
The idea of cultural recognition cuts across the grain of several lines 
of thought influential in American legal culture. It challenges the strictly 
neutral view that would leave regard for culture to the sphere of private 
choices and associations.'58 As Charles Taylor acknowledges, recognition 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres," 
id. at 76, suggesting that the public sphere's failure to incorporate societal culture in some form should 
be cause for concern. 
152. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism 25, 32-33 (Charles 
Taylor ed., 1994). 
153. See Margalit & Raz, supra note 104, at 84-85 (stating that the security that comes from being 
a member of a cultural group is a matter of belonging rather than achievement). 
154. Taylor, supra note 152, at 41. 
155. Taylor credits Hegel with seeing recognition as fundamental to human flourishing and 
concluding that "the struggle for recognition can find only one satisfactory solution... a regime of 
reciprocal recognition of equals." Id. at 50. 
156. See id.; see also Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of 
Group Political Conflict, in The Rights of Minority Cultures 162-63 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) 
("Many people who are oppressed or disadvantaged because of their group identity nevertheless find 
significant sources of personal friendship, social solidarity, and aesthetic satisfaction in their group 
based affinities and cultural life."). 
157. Gutmann, supra note 99, at 24 ("Mutual respect requires a widespread willingness and ability 
to articulate disagreements, to defend them before people with whom we disagree, to discern the 
difference between respectable and disrespectable disagreement, and to be open to changing our own 
minds when faced with well-reasoned criticism."). 
158. See id. at 4; see also Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference: Some Problems for Feminist 
Theory, in The Rights of Minority Cultures 288, 292 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). ("Liberals 
believe that people can (and should) detach themselves from whatever traditions or values they have 
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challenges "the politics of equal respect []enshrined in a liberalism of 
rights" that is "suspicious of collective goals."'159 Recognition also is in ten 
sion with theories of cosmopolitanism, according to which human beings 
derive meaning not just from their inherited cultures, but also from the 
many cultural sources available in a pluralistic society, including the net 
works that "transcend national and ethnic boundaries," such as the 
"'scientific community" or the "human rights community."'60 Critics of cul 
ture-based politics insist that ethnic identities represent "voluntary associa 
tions,"'61 and that "American ethnic communities .. . are communities 
without boundaries, shading off into a residual mass of people who think of 
themselves simply as Americans ... [with] no way for the various groups 
to prevent or regulate individual crossings."'162 Finally, recognition strains 
against the prevailing colorblind conception of American civil rights law. 
American civil rights discourse long has focused on whether differences 
among citizens must be recognized or ignored to achieve equality,163 and 
the prevailing view holds that we are more likely to treat minorities equally 
by ignoring their minority status, not by "giv[ing] acknowledgment and 
status to something that is not universally shared."'164 
Each of these forms of opposition to a culture-based politics has var 
ied sources and motivations, to be sure. But they all share an important 
concern-a general fear of coercion, or the worry that using the law to rec 
ognize cultural identity might result in policies that coerce individuals into 
identifying with particular subgroups. The danger of such coercion is at 
least twofold. Coercion threatens to isolate and insulate subgroups from the 
forces of change,165 and it results in the essentialization of minority iden 
tity, or the failure to treat individuals as complex, whole people. To some, 
Quebec's policy requiring both ethnically Francophone and immigrant par 
ents to send their children to French-language schools, leaving 
inherited."). But see Kukathas, supra note 101, at 230. ("[LJiberalism puts concern for minorities at the 
forefront. Its very emphasis on individual rights ... bespeaks ... wariness of the power of the majority 
over minorities. There is thus no need to look for alternatives to liberalism or to jettison the 
individualism that lies at its heart."). 
159. Taylor, supra note 152, at 60. 
160. Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in The Rights of 
Minority Cultures 93,102 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
161. Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political Perspective, in The Rights of Minority Cultures 
139,149 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
162. Id. at 150. 
163. See generally Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1436 (2005). 
164. Taylor, supra note 152, at 39. 
165. Waldron, supra note 160, at 109-10 (discussing how efforts to preserve a culture undermine 
the natural tendency of cultures to "live and grow, change and sometimes wither away"). 
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English-language schools to the children of Anglophones exclusively, ex 
emplifies these dangers.'66 
Though Quebec's language education policy may cross the line from 
freedom-enhancing to coercive, the possibility of such coercion should not 
stop us from developing a conception of cultural citizenship compatible 
with liberal democratic principles, for the simple reason that group identi 
ties matter to individuals. As late twentieth-century trends have demon 
strated, cultural groups do not want to transcend their cultural traditions. 
Instead, they have clamored to "maintain themselves ... living and 
working in their own languages, even as they modernize and liberalize 
their historical cultures."'167 Though people may learn from and appreciate 
multiple cultures, they remain tied linguistically and behaviorally to par 
ticular cultures.'68 Just because groups exert influence over one another's 
members through social and political interaction does not mean that those 
groups cease to be salient, or that they can no longer be identified and de 
scribed. Even where boundaries between cultural communities are loose, 
clearly definable ethnic communities and linguistic interests still exist.169 
Because individuals find satisfaction in their group identities, groups 
can be regarded as legitimate political actors in a system that nonetheless 
values individual autonomy. Various theorists have underscored that we 
can deal in terms of group identity without trapping individuals in group 
dynamics they would prefer to abandon. In his recent work, for example, 
Kenji Yoshino holds open the possibility of appreciating "correlations be 
tween certain behaviors and certain identities ... without falling into 
stereotyping" 170 as part of the attempt to assess and resist the assimilationist 
166. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 861 F.2d 1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) ("The question of what authority an employer has to address language-related tensions in 
the workplace is one of exceptional importance. As sad experience elsewhere has shown, language can 
be a potent source of racial and ethnic discrimination.... In Canada, for example, the bitter mutual 
resistance of French- and English-speaking citizens toward one another's language has taken on the 
characteristics of a racial confrontation.... Although the United States has become the home for 
people from all parts of the world, we have been spared much of the language-related agonies 
elsewhere. A nation of immigrants, we have been willing to embrace English as our public language, 
preserving native tongues and dialects for private and family occasions."). 
167. Kymlicka, supra note 77, at 207. 
168. Kymlicka cites Condorcet as the progenitor of modern cosmopolitanism; under Condorcet's 
view, cultural membership eventually would become optional and people would be liberated from 
"traditional identities," resulting ultimately in the emergence of a universal language. Id. at 203. He 
points out that nineteenth-century cosmopolitans believed national groups would be absorbed into 
increasingly larger entities as long as their individual rights were respected?a prediction proven either 
wrong or extraordinarily premature by the age of nationalism. Though, according to Kymlicka, a 
common civilization?a "modern, urban, secular, consumerist... democratic civilization"?has 
emerged, distinct cultural identities have survived alongside it. See id. at 205-07. 
169. See, e.g., id. at 209 (commenting on minority nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, 
Scotland, and Puerto Rico). 
170. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 782 (2002). Yoshino acknowledges that the 
antidiscrimination paradigm that protects behavioral traits, in addition to statuses such as race, poses a 
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demands of law and related institutions. In her discussions of the logic of 
group conflict, Iris Young recognizes the possibility of understanding 
group identity in terms of complex, overlapping affiliations.171 She sug 
gests treating intergroup dynamics in terms of a relational logic according 
to which groups are understood not as entirely distinct, but as overlapping 
or constituted in relation to one another; they thus shift their attributes and 
needs in accordance with salient relations.172 This relational logic suggests 
that the mainstream into which individuals might gradually assimilate is 
not static. Cultural identities constantly reinforce one another through so 
cial interaction, even as they provoke each other to evolve. 
As others have framed it, in slightly stronger terms, "Membership is a 
matter of belonging, not of achievement .... Qualification for membership 
is usually determined by nonvoluntary criteria."173 More often than not, 
one's mother tongue, like race or ethnicity, is determined by birth and is 
not a matter of "individual conscience."'74 While one can belong to more 
than one group or develop new cultural affiliations over time, most people 
are unlikely to escape completely the affiliations that, through home and 
school, have shaped them. Culture and language are not so accessible that 
we can adopt cultural practices we have neither inherited nor inhabited, 
transforming ourselves at will into members of a different culture. In the 
end, group membership ties individuals to their families and to a set of 
shared practices, values, and histories-to a comprehensive human narra 
tive that simultaneously embraces and subsumes differences among indi 
viduals.175 These realities make the recognition of inherited identities 
danger of essentialization. He argues persuasively, however, that the over-formalization of categories 
poses a greater danger to the protection of people from discrimination. See id. at 933. 
171. Young, supra note 156, at 155, 161. In this essay, Young leverages her observations on the 
fluidity of group identity to criticize the tendency toward "Constitutional Nationalism" in Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s, according to which national identity was defined in terms of "bounded, 
determinate structures of language, belief, religion, [and] practice." Id. at 168. Such observations about 
the fluidity of culture are particularly apt in the U.S. context and should inform the way we approach 
the language debate in this country. 
172. Id. at 162-66. 
173. Margalit & Raz, supra note 104, at 84. 
174. Nathan Glazer, Individual Rights Against Group Rights, in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures 123,126 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
175. K. Anthony Appiah puzzles over whether it makes sense to prioritize cultural traits over other 
characteristics, such as personality traits, that are equally important to many individuals. Appiah 
answers his own question by emphasizing that the large, collective identities at the heart of these 
discussions of recognition provide "scripts," or "narratives that people can use in shaping their life 
plans and in telling their life stories." K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, 
Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in Multiculturalism 149, 160 (Charles 
Taylor, ed. 1994). In addition, he explains that the history of the Western world in general, and the 
United States in particular, can be told in terms of the mistreatment of groups. See id. at 160-62. Such 
mistreatment can be remedied only by acknowledging that membership in those groups is a valuable 
part of an individual's identity. See id. at 160-62. Recognition of cultural difference thus becomes a 
critical feature of equal treatment, though, as Appiah emphasizes, even when more benign scripts 
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inescapably important. 176 Given these insights, if we truly aspire to provide 
individuals both with meaningful opportunities to control their destinies 
and to enjoy a sense of belonging, we cannot ignore how the structures of 
public life influence culture and cultural subgroups. 
3. Language and the Project of Recognition 
The act of incorporating cultural identity into political and legal deci 
sionmaking raises a basic definitional difficulty: which cultural practices 
should we recognize?177 One of the limitations of multicultural theory is its 
lack of specificity about what cultural recognition entails. Charles Taylor 
provides a partial answer to the question, arguing that not all cultural ex 
pressions deserve equal treatment: recognition of the equal worth of all 
people need not translate into state endorsement of all cultural practices or 
values.178 Acknowledging diverse cultural practices as a means of recogniz 
ing equal worth cannot require that we decline to prioritize and thereby 
judge those practices by acknowledging some and not others. 179 
In my view, language offers the ideal focal point on which to center 
the project of recognition. Relying on language rights adds a critical affec 
tive dimension into participatory politics, while also sidestepping the coer 
cion concern expressed by skeptics of the politics of recognition, for two 
interrelated reasons. Language is sufficiently valuable to individuals, or 
sufficiently "thick," to perform the affective work described above. At the 
same time, it is sufficiently flexible, or sufficiently "thin," to avoid the co 
ercion danger. Because the attachment to a language need not correspond 
to the affirmation of particular values, and because bilingualism is possible, 
a public sphere that embraces the existence of many languages will be a 
place where people remain able to interact and strive for values-based con 
sensus. 
The "thick" quality of language stems from its comprehensive charac 
ter, by which I mean that language serves as both the source of and the me 
dium for our expressive capacities. A speaker uses a particular language 
replace negative ones, the danger that culture-based identification will limit the individual's horizons 
remains. See id. at 162-63. 
176. As Kymlicka describes the upshot of cosmopolitanism, "[its] cultural m?lange ... does not 
involve moving between societal cultures. It is simply a case of enjoying opportunities provided by the 
pluralistic societal culture." Kymlicka, supra note 77, at 211. 
177. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 170, at 937 (noting in his elaboration of a trait-based approach to 
antidiscrimination protections that, while the decision of which traits to protect may be debatable, it is 
crucial that a conversation concerning this decision take place). 
178. Taylor also points out that a culture proper, or a "major culture," can be distinguished from a 
"partial cultural milieu[] within a society, as well as [from] short phases of a major culture." Taylor, 
supra note 152, at 66. 
179. See Susan Wolf, Comment, in Multiculturalism 75, 78 (Charles Taylor, ed. 1994). "[T]he 
demand that all cultures and the works they produce be evaluated as equally good is intertwined with a 
repudiation of all possible standards for evaluation, which would undermine the validity of judgments 
of equal worth as much as it undermines judgments of inferior worth."). 
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"to make statements about who she is, what her group loyalties are, how 
she perceives her relationship to her hearer, and what sort of speech event 
she considers herself to be engaged in."180 Language mediates the collec 
tive and personal dimensions of individual identity. The recognition of lin 
guistic difference, therefore, acknowledges individuals' cultural pedigrees 
and respects the framework through which they define and situate them 
selves in different social contexts, or how they choose to relate with others. 
Language is also comprehensive in the sense that it represents more 
than just a marker or symbol of culture; it is "the recorder of paternity, the 
expresser of patrimony and the carrier of phenomenology."181 
Sociolinguists describe language as carrying "cultural content."'182 A cul 
tural community's loss of its common language often presages an impover 
ishing of its culture, because language operates as a repository of cultural 
meaning.183 Cultural vitality therefore depends heavily on language main 
tenance. Language is comprehensive because it has the capacity to record 
the full range of values held by the members of a cultural community. 
In addition to having this deep relationship to cultural identity, lan 
guage offers the ideal focal point for a politics of recognition because it is 
also comprehensive in a "thin" sense. All languages possess the ability to 
develop new words and concepts as the needs arise and thus represent 
frameworks capable of adapting to changing circumstances.184 What is 
more, as a cultural characteristic, language encompasses nearly all mem 
bers of a group, regardless of the individual member's beliefs or attach 
ments to other cultural practices. Unlike other cultural traits, such as ethical 
or moral values, or even preferences for food, hairstyles, and fashion, 
members of a given cultural group almost universally share a connection to 
a language. The speaking of a language does not demand adherence to par 
ticular values, but rather provides the framework for expressing variation 
in other cultural forms. 
Given these characteristics, then, a system of culture-based politics 
focused on language avoids the essentialization of minority identity. Using 
language as the mechanism of recognition avoids stereotyping, because 
180. See Ralph Fasold, The Sociolinguistics of Society, at ix (1984). 
181. Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup 
Relations 15,25 (Howard Giles ed., 1977). 
182. Nancy C. Dorian, Linguistic and Ethnographic Fieldwork, in Handbook of Language and 
Ethnic Identity 25, 31 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1999). 
183. See David Crystal, Language Death 36-43 (2000); Ken Hale, On Endangered 
Languages and the Importance of Linguistic Diversity, in Endangered Languages: Language Loss 
and Community Response 192,204-12 (Lenore A. Grenoble & Lindsay J. Whaley eds., 1998). 
184. Rosina Lippi-Green, English with an Accent: Language, Ideology, and 
Discrimination in the United States 11 (1997); see also Joel Davis, Mother Tongue: How 
Humans Create Language 14 (1994) ("[LJanguages change. New words enter a language; new 
technologies generate new vocabularies; social or economic changes generate new patterns of 
discourse; sounds shift about."). 
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acknowledging a language does not require specifying which values or cus 
toms an individual should adopt. Such an approach ensures that the recog 
nizing state or institution does not impose upon individuals expectations 
that they conform to a group identity defined by a certain set of traits.185 
Language-based rights or policies, by focusing on the organizational and 
expressive dimensions of culture, will result in an institutional recognition 
of culture that leaves conflict over value-laden worldviews to group mem 
bers. Such policies avoid lending the imprimatur of the law to particular 
cultural practices, some of which may be contrary to liberal principles. 
But perhaps most importantly, the recognition of language difference 
does not preclude individuals from developing a bilingual or bicultural ori 
entation as a means of integrating themselves into a larger nation or world. 
That both people and communities have the capacity to be bilingual rein 
forces the value of language in this "thin" sense. The individual and social 
ability to be bilingual ensures that different language communities will be 
able to interact in the institutions common to all.'86 Indeed, universal acqui 
sition of English in the United States and of other widely spoken languages 
in societies containing small language minorities is inescapably valuable, 
because it works against the tendency toward social division along ethnic 
and linguistic lines. Even as small languages increasingly become the me 
dia for local political, governmental, and economic activity, certain "mega 
languages," especially English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese, 
Chinese, and Arabic, continue their spread, largely to good effect.187 The 
possibility of bilingualism makes language particularly valuable to those 
who are interested in simultaneously harnessing the value of ascriptive dif 
ferences and promoting social integration. Approaching language differ 
ence in this way should make institutions accessible and relevant to 
minorities and, at the same time, institutionalize a form of resistance to the 
self-segregation that might prevent groups from evolving. 
4. Language and the Argument for Survival 
Relying on language to develop a project of recognition is not without 
its downsides. Other dimensions of ethnic identity often outlast the ability 
185. Cf. Appiah, supra note 175, at 162-63 (discussing the possibility that recognizing group 
identities might constrain individual autonomy). 
186. The fact that so many legal systems around the world have incorporated linguistically defined 
rights of some kind into their constitutional and statutory laws suggests that recognition of 
multilingualism serves a considered purpose. Indeed, various systems have developed a conception of 
language rights distinct from the protection of cultural rights more generally. A strain of thought 
running through Canadian case law and commentary suggests that cultural recognition and language 
recognition constitute two distinct enterprises. See, e.g., Choudhry, jupra note 102 (noting this 
distinction but challenging its plausibility). While this distinction blurs very easily, the attempt to make 
it suggests that the actors involved?courts, lawmakers, and those seeking recognition of their 
linguistic interests?attach a special or particular significance to language. 
187. See Fishman, supra note 135, at 161. 
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to speak a common language, suggesting that linguistic recognition is not a 
complete answer to the questions that cultural difference raises.188 More 
significantly, a language-based form of recognition that emphasizes the 
possibility of bilingualism arguably encourages this assimilation. To the 
extent that language minorities prioritize the learning of the dominant lan 
guages of their societies, the likelihood of continued facility with minority 
languages diminishes, and the possibility that minority language communi 
ties will disappear remains unavoidable. But neither a politics of recogni 
tion centered on language, nor a participatory conception of a multilingual 
society, should adopt the survival of particular language groups as a pri 
mary goal. 
Of course, when cultures face extinction, a compelling case can be 
made for their rejuvenation and perpetuation.189 Calls for revival may re 
flect guilt on the part of the dominant culture, which likely had a hand in 
the minority's near extinction. But survivalist clams also suggest a belief in 
the aesthetic and intellectual value of human heterogeneity. In the United 
188. Indeed, in the Western provinces of Canada, French ethnic affiliation has outlasted the 
assimilation of many Francophones into an English-speaking world, much as ethnic communities 
persist in the United States despite the transformation of their non-English languages from 
comprehensive systems of communication to sources of idioms and expressions of emphasis?to 
cultural "traits," so to speak. For a discussion of language shift among Francophone Canadians outside 
Quebec, see John de Vries, Canada's Official Language Communities: An Overview of the Current 
Demolinguistic Situation, 105/106 Int'l J. of Soc. of Language 37, 62-64 (1994); see also Richard 
Julien, The Quest for All-French Schools in Alberta: A Quixotic Struggle?, 25 Canadian Ethnic 
Stud. 25 (1993) (discussing attempts to reverse linguistic assimilation through creation of French 
language schools, and suggesting that group affiliation remains, despite linguistic assimilation). For an 
example of ethnic identification that has survived linguistic assimilation in the United States, see O. 
Garcia, J.L. Morin & K. Rivera, How Threatened Is the Spanish of New York Puerto Ricans?, in Can 
Threatened Languages be Saved? 44, 44 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 2001) (describing the decline of 
Spanish language use among Puerto Ricans in New York as a primary mode of communication but 
documenting its use for symbolic purposes). 
One consequence of resistance to linguistic assimilation is that a politics focused on language may 
result in the more linguistically sophisticated members of a group challenging the authenticity of those 
who have lost the ability to speak the language. Consider the Spanish-language debate in the 2000 
Democratic gubernatorial primary in Texas. When one candidate insisted on providing English answers 
to questions posed in Spanish, the other candidate charged that his opponent's Spanish was 
inadequate?a fraught and potentially divisive charge in a language community made up of speakers of 
widely varying abilities. See, e.g., Sheila McNulty, Democratic Rivals for Texas Governor Talk it Out 
in Spanish: Bilingual Debate Reveals Growing Political Influence of Latinos, Fin. Times, Mar. 12, 
2002, at 13; R.G. Ratcliffe, Democrats Divided Further Over Debate: Sanchez Criticizes Morales For 
Planning to Use English During Spanish Segment, Hous. Chron., Mar. 1, 2002, at Al. 
189. The decline of language use among ethnic minorities raises the related interest in reversing 
language shift, or language revival. Reviving formerly oppressed or unused languages has been a 
successful phenomenon in parts of the world, including Spain and Israel, and it provides hope for 
indigenous populations seeking to recapture lost cultural origins. See, e.g., M.-J. Azurmendi, E. Bacho 
& F. Zabaleta, Reversing Language Shift: The Case of Basque, in Can Threatened Languages Be 
Saved? 234 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 2001); B. Spolsky & E. Shohamy, Hebrew After a Century ofRLS 
Efforts, in Can Threatened Languages Be Saved? 350 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 2001); M. Strubell, 
Catalan a Decade Later, in Can Threatened Languages Be Saved? 260 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 
2001). 
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States, these intuitions have given rise to measures such as the Native 
American Languages Act, a federal law that promotes the preservation of 
native languages and cultures, many of which are in danger of disappear 
ing.190 The autonomy regimes that have emerged around the world in vari 
ous forms,191 along with human rights lawyers' defense of the principle of 
self-determination,192 also reflect an interest in providing weakened minor 
ity cultures with opportunities to flourish. Indeed, the defense of minority 
run institutions grows from a desire to see minority groups survive into the 
long term.193 
But once we shift our focus from endangered language groups to the 
language diversity in multiethnic societies formed largely through immi 
gration, the claim for long-term survival becomes difficult to defend on the 
grounds that the group might otherwise disappear. Unlike many national 
minorities, for whom failure to plan for long-term survival is tantamount to 
a cultural death sentence, migrants tend to be from cultures whose fortunes, 
for the most part, rise and fall independently of the immigrants' status in 
host societies. In other words, the assimilation of Mexican Americans pre 
sents no real threat to the survival of either Mexican culture or the Spanish 
language, though emigration to the United States may well change 
Mexican culture and politics in significant ways. 
If the only remaining support for the survival claim is the cultural in 
terests of individuals and groups, the survivalist impulse must remain an 
cillary to the protection of both individual and group autonomy. Such 
autonomy can only be fully realized if individuals and groups alike are 
permitted to evolve in response to changing social conditions, with the 
freedom to conclude that a particular language has lost its social viability 
or its ability to make the members of the group effective social actors. 
Absent the creation of ethnic enclaves surrounded by strictly enforced bor 
ders, dominant surrounding cultures will change culture-based groups. 
And, particularly for small national minorities, the benefits of knowing a 
widely spoken language that can connect that minority to the world are too 
great to justify prioritizing cultural survivalism above all else. It may be 
that even the best-structured and responsive institutions "are at most able to 
contribute to the contemporary linguistic security of the language 
190. The Native American Languages Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-477, 104 Stat. 1152 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. ?? 2901-2906 (2000)). 
191. See generally Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy 
Regimes for Minorities, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539 (1991). 
192. See generally Antonio Cassesse, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal 
Reappraisal (1995). 
193. See supra notes 34-58 (discussing legal reforms in Spain, Canada, and Latvia designed to 
ensure revival and survival of minority languages through establishment of public institutions run 
primarily, if not exclusively, in Catalan, French, and Latvian, respectively). 
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community, rather than ensuring its long-run survival.""94 But in offering a 
participatory approach to language diversity, my goal is not to ensure the 
long-term survival of every group. Instead, my aim is to make it possible 
for cultural minorities to engage in the public and social spheres without 
feeling coerced into abandoning the practices that structure their world 
views. 
My emphasis on bilingualism as an aspiration, and its corresponding 
de-emphasis of particular groups' survival, thus resembles what Will 
Kymlicka has called a kind of American post-ethnic consensus.195 This 
view of ethnicity "favors voluntary affiliations[,] ... emphasizes the 
dynamic and changing character of many groups, and is responsive to the 
potential for creating new cultural combinations,"'96 but retains a primary 
focus on individual rights. But while the participatory conception I offer 
does recognize the fluidity of group identity, it diverges from the voluntary 
model in one important respect. My defense of a culture-based politics de 
pends on the realization that culture and language are constitutive, which 
gives rise to the need for legal and institutional recognition of group inter 
ests through actual structural reform. The participatory aspiration is not to 
make it possible for people to pick and choose among available cultures in 
the public sphere. Rather, its purpose is to allow cultural minorities to live 
public lives with existing cultural affiliations intact, while recognizing that 
the endpoint of an integrated political community will always be a moving 
target. In the process, the "mainstream" either will be transformed or cease 
to exist. In other words, both the dominant culture and the cultural minori 
ties within it will change through the process of participation. 
194. Macmillan, supra note 59, at 19; see also Walzer, supra note 161, at 152 ("State officials 
provide a framework within which groups can flourish but cannot guarantee their flourishing, or even 
their survival."). 
195. See Kymlicka, supra note 77, at 265, 266-67. As an example of this view, Kymlicka points 
to Canada's official policy of multiculturalism, adopted in 1971, and other immigrant-targeted 
multicultural policies that coexist with cultural autonomy regimes for national minorities. See id. at 
267. But while Kymlicka lauds the Act for encouraging immigrants to treat their ethnocultural 
affiliations as voluntary, see id., other critics contend that the policy might ultimately be incoherent on 
the grounds that ethnic minorities cannot be integrated into mainstream public life without ultimately 
being assimilated. See Heath, supra note76. 
196. See David Hollinger, Post-Ethnic America 3-4 (1995). Ronald Schmidt, an American 
theorist with multiculturalist sympathies, has articulated a view similar to the post-ethnic consensus, 
which he calls "pluralistic integration." See Schmidt, supra note 117, at 221-50. He develops 
pluralistic integration as an alternative to assimilationist and confederationist approaches, id. at 183 
220?a goal I share. But he premises his approach on principles of justice and common good, whereas I 
emphasize recognition and participation. Incorporating non-English into the public sphere is not first 
and foremost about giving language minorities their "due," nor can it be about identifying some 
substantive vision of the common good?it is of necessity too decentralized a project for such lofty 
aspirations. Moreover, a meaningful conception of language rights will be in some tension with 
integrationist attitudes and must include a willingness to accept non-English linguistic homogeneity or 
dominance under certain circumstances. 
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In place of the conventional argument for linguistic survival, my par 
ticipatory agenda provides a formula for dealing productively with multi 
lingual social conditions while recognizing that the same interests in 
cultural transmission and control over cultural destiny are held by immi 
grants and national minorities alike. The most important question always 
will be how to manage the cultural concerns of extant generations in a 
manner that promotes social investment; for this reason, principles of free 
dom of association will be critical to shaping the agenda. Some groups, 
armed with this principle, and because of their sheer numbers, may well 
endure-Spanish-speakers in the United States seem a likely candidate, at 
least for the foreseeable future. Yet the source of the language rights de 
fined in this Article is not the right to long-term survival, but rather the 
need to respect the choices of present-day actors, which may reach across 
generations, but not into perpetuity. 
5. Final Thoughts on Affection and Participation 
As I suggest above, the fear of coercion explains the tendency in 
American legal discourse to cabin culture in the private sphere, away from 
state involvement. This separation between public and private life is artifi 
cial, because cultural traits are complexly embedded in human personalities 
and are difficult to repress at the nebulous border between private and pub 
lic spaces. The cultural affiliations that tie individuals and groups to one 
another will vary and may change over the course of individual lifetimes, 
or from one generation to the next. Consequently, rather than conclude that 
our public institutions should transcend culture, it would be more appropri 
ate to adjust those institutions to respond flexibly to the people's cultural 
demands. Because we are fundamentally culture-bearing people, promoting 
participation in a multiethnic society requires acknowledging the cultural 
dimension of citizenship. 
A workable participatory model acknowledges that actual social en 
gagement, perhaps the most critical of democratic habits, is more likely 
when personalized forms of affiliation are allowed room for expression.l97 
Ultimately, both individuals and communities are sufficiently flexible to 
sustain multiple ethnic and linguistic identities. Just as individuals have the 
capacity for bilingualism in their daily lives, so too can they draw on mul 
tiple affective affiliations, including multiple linguistic ones, to form co 
herent political personalities. 
C. The Structure of Language Rights 
Cultural recognition is not simply about symbolic affirmation of cul 
tural interests. Cultural groups that seek recognition also desire political 
197. See Rodr?guez, supra note 22, at 145. 
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affirmation and pursue power as much as public validation of their cul 
tures. A culturally conscious politics thus acknowledges the political le 
gitimacy of groups of citizens who define themselves with reference to 
cultural characteristics. It thereby confers political status on the culturally 
defined group and the individuals who define their identities, at least in 
part, through membership in that group.198 The debate over how to struc 
ture this power-whether it should take shape through devolution, minor 
ity-run institutions, minority representation, or something less elaborate 
is always heated. But the final, important step in laying out the theoretical 
framework for a participatory approach to language difference is to specify 
the political and legal mechanisms through which the ideas expressed 
above should be realized. Whether we speak in terms of guaranteeing 
rights or protecting interests, and whether we think of the project as one for 
constitutional or statutory law, or even for informal norm development, it 
is important to clarify whether laws and policies should be addressed to 
groups or individuals. 
Resistance to the idea of group rights is powerful in American legal 
culture. Many Americans dismiss language or cultural rights as archetypal 
group rights incompatible with American conceptions of rights, which are 
oriented toward the protection of the individual.199 The same concerns 
about coercion that explain the opposition to cultural recognition also sup 
port resistance to projects that appear to involve the protection of group 
rights. 
But the group/individual dichotomy draws too crude a distinction. The 
language rights and policies I seek to develop are ultimately of a hybrid 
character. In this Section, to complement the conclusion reached above 
that the recognition of language groups promotes participation and social 
integration-I demonstrate that language rights, like most rights, can show 
regard for individuality by acknowledging that individual interests are em 
bedded in the interests of groups. 
198. Charles Taylor traces the modern preoccupation with recognition in the form of "demands for 
the equal status of cultures and of genders" to the disintegration of social hierarchies, the corresponding 
irrelevance of honor as a social force, the increase in "individualized identity ... [that] arises ... [out 
of] being true to [one]self," and the "ideal of authenticity" that emerged in the eighteenth century. 
Taylor, supra note 152, at 27-28. According to Taylor, Hegel gave the concept of recognition its 
earliest treatment in Phenomenology of Spirit. Id. at 36. 
199. The critique echoes the national minority versus immigrant dichotomy, which juxtaposes the 
culturally coherent group versus the individual seeking transformation. The former may have purchase 
on politics elsewhere in the world, but the latter represents a more American version of how to deal 
with cultural diversity. The rejection of the group rights construct stems from a belief that it treats 
individuals as members of groups, rather than as individuals. The construct also encourages individuals 
to identify with subgroups, at the expense of social cohesion. 
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1. Language Rights as Group Rights 
Language rights, as commonly understood, do not include the right to 
use any language, but instead focus on the protection of mother tongues. 
This emphasis on heritage thus connects the concept of language rights 
closely to group identity. As a result, it is not surprising that language 
rights often take shape as group rights, both in theory and in practice.200 
What is more, people use and enjoy language in community, rather than in 
isolation. Respect for the linguistic interests of individuals, therefore, can 
not be separated completely from the linguistic fate of groups and may re 
quire protecting groups as groups. Indeed, individuals accumulate power 
and develop important relationships through group affiliations. But there 
are many ways of protecting these intertwined interests, and the challenge 
is to give adequate recognition to both individual and group interests. 
In their strongest form, group rights endow particular social units with 
power and perhaps even with sovereignty. The benefits of these arrange 
ments may or may not trickle down to individual group members, and the 
individual's interests may be subordinated to the group's. The treatment of 
indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada roughly approximates 
this type of arrangement.201 The Belgian system, under which the country's 
three primary linguistic communities constitute rights- and duty-bearing 
units, reflects group rights in their strongest form, as well.202 Each autono 
mous region governs in the majority language of the territory. Language 
rights attach to a culturally determined people, not to individual members 
of those communities. Individuals, therefore, do not take their rights with 
them when crossing regional boundaries, and the Belgian Constitution es 
tablishes that the boundaries, and hence the language rights, cannot be 
200. A common and related question in language rights discourse is whether a multilingual society 
should implement a geographically based language rights regime or a portable, individual rights 
regime. See, e.g., R?aume, supra note 88, at 271. 
201. Section 35 of the Charter recognizes the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada." The Charter effectively treats First Nations People as sovereign, treaty 
making entities. The Charter does inject a more individualistic element, however, by applying the rights 
to "male and female persons" equally. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), ? 35 (Can.). This approach is subject to much debate in American 
Indian law. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (rejecting, on tribal sovereign 
immunity grounds, equal protection challenge brought pursuant to Indian Civil Rights Act by Pueblo 
woman whose children had been denied tribal membership as result of her marriage to non-Pueblo and 
emphasizing that Congress intended to protect tribal self-determination when it passed Act). 
202. See Wouter Pas, A Dynamic Federalism Built on Static Principles: The Case of Belgium, in 
Federalism, Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights 157, 158-59 (G. Alan Tarr, 
Robert F. Williams & Josef Marko eds., 2004) ("[I]n 1970, the Belgian State was divided into four 
territorial linguistic regions: The Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual 
region of Brussels-Capital, and the German-speaking region.... The authorities in each region may, in 
principle, only use the official language of that region in their dealings with citizens. In some 
municipalities, where a significant number of the inhabitants speak another language, special provisions 
were enacted to give individuals the right to continue to use their own language in their relations with 
the local authorities."). 
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altered except through an elaborate series of procedures under which the 
three national groups hold specific voting and representation rights.203 
Some theorists articulate a similarly strong version of group rights by 
calling for the devolution of political power to internal national groups. 
Kymlicka, in particular, contends that the creation of linguistically homo 
geneous, separate institutions for minority subgroups within a larger fed 
eral structure will foster the participation of minority groups in democracy 
by giving them the autonomy to control cultural policy.204 He claims that, 
without separate institutions governed in their mother tongues, cultural mi 
norities will lack the access to "societal culture" critical to true political 
autonomy.205 Quebec's language policies reflect this insight.206 Similarly, 
trends in human rights law toward the creation of "autonomy regimes"207 
for cultural minorities assume that stability and democracy within nation 
states depend on the creation of minority-run institutions capable of chan 
neling the demands of culture-based political movements.208 
Although territorial models and minority-run legal institutions have 
worked reasonably well in places such as Belgium, Spain, and Canada, the 
minority-run institution is hardly a panacea for diversity-related conflicts. 
203. See Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political 
Theory, in The Rights of Minority Cultures 31, 40 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). The relevant 
Belgian constitutional provision reads: 
The boundaries of the four regions may only be altered or amended by an act of Parliament 
passed on a majority vote in each linguistic group of each of the Houses, on condition that the 
majority of the members of each group are present and that the total votes in favour within 
the two linguistic groups attain two-thirds of the votes cast. 
The Coordinated Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium art. 4 (quoted in Van Dyke, supra, at 40). 
204. Kymlicka, supra note 77, at 156. 
205. Id. 
206. Quebec's language laws and the support they receive from the Charter represent an effort to 
give French primacy in all aspects of public life. Cf. Taylor, supra note 152, at 53-55 (discussing the 
Charter's collective goals and efforts in Quebec to give French primacy, as well as the tensions that 
emerged between Quebec's language policy and the Charter's protection of individual rights). 
207. Steiner, supra note 191. Steiner identifies three different types of autonomy 
regimes: (1) "power-sharing regimes" that allocate particular rights to ethnic populations, such as 
reserved cabinet positions or a certain number of representatives in the national 
legislature; (2) political control through devolution according to which ethnic minorities are permitted 
to govern their own affairs, such as in Catalonia; and (3) "personal law" regimes according to which 
ethnic minorities are allowed to govern themselves according to their own laws, which are usually of 
religious origin. Id. at 1541-42. 
208. The idea of devolution extends back at least as far as the multilateral minority rights treaties 
administered by the League of Nations after World War I. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, at 18-19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l 
(1977) {prepared by Francesco Capotorti). These treaties established rights for minorities to run their 
own institutions, obligated states to provide access to courts in the native language of linguistic 
minorities, and required adequate facilities for primary school instruction in the minorities' language. 
Some scholars have contended that the demise of these treaties in the years leading up to World War II 
engendered a deep suspicion of minority or group rights claims?a suspicion reflected in the heavy 
emphasis on individual rights in the human rights movement that flourished after World War II. See, 
e.g., Magnet, supra note 40, at 414-15. 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
744 CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 94:687 
Devolution to minority-run institutions will not help secure rights for dis 
parate ethnic groups spread out over a nation's territory, nor will it be ideal 
for richly diverse countries seeking a multicultural form of integration.209 
Multiple linguistic communities sometimes exist within a national commu 
nity defined by nonlinguistic factors, such as shared historical experiences 
or a common religion. A single linguistic identity may cut across particular 
national identities. As the presence of a sizable Anglophone population in 
Quebec suggests, no matter how decentralized a political system is, minori 
ties always will be present within minorities. And, in a free society, they 
will be vocal.210 This minority-within-the-minority phenomenon is also 
characteristic of communities in the United States, where an 
English-speaking minority lives within a larger Spanish-speaking commu 
nity, which is itself a minority within the larger national context. The exis 
tence of these overlapping language communities diminishes the 
practicality of the multiculturalist's preference for linguistically homoge 
neous, minority-run institutions.211 Nonetheless, in these same contexts, 
recognition of group identity and interests will be important. Finding an 
alternative to a strong form of group rights that still captures inescapably 
valid group interests thus becomes necessary. 
2. Language Rights as Hybrid Rights 
Even in systems that rely on minority-run institutions, various other 
means of addressing the concerns of disparate ethnic groups and the inter 
ests of individuals have been developed. Once again, the Canadian system 
offers a case in point, demonstrating that the interests of groups and indi 
viduals, while sometimes in competition, can be reconciled.212 On the one 
hand, the emphasis in Canadian case law on language rights as emanating 
from a historic compromise suggests a group-based conceptualization of 
209. This latter model is one way of describing South Africa, which has opted to declare eleven 
languages official at the federal level. See Iain Currie, Official Languages, in Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 37-2 (Iain Currie ed., 1999). 
210. See Clifford Krauss, Quebec Is Shedding Image as Hotbed of Political Rest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
3, 2005, at 16. 
211. Henry Steiner offers a related critique of autonomy regimes, pointing to what could be 
considered another danger of the push to linguistic homogeneity: "[AJutonomy schemes frustrate a 
major objective of the human rights movement of assuring that societies remain open to challenge and 
change.... To the extent that autonomy regimes protect historical differences but inhibit the 
creation... of fresh differences, they would convert the human rights movement's framework of 
protection of open inquiry and advocacy into the protection of static traditions." Steiner, supra note 
191, at 1552. 
212. The Charter of Rights is not strictly a list of individual rights. See Joseph Eliot Magnet, 
Multiculturalism in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, at ch. 18, ?? 18-37 (Gerald-A. Beaudoin & Errol Mendes eds., 1996). Both the 
language rights provisions and the rights given to indigenous populations and sectarian schools 
represent group rights, thus reflecting the Charter's dual character. 
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the issue.213 Although English speakers significantly outnumber French 
speakers in Canada as a whole, English and French have equal constitu 
tional status within federal institutions.214 Securing equality between the 
two languages requires the maintenance of linguistic groups, which, in 
turn, requires compromises focused on group demands. These imperatives, 
for example, justify Quebec's insistence that immigrants to Quebec assimi 
late into the Francophone community, to help keep the Francophone popu 
lation robust in the face of English language dominance in North America 
as a whole. Quebec's retention of control over language and cultural policy 
within the province promotes language equality in Canada generally, be 
cause the status of Francophones outside of Quebec depends in part on 
Quebec's vigorous promotion of the French language within its territory. 
The Canadian language rights regime thus assumes that preserving cultural 
autonomy requires considering whether the cultural practices that make 
that autonomy meaningful are at risk. 
Yet language rights receive their higher-law expression in the Charter, 
which arguably subordinates collective goals to the rights of the individ 
ual.215 The Charter declares the equality of language groups but protects 
that equality by granting the individual the right to access federal institu 
tions, public services, and education in one's mother tongue.216 These 
rights belong not just to Francophones in Quebec, but can be enforced by 
individual minorities in other provinces. Anglophones in Quebec also pos 
sess certain rights against the province, which ostensibly limit Quebec's 
ability to regulate language.217 The Charter ultimately protects individuals 
as members of groups, a structure that reflects the salience of group iden 
tity to the individual. Of course, if Canadian language protections were 
truly individual rights protections, they would extend to third-language 
speakers, and not merely Franco- and Anglophones. But this feature of the 
Canadian compromise does not obscure the possibility of hybridity. 
In fact, individual rights guarantees that apply universally to all 
Canadians cabin some of the excesses of Canada's group-based arrange 
ments. In Ballantyne v. Canada, Anglophone claimants challenged 
213. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing historical origins of Canadian 
language rights regime). 
214. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), 
? 16 (Can.) (establishing that English and French have equal status). 
215. Taylor, supra note 152, at 54-56 (discussing the tension between the Charter's individual 
rights framework and Quebec's demand for recognition as a distinct society). 
216. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), 
??17-19,23 (Can.). 
217. As almost proof of this point, at the time of the Charter's passage in 1982, many in Quebec 
regarded this structure as a repudiation of the province's ability to run a democratic society in 
conjunction with an aggressive cultural policy. See Taylor, supra note 152, at 54-56 (stating that 
Anglophones are wary of Francophones' collective goals because Anglophones believe they impede 
individual rights and are inherently discriminatory), 
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Quebec's Bill 178, which required the exclusive use of French for outdoor 
commercial signs and the names of commercial firms, arguing that the Bill 
violated their rights under various provisions of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.218 The U.N. Human Rights Committee found 
in favor of the Anglophones, holding that the regulation violated article 
19's guarantee of freedom of expression.219 The Committee found com 
mercial communication was protected and concluded that restrictions on 
the speech rights of Anglophones were not necessary to protect the endan 
gered status of Francophones in Quebec.220 Like the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Ford v. Quebec, the Committee concluded that less restrictive 
means could be used to protect the language interests of Francophones, 
such as requiring English commercial signs to include equivalent expres 
sions in French.221 The Committee treated the parties' language interests as 
group-based concerns, reflecting on the relative status of Francophones and 
Anglophones in Canada as a whole. At the same time, it affirmed the 
Francophone minority's language law only insofar as it adhered to certain 
universally applicable free speech rights, which here benefited the provin 
cial Anglophone minority. In other words, the Francophone majority re 
tained its authority to regulate the province's linguistic landscape to the 
extent that its regulations did not needlessly disadvantage the minority citi 
zens of Quebec. 
These observations are not intended to demonstrate that the United 
States should adopt a Canadian-style system. Rather, they show that devel 
oping a conception of language rights need not entail entrenching group 
interests at the expense of individuals. In the final analysis, one would be 
hard-pressed to deny that individuals derive much of their identities from 
their collective affiliations. Respect for individual autonomy demands re 
spect for the social and cultural groupings to which individuals belong.222 
218. Ballantyne v. Canada, Communications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, U.N. GAOR, Hum. 
Rts. Committee, 47th Sess., Annex at ffl 3.1-3.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 
385/1989/Rev.l (May 5, 1993), available at http://wwwl.urrm.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/ 
v359385.htm. The U.N. Human Rights Committee rejected the claim that the Bill violated Article 26's 
equal treatment provision, as well as the claim that it violated Article 27. Id. fl 11.2, 11.5. The 
Committee reasoned that, because Article 27 applied to states and not subunits such as provinces, 
Anglophones could not invoke its protection because they were not minorities within the state of 
Canada. Id.\ 11.2. 
219. Id. ffll 11.3-11.4. 
220. Id. % 113. 
111. Id. K 11.4. For a detailed discussion of this case, see William Green, Schools, Signs, and 
Separation: Quebec Anglophones, Canadian Constitutional Politics, and International Language 
Rights, 27 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 449,462-67 (1999). 
222. As scholars of human rights law have observed, the "thrust of [Article 27 of the ICCPR] is to 
stress culture as a communal, group phenomenon." Steiner, supra note 191, at 1547. Steiner argues that 
groups transmit culture from one generation to the next and preserve cultural and social differences in a 
society. Hence we see "the link between autonomy regimes and an ideal of maintaining diversity." Id. 
at 1549. This emphasis "permeates human rights law," id. at 1548, and "commit[s] the human rights 
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Language rights guarantees, like those adopted in Canada, respect individ 
ual rights in the context of group-based interests, demonstrating that the 
legal recognition of groups is not in irresolvable tension with respecting 
individual integrity. 
As I explain in more detail in Part III, the American legal system pos 
sesses resources for expressing this kind of developed appreciation for 
group interests. The possibility of hybridity is already reflected in Ameri 
can antidiscrimination law. Individuals enforce civil rights claims as mem 
bers of classes of similarly situated people, and the law protects them from 
discrimination based on their memberships in particular groups. In other 
words, the law recognizes racial, ethnic, and gendered groups as salient 
social entities and, by extension, offers remedies to individuals in acknowl 
edgment of their group memberships.223 Going forward, principles of free 
dom of association and personal autonomy can ground a framework that 
relies on group identity to promote participation. Despite the limited appeal 
of strong forms of group rights in the United States, then, it is nonetheless 
possible to deal in terms of individual affiliation with group identities. 
Though this emphasis suggests that groups matter only because "they are 
essential for the well-being of the individual,"224 we can still acknowledge 
that "[g]roup interests cannot be reduced to individual interests," and that 
groups experience prosperity and decline, and can be harmed by societal 
actions.225 
Even territorial solutions short of devolution that emanate from states 
and localities will be feasible in parts of the United States and will contrib 
ute to efforts to acknowledge the interests of groups.226 The decision of the 
New Mexico Supreme Court to require the state judicial system to 
movement to the protection of people's ongoing capacity to form, develop, and preserve different types 
of groups," id. 
223. As Habermas puts it, "in the political arena those who encounter one another are collective 
actors contending about collective goals and the distribution of collective goods. Only in the courtroom 
and in legal discourse are rights asserted and defended as actionable individual rights ...." Habermas, 
supra note 150, at 108. 
224. Kukathas, supra note 101, at 233 (noting that to the extent that liberal theory countenances 
existence of groups, it is because such groups are linked to the well-being of individuals). Charles 
Taylor contends that "profound philosophical assumptions" based on Kantian notions of human dignity 
and rationality underlie this conception of morality and agency as lodged in the individual. Taylor, 
supra note 152, at 57. In my view, even if we can justify group rights based on the preeminence of the 
political value of equality, it is hard to imagine a moral justification for doing so that is stronger than 
the equal worth of all individuals. 
225. Margalit & Raz, supra note 104, at 87. Margalit and Raz, in acknowledging the independent 
identity of groups nonetheless declare that the moral importance of the group's interest depends on its 
value to the individual. Id. 
226. The 1999 decision of the border town of El Cenizo, Texas, which is populated 
overwhelmingly by Spanish speakers, to conduct all of its public affairs in Spanish exemplifies this 
kind of localized language solution. See, e.g., Hillary Durgin, Will El Cenizo's Present Be America's 
Ma?ana?, Fin. Times, Sept. 4, 1999, at 5; Thaddeus Herrick, Spanish Official Language in "Safe 
Haven 
" 
Border City, Hous. Chron., Aug. 14,1999, at Al. 
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accommodate jurors who do not speak English reflects a kind of territorial 
solution that strives to protect the rights of individuals engaged in the pub 
lic sphere.227 The court's decision both protected the rights of non-English 
speakers to serve on juries and reinforced the state's more general interest 
in promoting the status of non-English-speaking language groups.228 While 
such an interpretation of the rights associated with political participation 
might not be generalizable to other parts of the country, and thus not cog 
nizable as universal, portable rights, this event in New Mexico offers a 
clear example of "Our Federalism" at work.229 A framework that incorpo 
rates culture into the public sphere in order to protect the individual's abil 
ity to associate freely, within the communities of one's choice, reflects the 
ultimate, hybrid expression of freedom. As I demonstrate in the next Part, 
encouraging participation in the institutions of social life requires harmo 
nizing the interests of groups and individuals, which in turn depends on 
openness to multilingualism. 
III 
LANGUAGE AND PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Articulating a set of participatory practices for all democratic societies 
is beyond the scope of this Article. Because language law and policy must 
reflect specific institutional and national contexts both, any such generali 
zations will be limited in their accuracy and utility. I offer the United States 
as a case study, however, to develop the idea of multilingual participation 
through examples, and to demonstrate that American legal culture contains 
resources to support a theory of language rights. The federalist structure of 
our Constitution, designed in part to encourage experimentation in govern 
ance, is helpful in managing the diversity that may seem unwieldy at the 
national level. Furthermore, our culture of constitutional rights and self 
government also contains ample resources and vocabulary to facilitate the 
cultural dimensions of politics. Principles of freedom of association, paren 
tal autonomy, and freedom of conscience all can be understood as having 
cultural components. 
In the discussion that follows, I consider several of the most common 
sites and forms of language conflict in the United States: the political cam 
paign, the English-only law, the English-only workplace rule, and the de 
bate over language education. I consider how lawmakers and members of 
the public can manage language difference in each context to maximal 
227. The court delivered its opinion from the bench. For discussion of the opinion, see Elizabeth 
Amon, Breaking a Language Bar in N.M., Nat'l L.J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A13. See also Marilyn Haddrill, 
The Language of Justice: NM Ruling Allowing Non-English-Speaking Jurors Draws Notice, Dallas 
Morning News, Mar. 8,2000, at 21 A. 
228. See Amon, supra note 227. 
229. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971) (explaining the doctrine of "Our 
Federalism" as "policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings"). 
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participatory effect. I draw on tools available at all levels of organiza 
tion: federal, state, local, and civil society. Although different legal and 
political resources exist to channel participatory objectives in each case, I 
converge in each case on multilingual rather than monolingual presump 
tions. 
But before turning to specifics, it is important to note that developing 
strategies to meet the participatory goals outlined in Part II requires two 
perspectives on the language question: a rights perspective and a policy 
one. As the Canadian case suggests, a rights-based framework will be a 
crucial component of promoting participation in a multilingual setting, be 
cause the rights and participation frameworks reinforce one another. On the 
one hand, language rights work as the engines of participation: protecting 
certain individual rights promotes personal autonomy, which powers the 
social engagement that a healthy democracy requires. Actual participation 
in social decision making, particularly over matters of deeply personal 
concern, heightens individuals' sense of control over their place in society 
and therefore makes them more confident and better social actors. On the 
other hand, by participating in important social institutions, individuals 
honor the personal integrity whose protection is at the core of rights-based 
theory. 
Rights-based thinking alone, however, will not be sufficient, as many 
of the interests at stake in the language debate will not be best articulated in 
the form of rights. We must also think in terms of policy. Language-related 
discourse and the rules that emerge from that discourse, such as 
English-only laws, have important symbolic or expressive effects, because 
they emit cultural signals about general attitudes toward linguistic differ 
ence and language minorities. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, 
when thinking about how to structure certain institutions, language should 
be thought of as a value. Consequently, linguistic interests will compete 
with other social values for primacy and resources, and such interests 
might be advanced in different ways for different groups depending on 
their preferences. 
A. The Symbolic Politics of Language Use 
Understanding the value of recognizing language minorities through 
symbolic politics is the first step in crafting a participatory strategy. By 
symbolic politics, I mean the use of cultural symbols, such as language, in 
political discourse to signal solidarity with or appreciation of certain mi 
nority groups. Symbolic politics are important, particularly in multiethnic 
democracies, because "symbols that make national identities feel secure" 
anchor the notion that peaceful coexistence among groups is possible.230 
230. Magnet, supra note 40, at 427-28. 
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Indeed, the multiculturalist insight into the "ritualistic," language-specific 
component of political communication231 underscores the danger of calling 
for a single public language in a society of complex, overlapping linguistic 
sub-units. A heavy preference for monolingualism will limit the forms of 
political expression available to a citizenry and risk alienating nondomi 
nant segments of society from politics. 
The 2002 Democratic primary in the Texas gubernatorial race offers a 
poignant example of how largely symbolic uses of languages other than 
English confer recognition and therefore encourage loyalty to the body 
politic. The two candidates, both Mexican American, elected to hold an 
entirely Spanish-language debate-the first event of its kind in Texas poli 
tics.232 The need to communicate with monolingual Spanish speakers did 
not motivate the decision, as most Texan voters who speak Spanish also 
speak English. Rather, the recognition that a Spanish-language debate 
would have a unique ritualistic resonance with a largely bilingual audience 
mobilized the politicians. Similarly, the GOP's recent efforts to fund 
Spanish-language instruction for its candidates, as well as the ever 
expanding efforts of politicians on both sides of the aisle to incorporate 
Spanish into their stump speeches, reflect an awareness of the salience of 
non-English, even for English speakers.233 
Symbolic uses of language are compelling because they include char 
acteristics traditionally reserved for private life in public discourse.234 This 
kind of symbolic politics enables people to assert ownership over some 
aspect of public life and is thus based on the same assumption that supports 
practices such as bilingual legislative enactment in officially bilingual so 
cieties.235 Behind the Canadian prescription that all laws must be enacted in 
both French and English rests a belief that the people should see 
themselves as the authors of their laws and the owners of their 
231. Kymlicka, supra note 77, at 213. 
232. See Mercedes Olivera, Will Latinos' Gains Matter in November?, Dallas Morning News, 
Mar. 16, 2002, at 30A (noting that the "primary elections were historic for many reasons 
.... [I]t was 
the first time candidates for Texas governor... debated in Spanish on television"); R.G. Ratcliffe, 
Morales Bid Still Effective Minus Funds, Hous. Chron., Mar. 7, 2002, at A17 (noting that the debate 
"made history as the nation's first televised debate in Spanish between major candidates"). 
233. William E. Gibson, President Stops at Miami Catholic Church to Surprise and Applause of 
Parishioners, Sun-Sentinel, Nov. 1, 2004, at 1A ("Bush delivered his well-practiced stump 
speech ... adding a few words of Spanish"); Gary Martin, Pollsters: Big Race Remains Heated, San 
Antonio Express News, Oct. 2, 2004, at 11B ("Both campaigns have spent the year targeting the 
emerging Latino political force with Spanish language advertising and stump speeches that include cute 
and catchy phrases in Espa?ol [sic]."). 
234. This recent move by the GOP is ripe for a cynical interpretation: Republicans would rather 
appeal to an ethnic nostalgia to win Latino votes than address issues of particular concern to Latinos. 
But even if this is the case, the attempt still reflects an awareness of the political dimensions of 
language difference. And detractors should be careful about emphasizing too vehemently a critique that 
assumes Latino voters are superficial. 
235. See Silver, supra note 53, at 693 (discussing underrepresentation of Francophones in the 
public service). 
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government.236 In this vein, at least one American state has adopted an 
English-plus resolution that gives quasi-official status and symbolic recog 
nition to a language other than English.237 While such recognition remains 
largely symbolic, it challenges the monolingual version of American iden 
tity behind the typical English-only measure. These resolutions also mark 
the multilingual heritage of a community and suggest the possibility of 
state accommodation of languages other than English in response to demo 
graphic evolution. 
Of course, despite the value of symbolic politics, for cultural recogni 
tion to bring people into the political community successfully, it must traf 
fic in more than ritual and image. The measures adopted in Canada to 
address the language question suggest that something more powerful than 
symbolism motivates efforts to manipulate the visage linguistique.238 
Behind the desire to insert linguistic symbols into public life lies a concern 
not just for status, but also for control.239 Symbolic statements purporting to 
recognize a group's legitimacy, even if constitutional in nature, do little to 
facilitate interaction among different linguistic groups. Nor will most sym 
bolic statements, on their own, broaden the public sphere to include the 
members of the linguistic group so recognized. As a result, the participa 
tory account requires that we assess whether the linguistic rules that actu 
ally govern mid-level social institutions improve or reduce the quality and 
breadth of the people's participation in those institutions. 
B. Official English Laws and Self-Government 
To understand how to make the transition from symbolic uses of lan 
guage to truly participatory language policies, it is helpful to consider the 
English-only laws that were a flashpoint of the language wars of the 1990s 
and that remain a persistent, though less frequently discussed, phenomenon 
today.240 Such laws have been assessed traditionally in antisubordination or 
236. See id. 
237. See, e.g., Resolution of the New Mexico Legislature (Mar. 1989), reprinted in Bill Piatt, 
Only English? Law and Language Policy in the United States 25 (1990). 
238. This term is invoked to describe Quebec's attempts to regulate the language of commercial 
signs and firm names. 
239. See Macmillan, supra note 59, at 113 (quoting Conseil de la Langue Fran?aise, an advisory 
body that urged the premier to reinstitute French-only requirement to protect visage linguistique). 
240. At least twenty-two states had official English laws on the books in 2005. See Peter W. 
Schroth, Language and Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 17, 17-18 (1998) ("[I]n recent years over twenty of 
the fifty states have felt their English-speaking ethnicity sufficiently threatened to require statutes or 
state constitutional provisions declaring English their official language_"). The exact count of 
official English laws depends on the type of statute counted as an official language enactment. South 
Dakota, for example, has passed a statute declaring English the "common language." S.D. Codified 
Laws ? 1-27-20 (1995). Under Hawaii law, both English and Hawaiian are official languages. See 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 1-13 (LexisNexis 2005). 
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status-based terms.241 The scholarly concern has been that English-only 
laws push the limits of the Equal Protection Clause by establishing an eth 
nicity-based classification without a legitimate state purpose.242 But al 
though such statutes have symbolically exclusionary implications, it is 
notoriously difficult to demonstrate that they reflect animus against minori 
ties, rather than a more benign intent to affirm the obvious dominance of 
English.243 Indeed, whether such laws have actual subordinating effects is 
unclear. 
Under my participatory framework, I would not categorize an 
English-only law as presumptively invalid. Instead, I would evaluate the 
law based on how it affects the relationship between the people and the 
state. Under this framework, courts would scrutinize the limitations such 
laws place on the ability of the individual to both comprehend and structure 
her relationship with the state. This type of inquiry embodies an important 
participatory interest; whether one thinks the state-participant relationship 
should be involved or minimal, it remains central in a participatory democ 
racy. The accessibility and credibility of public institutions shapes a per 
son's willingness to engage with the public sphere. In fact, in recognition 
of its importance, state courts have safeguarded the state-participant rela 
tionship using the free-speech principles of their state constitutions,244 and 
the federal courts have protected it by articulating general access-to 
government rights based on the requirements of due process.245 
241. See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 503, 582-89 (1998) (noting the standard equal protection approach to assessing English-only laws 
and offering a First Amendment alternative on the ground that the use of Spanish is political, 
solidaristic speech and that the suppression of Spanish reflects an assumption that it is an inferior 
language); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural 
Pluralism, and Official English, 11 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 356-71 (1992) (developing the equal protection 
argument). 
242. For a discussion of these sorts of claims, see generally Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 161-72. 
243. See generally Murray, supra note 241 (discussing courts' rejection of constitutional claims 
against official English laws). 
244. See infra notes 246-49 (discussing Oklahoma and Alaska free speech cases). 
245. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that, as it applies to cases 
implicating the right of access to the courts, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act constitutes a 
valid exercise of Congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also id. at 
523 (detailing different types of access rights, including access to courts, procedural due process rights, 
right to trial by jury, and right of access to criminal proceedings); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 
(1977) (requiring that access to courts be "adequate, effective, and meaningful"); Ex parte Hull, 312 
U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (striking down prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from filing habeas corpus 
petitions unless state official determines them to be "properly drawn"); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio 
R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) ("The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In 
an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly 
government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship...."); Harbury v. 
Deutsch, 233 F.3d 596, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that government cover-ups can infringe upon 
right of access to courts); Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
county must "make each county service, program, and activity, when viewed in its entirety, readily 
accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities"). 
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In a 2002 decision, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied on this 
type of access-to-government principle to strike down an official English 
law.246 The court held that an initiative petition declaring English the offi 
cial language violated the state constitution's free-speech provision.247 In so 
doing, the Court emphasized the importance of freedom of speech "in the 
political context," articulating a broad conception of that context: 
[p]rotection of [political] freedoms is an essential part of the right 
to participate in self-government. Information and meaningful 
discussion are necessary for a self-governing society. There should 
be no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas 
concerning self-government; nor should there be a threat of 
liability that causes self-censorship.248 
According to the court, the English-only law, which barred the state's pub 
lic institutions from using languages other than English, impeded individu 
als' access to information and resources necessary for self-government.249 
Because the purpose of the freedom of speech, under this view, is to pro 
mote self-government, the protection of speech requires protecting the 
means through which individuals communicate with the state. The interests 
of state speakers, as well as of the listening public, require safeguarding not 
only the freedom to say what one wants, but also the manner in which ones 
says it.250 
Though based on compelling principles, the court's conclusion con 
tains a serious analytical flaw. The court found a free-speech violation, but 
it did not impose an obligation on the state to provide information and ser 
vices in languages other than English to the public. But if such services are 
not constitutionally required, and the state chooses not to provide them, 
does that not mean that the threat to self-government posed by linguistic 
inaccessibility is inescapable? Reliance on free-speech principles, which 
are not typically understood to impose affirmative obligations on states, to 
assess English-only laws, is therefore a limited strategy-at least pragmati 
cally, if not conceptually. The most that this approach can accomplish is to 
preserve a space for administrative officials to exercise discretion in 
246. In re Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P.3d 123 (Okla. 2002). 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 127 (internal citations omitted). 
249. See id. A state court in Alaska struck down an English-only law for similar free speech 
reasons, citing the violation of the rights of citizens to receive information and ideas. Kritz v. Alaska, 
No. 3DI-99-12 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://www.alaskabar.org/ 
opinions/69.html (declaring unlawful an initiative that stated "[t]he English language is the language to 
be used by all public agencies in all government functions and actions"). 
250. In Y?iguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1996), the Ninth Circuit relied on the First 
Amendment to invalidate Arizona's highly restrictive English-only law. While the court based its 
holding on the free speech rights of public employees, the court also expressed concern for the speech 
rights of the receiving public. Id. at 932. 
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addressing the linguistic needs of the population, or to preserve the ability 
of lawmakers to craft formal and informal arrangements to accommodate 
different linguistic needs. 
Given these limitations, then, a court faced with a challenge to an 
English-only law only can ask certain types of questions to determine 
whether the law hinders self-government. Does the rule affect service 
delivery? Are the kinds of services affected integral or peripheral to fulfill 
ing the bargain between the people and the state? Does the law prohibit 
municipalities from operating in a non-English language, even when those 
municipalities have determined that their operations would be more effec 
tive were such services to be provided? Not all English-only laws are 
equally restrictive; some simply declare English to be part of the state's 
heritage,251 whereas others prohibit any government official from ever ut 
tering a word in a language other than English.252 Applying the self 
government framework, laws in the former category are likely to remain on 
the books, while laws in the latter category will face greater scrutiny. In 
states or localities with small linguistic minority populations, even laws in 
the latter category might have de minimis participatory effects, rendering 
them potentially permissible. Ultimately, by understanding English-only 
laws through the participatory lens, rather than discrediting them as mani 
festations of inequality, we begin to address the actual problem with the 
statutes-the possibility that they will interfere with the participant-state 
relationship, making government inaccessible to linguistic minorities. 
C. English-Only Rules and the Workplace 
The rise of the English-only workplace rule has eclipsed in signifi 
cance the debate over official language laws, at least for the time being. 
The controversy surrounds rules established by employers prohibiting the 
speaking of non-English languages in the workplace.253 The rules have ap 
peared in a variety of workplaces, and they take different forms, sometimes 
requiring employees to speak English during certain times of day and, in 
other instances, permitting only English to be spoken at all. In January 
2002, for example, the chief administrator of the Paterson, New Jersey, 
courthouse attempted to prohibit all courthouse employees from using 
251. See, e.g., Iowa Code ? 1.18 (2004) (declaring that "[throughout the history of Iowa and of 
the United States, the common thread binding individuals of differing backgrounds together has been 
the English language," and providing that many official acts must be in English, but also stating that 
government officials may use languages other than English). 
252. .See, e.g., Ariz. Const, art. XXVIII, ? 3 ("This State ... shall act in English and in no other 
language."). 
253. See, e.g., Jim Fitzgerald, Foreign-Born Doughnut Shop Manager Issues English-Only Edict, 
Assoc. Press, Mar. 18, 2005, at 1 (describing English-only rule adopted by Dunkin' Donuts manager in 
Yonkers, New York), http://www.nysun.com/article/10773. 
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languages other than English.254 Emphasizing the city's effort to "have 
bilingualism in every department," the city's mayor quickly declared that 
the judge had no such authority,255 underscoring the incompatibility of such 
workplace rules with the objectives of public workplaces serving multilin 
gual populations. In the private sector, these rules affect both blue-collar 
workers in the service sector and white-collar and professional workers in 
settings such as hospitals.256 Some states have passed statutes prohibiting 
workplace language restrictions absent an overriding business necessity257 
and thereby have accomplished through state regulation what federal civil 
rights litigation has struggled to deter. 
This practice appears to have emerged in the early 1980s, and com 
plaints lodged with the EEOC quintupled from 1996 to 2000.258 National 
origin-related complaints, which often include challenges to English-only 
rules, represent one of the fastest growing sources of complaints to the 
Commission.259 And the dramatic immigration to this country, highlighted 
in Part I, promises to fuel the proliferation of English-only regulations in 
public and private workplaces. 
Although I explore the participatory consequences of English-only 
workplace rules elsewhere,260 a detour into the Title VII litigation on this 
question will help explain the emerging participatory need for limitations 
on such rules.261 Whereas many complaints over English-only workplace 
rules have settled, a number of them have reached the federal courts as 
cases alleging disparate impact on the basis of national origin.262 The courts 
254. See Robert Hanley, Judge's English-Only Directive Rescinded by Paterson Mayor, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 18,2002, at B5. 
255. Id. 
256. See Cristina M. Rodr?guez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 104 NW. U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2006) (discussing the different contexts in which such rules have arisen). 
257. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code ? 12951 (Deering 2005) (codifying California Fair Employment 
and Housing Commission regulations, which prohibit workplace language restrictions unless "[t]he 
language restriction is justified by a business necessity" and "[t]he employer has notified its employees 
of the circumstances and the time when the language restriction is required to be observed and of the 
consequences for violating the language restriction"). 
258. .See, e.g., Carlos R. Soltero & Keith Strama, English-Only Rules in the Workplace in Texas, 
64 Tex. J. Bus. L. 130,131 (2001) (noting the increasing commonality of English-only workplace rules 
in Texas); Shim, supra note 66 (noting the increase in complaints to the EEOC about the existence of 
English-only rules in the workplace, and attributing the rise to a number of factors, including EEOC 
outreach to employees and employers). 
259. See Colorado Casino to Pay $1.5 Million to Settle EEOC National Origin Bias Case, Daily 
Labor, July 21, 2003, at A-10 (noting that charges of national origin discrimination increased by 28% 
from 1995 to 2002). 
260. .See generally Rodriguez, supra note 256. 
261. I have explored the participatory consequence of these rules more fully elsewhere. Id. 
(analyzing the various types of English-only rules, assessing the EEOC s national enforcement strategy 
against these rules, and proposing an alternative to Title VII litigation as a means of regulating the 
practice). 
262. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding English-only policy); 
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Kania v. Archdioceses of Philadelphia, 14 F. 
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tend to dismiss these suits on the ground that no prima facie case of na 
tional origin discrimination can be established by bilingual plaintiffs based 
on the mere existence of an English-only rule.263 
In reaching this conclusion, however, the courts seem to contemplate 
the possibility that such rules, if imposed on employees who do not speak 
English at all, have a cognizable impact. Of course, the bilingual persons 
affected by such rules are nearly as likely to be disproportionately national 
origin minorities as the affected non-English-speaking employees. The 
only explanation for the difference in the courts' approach is that they un 
derstand the nature of the impact in each case to be distinct. In the case of 
workers unable to speak English, some courts seem to fear the possibility 
that English-only rules might isolate them socially by silencing them, or 
leaving them unable to communicate at all. This fear reflects a conception 
of the workplace as a social setting where communication plays an impor 
tant role in connecting the individual to his environment.264 Bilinguals, 
however, remain able to communicate in the face of an English-only rule; 
in the courts' view, their ability to comply with the rule amounts to the ca 
pacity to engage in self-help, and the effects of the rules on bilinguals are 
therefore de minimus.265 
Without question, the impact of an English-only rule on the bilingual 
worker is less severe than the impact on the non-English speaker. But the 
difference is ultimately one of degree, not of kind. The impact on both 
types of speakers is a participatory one. English-only rules limit the capac 
ity of linguistic minorities to be a full part of and form relationships in a 
very basic social institution. The rules disrupt associative dynamics in the 
workplace, and they create a rift between the workplace and the commu 
nity in which the workplace is situated. By forcing minority languages out 
of public spaces, such rules also make it potentially more difficult for mi 
nority communities to sustain their native languages-the essential glue 
that keeps individuals at various stages of assimilation connected to one 
another. In other words, these rules interfere not just with employees' ex 
pressive interests, or their interests in displaying individuality through cer 
tain behaviors, but also with their associative interests, or their interests in 
interacting with others, both in and out of the workplace. These associative 
interests should be protected primarily because the workplace functions not 
Supp. 2d 730 (1998) (dismissing Title VII disparate impact claim on ground that no impact arose but 
permitting retaliation claim to go forward); see also Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 894 F. 
Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that employees failed to establish prima facie case of disparate 
impact under Title VII). 
263. See supra note 262. 
264. See, e.g., id. at 1488 ( "[N]on-English speakers cannot enjoy the privilege of conversing on 
the job if conversation is limited to a language they cannot speak."); see also 29 C.F.R. ? 1606.7(a) 
(EEOC guideline establishing that English-only rule may "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, 
and intimidation"). 
265. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993). 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2006] LANGUAGE AND PARTICIPATION 757 
only as a commercial setting, but also as a social institution-an intuition 
buttressed by a growing literature portraying the workplace as a site where 
significant social bonds take shape.266 
By challenging the validity of these rules, I do not mean to suggest 
that employers never can justify imposing them on their employees. 
Non-English speakers may well use language to isolate and harass fellow 
workers unable to comprehend them, and such harassment certainly has 
participatory consequences. Choosing a blanket prohibition instead of a 
more targeted disciplinary rule, however, allows employers to overreach. 
Indeed, the linguistic and conversational complexity of many workplaces, 
where multiple conversations among shifting groups of people occur si 
multaneously, undermines the claim that English-only rules will always 
make the workplace more collegial. Whether the rules promote collegiality 
depends, in part, on the composition of the workplace, the community from 
which the employer draws its workforce, and the community the employer 
serves. Increased scrutiny of English-only rules may make it more difficult 
for employers to police the workplace, and they may place employees who 
do not understand non-English at an occasional disadvantage vis-a-vis their 
coworkers. But given the multilingual nature of our population, most indi 
viduals will experience this cost. Moreover, these consequences reflect the 
costs of pursuing an objective outlined in Part II: spreading the burden of 
integrating minorities and immigrants across the population by expecting 
English speakers to tolerate some discomfort in their environments. This 
objective is a participatory one, not just because it more effectively inte 
grates minority workers into social institutions such as the workplace, but 
also because it imposes an appropriate social responsibility on the popula 
tion as a whole to confront and absorb the diversity generated by immigra 
tion. Some states, such as California and Illinois, have gone so far as to 
pass laws prohibiting English-only rules in the workplace.267 These laws 
recognize that such rules not only interfere with the right to work, but also 
threaten to isolate employees.268 Such laws, ultimately, derive their regula 
tory force from a participatory conception of the workplace. 
266. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 119, at 7 ("The workplace is the single most important site of 
cooperative interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the family."). 
267. See Cal. Gov't Code ? 12951 (Deering 2005); 775 III. Comp. Stat. 5/2-102 (2005). A 
similar bill, establishing that an employer "commits an unlawful employment practice if the employer 
requires an employee who is bilingual or multilingual to speak only English while at the workplace," 
has been introduced in the Texas legislature but has not become law. See H.B. 3379, 2003 Leg., 78th 
Sess. (Tex. 2003). 
268. Cf. Matkov Salzman, New Illinois Law Declares Blanket "English-Only" Work Rules 
Unlawful Discrimination, in Emp. L. Update 1 (Jan. 2004). 
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D. Language Education and Two- Way Integration 
No account of multilingualism and participation would be complete 
without extended treatment of the most explosive issue in this country's 
language debates-bilingual education. In many societies with multilingual 
populations, public education rests at the heart of the language question.269 
Minority language education represents the chief survival mechanism for a 
language, because in the educational context, a language's fate is sealed. 
For some multilingual societies, such as Canada, this realization has gener 
ated constitutionally protected minority educational rights.270 But in the 
United States, the only language-based educational "right" that exists is the 
statutory right of non-English-speaking students to programs that assist 
them in overcoming language barriers, or the right to learn English.271 
Nonetheless, the sprawling debate over bilingual education in the 
United States presents a particularly useful lens through which to examine 
language and participation. After all, the public schools bear the chief re 
sponsibility for cultivating individuals capable of participating in society, 
and they represent the social institutions of most immediate and local inter 
est, not just to parents, but to all those concerned with society's future. 
Language education also represents a matter of some urgency for school 
districts. Current immigration patterns are bringing "unprecedented 
diversity in cultural backgrounds and languages" into the classroom,272 not 
only in states that traditionally have had high numbers of immigrant chil 
dren in their schools, but also increasingly in urban, rural, and suburban 
schools across the country.273 The bilingual education debate ultimately 
forces us to confront the question of whether it ever makes participatory 
sense for the state to promote bilingualism, or the persistence of minority 
languages. 
The answer to this question is complex. On the one hand, a participa 
tory approach to language education demands acceptance of English 
language acquisition as a means of promoting advancement and integration 
for all children. On the other hand, the participatory approach also de 
mands that we reorient the framework through which we debate language 
education policy. We should understand what states have lost by banning 
the use of native language instruction for limited English proficient 
269. See, e.g., Pierre Foucher, Language Rights and Education, in Language Rights in Canada 
258 (Michel Bastarache ed., 1987). 
270. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), 
? 23 (Can.). 
271. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
272. Marcelo Su?rez-Orozco, Peter D. Roos & Carola Su?rez-Orozco, Cultural, Educational, and 
Legal Perspectives on Immigration: Implications for School Reform, in Law and School 
Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity 162 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
273. See id. at 162-63 (noting a defining characteristic of immigration today: for a variety of 
familial and economic reasons, immigrants are moving from traditional gateway cities and states to 
communities less accustomed to coping with linguistic and cultural diversity). 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2006] LANG UA GE AND PARTICIPATION 759 
students (LEPs). And we should understand what states have gained 
through educational reforms that promise bilingual education for native 
and non-native speakers of English. 
Though the bilingual education debate in the United States involves 
these two dimensions-English-language acquisition and native language 
maintenance-the law only emphasizes one of them-the acquisition of 
English. In Lau v. Nichols,274 the Supreme Court held that the San Fran 
cisco public schools violated their obligations under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide programs for LEP students of 
Chinese ancestry to assist them in learning English. The essential premise 
of Lau-that all students must have adequate access to English-language 
instruction-is sound under the participatory formulation.275 Access to the 
dominant medium of communication is a basic prerequisite for effective 
and meaningful participation, a conclusion consistent with the overriding 
bilingual ethos of my participatory account. 
But in the decades since Lau, courts, commentators, and administra 
tive agency officials have battled over whether fulfilling these obligations 
requires bilingual education that includes native-language instruction, or 
whether English immersion classes are sufficient.276 With one outlying and 
dated exception, no court has held that Title VI requires bilingual education 
specifically.277 But it was not until recently that states began prohibiting 
schools from using LEP students' native languages in teaching them Eng 
lish and other subjects.278 While such native language bans, passed through 
popular referenda in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, do not 
274. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566. 
275. Id. at 565 (noting that "those who do not understand English are certain to find their 
classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way meaningful"); id. at 568 ("Where 
inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group children 
from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must 
take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to 
these students.") (internal citations omitted). 
276. For a detailed discussion of the case law and statutes through which the debate can be traced, 
see Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 209-16. For important reference points in this debate, see Equal 
Educational Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. ?? 1701-1720, 1703(f) (1994) (providing that "no state shall 
deny equal educational opportunity to an individual... by ... the failure ... to take appropriate action 
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional 
programs" but not requiring bilingual education); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. 
No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Lau did not require schools to provide LEP 
students with a bilingual-bicultural education; rather, schools need only take affirmative steps to rectify 
language deficiencies); Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge to California initiative banning use of native language in instruction of LEP 
students). 
277. United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (imposing bilingual education as 
remedy in school desegregation suit). 
278. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ? 15-752 (LexisNexis 2005) ("[A]ll children in Arizona public schools 
shall be taught English by being taught in English..."); Cal. Educ. Code ? 305 (Deering 2005) 
("[A]ll children in California public schools shall be taught English by being taught in English."); 
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 71 A, ? 4 (LexisNexis 2005) (same). 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
760 CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 94:687 
necessarily impede LEPs' acquisition of English,279 they do hamper LEPs' 
retention of their native languages.280 Legal discussions rarely address re 
tention, or the impact of English-language instruction on the mother 
tongue. Courts consistently assume that retention is irrelevant to the rights 
of the children, who will be served best by being given access to the 
American mainstream.281 But this blindness to retention undermines impor 
tant constitutional interests of parents and children and ignores the poten 
tial participatory value of native language instruction and retention. I 
address these two consequences in turn. 
To understand how the elision of native language affects rights central 
to democracy, we must first focus on the nature of language education. 
Language instruction transmits an important tool and a culture resource 
from an authority figure to a child.282 Parents, by virtue of being parents, 
have a profound interest in cultural transmission; children share this inter 
est, because it facilitates their relationships with their parents and commu 
nities. And this interest-in intimate, familial, association-is at the core of 
the so-called concept of ordered liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.283 
Given the nature of the transmission at stake, then, both existing law 
and liberal theory support protecting parents' decision making authority in 
the area of language instruction. Indeed, it is precisely in the educational 
context that our analysis must account for the individual's liberty interest 
in controlling his or her cultural destiny. To be sure, it may seem as if the 
279. For a discussion of the mixed social science data on this point, see, e.g., Wayne P. Thomas 
& Virginia P. Collier, A National Study of School Effectiveness for Language Minority 
Students' Long-Term Academic Achievement (2003), http://www.crede.ucsc.edu/research/ 
llaa/1.l_final.html (concluding, inter alia, that English language learners immersed in the English 
mainstream because their parents refused services showed large decreases in reading and math 
achievement by fifth grade). 
280. Laura Alamillo & Celia Viramontes, Reflections from the Classroom: Teacher Perspectives 
on the Implementation of Proposition 227, 24 Bilingual Res. J. 1, 12 (2006), available at 
http://brj.asu.edu/v2414/pdf/arll.pdf (noting that after the implementation of this ban, "teachers have 
witnessed an overall negative effect on second language learners' cultural and linguistic identity"). 
281. See, e.g., Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15 (rejecting equal protection challenge to 
California's Proposition 227, which banned bilingual education, and noting that language debate is 
about "which system will... enable [children] to function as American citizens and enjoy the 
opportunities and privileges of life in the United States"). 
282. Simon H. Cheng & Wen H. Kuo, Family Socialization of Ethnic Identity Among Chinese 
American Pre-Adolescents, 31 J. of Comp. Fam. Stud. 463, 464 (2000) ("Through teaching family 
languages and ethnic cultures, immigrant children learn to identify with their parents' nationalities and 
thus develop an ethnic consciousness distinct from mainstream society."); Bernhard Nauck, 
Intercultural Contact and Intergenerational Transmission in Immigrant Families, 32 J. of Cross 
Cult. Psych. 159, 168 (2001) ("[LJanguage retention [by an immigrant child of her parents' language] 
increases its direct effect on the child's ethnic identification."). 
283. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska law prohibiting 
teaching of any modern language other than English violates Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests, 
including pupils' rights to acquire knowledge, parents' power to control their children's education, and 
language teachers' liberty). 
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child's interest has been lost in this formulation. But children remain 
largely powerless whether the parent or the state makes decisions for them. 
And given that this particular debate focuses on public schools, and not on 
parents' rights to remove their children from public schools altogether, the 
English language acquisition right already recognized by the law satisfies 
the child's interest in integration into a world beyond his or her family.284 
But the question remains: would this analysis have a legal/doctrinal 
upshot? State referenda banning native language instruction affect only 
public schools, where states have a certain amount of authority to regulate 
and constrain parental choices. As noted above, with one exception, courts 
have never constitutionally required bilingual or bicultural education;285 
constitutional resources do not extend far enough to require bilingual edu 
cation or to differentiate between the groups who might be entitled to it. 
Further, courts have proven ill-equipped to police the types of decisions 
that must be made in creating language education programs. Such deci 
sions hinge on the demographic characteristics of the school district in 
question, the availability of competent teachers, and the programmatic de 
mands on a resource pie of surely limited size. Finally, as an empirical 
matter, some parents actually prefer English immersion to bilingual educa 
tion programs,216 which, in many cities, have been hothouses for educa 
tional failure because of the lack of adequate resources to support quality 
programs.287 
284. The child, of course, also has an interest in quality language instruction. If English immersion 
were a more effective means of teaching English, then arguably the child's interest would be best 
served by English immersion programs, since the teaching of English to LEP students is a critical 
participatory objective. In fact, it is difficult to make claims of this kind. Despite the claims of its 
political critics, bilingual education generally has not been an abject failure. Considerable research 
supports the conclusion that students in properly designed bilingual programs consistently outperform 
peers in English-only classrooms. The research most critical of bilingual education suggests that it is 
slightly less effective than structural immersion programs, but also indicates that more research is 
needed to substantiate this claim. See Stephen D. Krashen, Condemned Without a Trial: Bogus 
Arguments Against Bilingual Education 49-51 (1999). More specifically, in the first few years 
after Californians passed Proposition 227, LEP students' test scores did go up, but the improvement 
occurred among students in bilingual classrooms, as well as students in English-only classrooms. See 
Patricia G?ndara, Learning English in California: Guideposts for the Nation, in Latinos: Remaking 
America 339, 349-50 (Marcelo M. Su?rez-Orozco & Mariela M. P?ez eds., 2002). 
285. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (ordering comprehensive 
bilingual education program to comply with Lau and Equal Educational Opportunity Act). 
286. Compare James Traub, The Bilingual Barrier, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1999, ? 6, at 32 ("A 
recent poll by Public Agenda, a non-partisan research organization, found that 75 percent of recent 
immigrants oppose bilingual instruction. Very few immigrants care about multiculturalism or 
bilingualism; they want their children to learn English as fast as possible in order to make it into the 
American mainstream, where good jobs are available_") with Mireya Navarro, For Parents, One 
Size Doesn't Fit All In Bilingual Education, Feb. 24, 2001, N.Y. Times, ? B, at 1 ("Some groups of 
parents, like the emigres from the former Soviet Union, seem overwhelmingly to reject bilingual 
education, while staunch supporters can be found among other groups?parents from Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, for example."). 
287. ?See, e.g., Su?rez-Orozco, Roos & Su?rez-Orozco, supra note 272, at 189-90 (observing that 
language programs often disserve LEP students not because of inherent problems with programs, but 
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In light of these constraints, the liberty interest in control over cultural 
transmission will serve, at most, to defend against state encroachment on 
family life. Applying the principles articulated above, states could be pro 
hibited from banning altogether the use of the native language in language 
education, which would leave decisions about complementary native lan 
guage instruction in the hands of parents and local school boards. The un 
derlying rationale would be that banning native language use is not an 
ordinary policy decision, but one that conflicts with constitutionally pro 
tected parental choice rights.288 This approach also would reinforce choice 
among policymakers, leaving them free, along with parents, to experiment 
with different forms of English immersion and native language use.289 That 
this approach offers a fair solution to the language education debate is un 
derscored by the fact that states like Massachusetts have made efforts to 
interpret native language bans as not covering bilingual programs for non 
LEP students.290 By understanding bilingual referenda to affect a basic lib 
erty interest, we accord parents of LEP students the same power over lan 
guage education given other parents in the same context. 
Restraining states in this way also would have important ancillary so 
cial benefits. First, parental control promotes social, democratic interests, 
because it helps preserve existing frameworks for managing pluralism.291 
because of "inept, passive-aggressive, or outright hostile administration"); see also H.D. Adamson, 
Language Minority Students in American Schools 231-32 (2005) ("Research shows that well 
run BE programs are effective. Research also shows that some BE programs are not as effective as they 
should be.... [S]ome programs have trained teachers, good materials, and community support, but 
others don't. Conclusions about the effectiveness of a BE program can only be generalized to other 
programs that have similar resources and students."); Jacques Steinberg, City's Bilingual Education 
Debated at Spirited Hearing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2000, ? B, at 4 ("Even staunch advocates of the 
city's bilingual system conceded ... that it was riddled with problems, as evidenced by the fact that one 
of every two students enrolled in such classes is still enrolled after three years, and often after eight 
years, even though such programs are intended to be transitional."). 
288. In California, the referendum banning bilingual education contained an exception permitting 
parents to seek waivers from the English-only requirement. Waivers were permitted under one of three 
conditions: if the child already knew English; if the child was over ten and the school believed another 
approach might better suit his or her needs; or if the school staff determined that the student had special 
needs that would be better addressed in another program. See G?ndara, supra note 284, at 344. 
289. See, e.g., Peter Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe 
Distance 122-23 (2003) (proposing that parents be given vouchers to choose among different types of 
language instruction in order to provide "broader parental information and choice, services tailored 
more closely to individual need," as well as "greater accountability by providers."). 
290. The Massachusetts legislature overrode Governor Romney's efforts to apply the referendum 
to two-way bilingual education programs. See Raphael Lewis & Michelle Kurtz, Legislature Loosens 
Law on English Immersion, Boston Globe, July 15, 2003, at Al; Jonathan Saltzman, Reinstating 
Two-Way Bilingual Ed Is Hailed, Boston Globe, July 20, 2003, ? Globe West, at 1 (quoting Governor 
Romney declaring legislature's actions a "demonstration of unfathomable arrogance" and describing 
two-way bilingual programs preserved in Massachusetts). 
291. Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us, Daedalus, Fall 2000, 
at 125, 139. Minow concludes that the existence of a system where parents have most of the 
responsibility for and control over the upbringing of their children "establishes a framework of 
pluralism and avoids state standardization of children." Id. at 139. Further, such a system keeps many 
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As Martha Minow has pointed out, "[p]arental autonomy, along with reli 
gious free exercise, is the chief instrument of cultural pluralism in this 
country."292 Like the free exercise protection afforded by the First 
Amendment, parental control reinforces the status of the individual as the 
ultimate decision maker in certain matters of personal and community con 
cern. Furthermore, parental control also operates as a decentralized check 
on the state's authority by empowering individuals to make decisions that 
reflect their own values. This is a power essential to the maintenance of a 
robust democracy in a pluralistic society. 
Second, native language bans make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
take advantage of the bridging capacity of bilinguals. If law restrains poli 
cymakers from ensuring native language retention alongside English acqui 
sition, then the bilingual resources needed to bridge the gaps between 
different linguistic communities never will be developed to their full capac 
ity. Relatedly, native language bans interfere with policymakers' ability to 
experiment with different types of language education. Such bans are 
wholly inconsistent with the experimental form of democratic participation 
I emphasize in Part II, because they remove a key piece of the policy puz 
zle through a top-down, uniform solution masquerading as a populist re 
form effort. In the education context, in particular, experimentalists 
emphasize that successful reforms have been based on "solutions lying 
between top-down standards and bottom-up school-based reform,"293 and 
that responsive and sound educational policy depends on the involvement 
of parents, civil society groups, and governmental actors alike.294 And ex 
perts on the education of LEPs stress that the complexity of these students' 
concerns demands collaboration among community advocates, parents, 
educators, and researchers.295 Native language bans thwart this dynamic 
process. 
In emphasizing the importance of experimentation in this area, my 
claim is not that native language instruction should always be employed. 
Rather, my point is that something as central to education as the student's 
native language represents an indispensable input in the policy-making 
process. Under existing constitutional structures as understood by the 
courts, we have no good legal mechanism through which to articulate and 
resist interference with policy collaboration-a factor that gives the 
decisions that affect children private, "avoiding both public controversies and public responsibility 
about everything from what constitutes appropriate moral instruction to what for children are decent 
standards of living, medical services, and time with loving adults." Id. 
292. Id. 
293. .See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 191; see also Su?rez-Orozco, Roos & Su?rez 
Orozco, supra note 272, at 179 (referencing studies concluding that relational aspects of schooling 
mean that top-down reforms cannot address concerns central to educating LEPs). 
294. .See generally Liebman & Sabel, supra note 116, at 191. 
295. See Su?rez-Orozco, Roos & Su?rez-Orozco, supra note 272, at 164. 
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rights-based approach a strategic salience for now. A rethinking of stan 
dard ideas of federalism and decentralization along the lines suggested by 
democratic experimentalists may point in a new and productive direc 
tion.296 For the time being, we can begin with the policy observation that 
the trend toward native language bans in the education of linguistic minor 
ity children disrupts crucial participatory objectives. Freeing local schools 
and parents from the constraints imposed by the bans would open up im 
portant democratic space, in the sense that it would permit the parties di 
rectly involved in the educational relationship to respond with maximum 
flexibility to the needs and concerns of parents and children. 
To be sure, emphasizing the experimental possibilities that would be 
restored by a rolling back of the native language bans necessarily tempers 
claims made on behalf of parental control, because the collaborative proc 
ess requires both flexibility on the part of interested parties as well as in 
volvement by bureaucracies of one kind or another. What is more, 
immigrant parents, in particular, will have difficulty becoming meaningful 
partners in school reform without some form of external financial and lo 
gistical support. A number of clear obstacles stand in the way of their par 
ticipation: inability to speak English, lack of familiarity with the American 
educational system, inability to vote and status as outsiders to local poli 
tics, and economic disadvantage.297 And even once we recognize parents' 
liberty-based rights to control the law's reach, they must still fight over the 
resources needed to act on that right. A second-generation set of questions 
asking who will be entitled to what resources to create which programs will 
inevitably follow a constitutional assessment of a native language ban.298 
But acknowledging that parents have an interest of constitutional dimen 
sion at stake is not inconsistent with the conclusion that decisions about the 
types of programs to adopt in a given district must involve decision makers 
other than parents. Nor is it inconsistent with the conclusion that devising 
viable language education programs is better left to the policy realm than to 
constitutional litigation. 
When left free to experiment, there is evidence that school districts, 
together with parents and researchers, have devised creative innovations on 
traditional bilingual education programs. The new trend toward two-way 
bilingual education, or programs designed to help native English speakers 
296. .See supra notes 116 & 120 (discussing Sabel's conception of decentralized experimentation). 
297. See Su?rez-Orozco, Roos & Su?rez-Orozco, supra note 272, at 195-97. 
298. Limiting principles will have to govern resource allocation. Contrary to the claims of 
theorists who reject the rights-based paradigm for the framing of culture-based interests, a language or 
cultural right need not create an absolutist entitlement that imposes an inflexible mandate on the state. 
Cf. Richard Thompson Ford, Cultural Rights and Civic Virtue (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working 
Paper No. 99.2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract_idM78483. Apart 
from framing the constitutional dimension of language rights as primarily defensive, as I have done, 
statutorily created rights in the delivery of either public education or public services can be cabined by 
limiting principles. 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:48:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2006] LANG UA GE AND PARTICIPATION 765 
and non-native English speakers learn one another's languages, exempli 
fies the participatory benefits of decisions that embrace bilingualism in 
individuals and multilingualism in society. Miami-Dade County public 
schools, for example, have used a federal grant aimed at improving the ser 
vices provided to LEP students to embark on an ambitious language cur 
riculum.299 The school district has complemented traditional English as a 
Second Language (ESL) classes with a wide variety of language programs 
that benefit all language learners, including native English speakers. These 
programs offer Spanish for Spanish speakers, elementary Spanish as a sec 
ond language, and district-wide initiatives designed to ensure that all chil 
dren are exposed to two languages in a sixty percent English instruction, 
forty percent other language instruction format.300 The purpose of these 
programs "is to produce students who can communicate orally and in writ 
ing in English and in another language with proficiency commensurate 
with their ... educational level [and] age ... and who can interact 
effectively with groups using those languages."30' With this objective, the 
Miami-Dade schools are taking steps to harness language diversity as a 
participation-promoting value. Such programs integrate non-English speak 
ing students while enabling them to sustain preexisting linguistic ties to 
family and community. At the same time, they give monolingual English 
speakers heightened access to a linguistic subcommunity in their midst. In 
addition to the documented benefits to scholastic achievement,302 these 
programs represent deliberate attempts to restructure a public sphere to 
adapts to society's changing cultural characteristics. 
E. Final Thoughts on the American Case 
In exploring the most important arenas of language conflict in the 
United States, I have demonstrated how embracing bilingualism in indi 
viduals and multilingualism in society would encourage broad participation 
in public and social life. The language debate in the United States revolves 
most publicly around symbol and rhetoric-a tendency exemplified in at 
tempts by politicians to use Spanish to their electoral advantage, as well as 
299. See Miami-Dade County Public Schools, Bilingual Education and World Languages, 
http://bilingual.dadeschools.net/BEWL/programs.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (describing two-way 
bilingual education programs of Dade County Schools); see also Adamson, supra note 287, at 209-10 
(describing Coral Way Elementary program). 
300. David R. Schwandt & Timothy J. Tobin, Inst, for Educ. Policy Stud., Report on 
Title VII, Subpart I: Professional Development Activities, Miami-Dade County Public 
Schools (1999), http://www.ncela.gwu.edu/pubs/reports/profdev/. 
301. See id. 
302. See Thomas & Collier, supra note 279, http://www.crede.0rg/research/llaa/l.l_es.html 
("Native-English speakers in two-way bilingual immersion programs maintained their English, added a 
second language to their knowledge base, and achieved well above the 50th percentile in all subject 
areas on norm-referenced tests in English. These bilingually schooled students equaled or outperformed 
their comparison groups being schooled monolingually, on all measures."). 
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in the official English movement. But, more importantly, the debate rests at 
the heart of everyday interactions in our most important social institu 
tions-the workplace and the public schools. It unfolds through the daily 
attempts by workers, managers, school officials, and parents to deal with 
the linguistic consequences of an ever-expanding, non-English-speaking 
population. 
Once we set our goal as the promotion of participation, rather than the 
articulation of a coherent conception of national identity, it becomes clear 
that active promotion of bilingualism best serves our ends. In politics, the 
participatory conception means acknowledging the salient identities pre 
sent in the body politic. In government, ensuring accessibility and promot 
ing self-government mean developing the linguistic capacities of 
individuals and institutions and require leaving institutions with the discre 
tion to respond to the linguistic particularities of the communities they 
serve. And, in the schools where socialization occurs and the workplaces 
where we live out our adult lives, our aim should be to expand the individ 
ual's associative options. Particularly in the schools context, the participa 
tory objective depends on thinking in terms of adding to individual 
students' linguistic capacities and expanding their options for association, 
rather than in terms of replacing an old identity with a new one. These ob 
jectives will require acceptance of a certain amount of cacophony. But as 
this American case study underscores, emphasizing linguistic commonality 
as a prerequisite for participation dramatically oversimplifies the nature of 
interaction among individuals, among communities, and between commu 
nities and institutions in a large and deeply diverse society like the United 
States in 2006. 
CONCLUSION 
At the heart of this Article rests a concern for autonomy-for the abil 
ity of individuals to control their cultural destinies. All language rights de 
bates implicitly assume that the cultural dimension of identity formation 
and social interaction cannot be escaped. Indeed, in recognizing the cul 
tural dimension of citizenship, language must be central, not just because 
of its comprehensive character, but because it is the medium through which 
all choices must be made. The purpose of this Article has been to explore a 
new way of framing these debates within the framework of liberal democ 
racy. While the remediation of historical injustices, designed to promote 
language-group revival, will be necessary to the realization of democracy 
in many contexts, a multiethnic democracy should ultimately develop a 
participatory agenda suited to the linguistic dynamics that define its people. 
Although language rights have value as a mechanism for addressing the 
concerns of vocal national minorities, they have proven attractive precisely 
because language functions as a repository of our expressive capacities. 
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Language rights should therefore be designed to incorporate the interests of 
all cultural groups, regardless of their historical positions. While the argu 
ment for participation is not a claim for equal status among all languages or 
a call to abandon limiting principles that wisely reflect certain historical 
imperatives, it is an attempt to orient the discussion of language policy to 
ward the future. 
In the final analysis, the state cannot be neutral with respect to lan 
guage use. But the participatory ethic does not require neutrality. It only 
requires accepting certain limitations on the paradigm of single-language 
dominance, or acknowledging that the sociological primacy of the domi 
nant language does not, by definition, make a monolingual public sphere 
preferable to a multilingual one. Under the participatory formulation, we 
would understand the monolingual bias in countries like the United States 
not as a reflection of fear of or animus toward minorities, but as a failure of 
political imagination-as a rejection of the fundamentally democratic be 
lief in the value of heterogeneity. 
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